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ABSTRACT
The exclusive right afforded by patent protection to an inventor is in exchange for contribution
to the public domain of an enabling disclosure of the subject matter claimed. The requirement
of novelty and the prohibition against infringement are both based on statute, and linked in
well-established judicial precedent as "that which infringes, if later, anticipates, if earlier."
See, e.g., PairpearlProducts,Inc. v. Joseph H. Meyer Bros., 58 F.2d 802 (D.C.D.M.S.D. 1932).
Grant of a limited period of exclusivity to an inventor and interpretation of the scope of the
right given in exchange for complete disclosure have engendered the judicial doctrines
commonly known as inherent anticipation and experimental use. Analysis of three recent
cases illustrate how historical conceptions of inherency and experimental use doctrines can
greatly simplify determinations of the scope of exclusive rights under widely varying
circumstances so long as those rights are not confused with the inexorable capacity of thought
and a corollary right of exploration reserved to the public.
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A NEW DAY YESTERDAY:
BENEFIT AS THE FOUNDATION AND LIMIT OF EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS IN
PATENT LAW
N. SCOTT PIERCE*

If we were all destined for the same battles, life would have to be a
war without rest or truce; but since it happens, on the contrary, that
some objects become the property of each man, or in other words,
since there is property ownership, it follows from this that life is
possible; that the human species can exist in peace; that the natural
instinct of sociability that characterizesour species is not a deception
of our nature; that the work of yesterday serves the progress of
tomorrow.1

Antoine -Augustin Renouard

INTRODUCTION

Exclusive rights that are granted to inventors in exchange for disclosure to the
public of useful inventions are calculated to provide an incentive to the population as
a whole and to reward inventors for their discoveries. The period and scope of
exclusivity are limited in order to permit society to fully exploit an inventor's
contribution once the inventor has been given a reasonable opportunity to profit from
the invention without competition. As stated by Antoine-Augustin Renouard, the
French philosopher, patent rights are based on two propositions that must be
reconciled:
Therefore, here are two propositions, both of which are incontestable:
one, is that the legitimate rights of the inventor oppose the
exploration of the discovery made by his genius with complete
freedom of competition by whoever can understand it; the other, is
that each member of the human species has the right to freely use his
thought, regardless of where it comes from, and to impress on any
part of matter that he masters the form of the invention which he has
understood with his intellect and identified with his thought.

* Principal, Hamilton Brook Smith Reynolds, Concord, MA, and Adjunct Professor at Suffolk
University Law School. He can be reached at (978) 341-0036 and at scott.pierce@HBSR.com. The
author is solely responsible for the views of this article.
I ANTOINEAUGUSTIN RENOUARD, TRAITI DES BREVETS D'INVENTION (Rue de Tournon, No. 6
1825), p. 19.
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These two propositions, since they are both true, cannot be
irreconcilable, regardless of their apparent contradiction, since truth
has nothing to fear of being destroyed, fought, or even hindered, by
2
[another] truth; it is only incompatible with error.
For Renouard, these propositions were reconciled by a system of payment,
whereby a temporary, exclusive privilege is granted to the inventor.3
The
consequence of a temporary monopoly, according to Renouard, is freedom from
competition, which will "have the effect of raising the average price at which the
products will be delivered to consumers" 4 whereby "one is reduced to so feeble an
objection as the delay that the temporary monopoly could bring to reducing the price
of the products of the invention."5 Renouard is silent with respect to any delay in
advancements of technology consequent to grant of an exclusive right to the inventor.
However, as expressed above, reconciliation of the two propositions is contingent
upon limiting the "legitimate rights of the inventor" to freedom from competition in
the marketplace by substitute sources of his invention without limiting the right of
"each member of the human species ... to freely use his thought.
...6
The
temporary exclusive right of an inventor, therefore, should protect his freedom to
profit or otherwise exclude others from benefiting by his invention. However, the
benefit of his invention should not include the right to exclude discovery of the
manner in which it operates or to improve upon it. Such a right would limit the
public's source of thought and the consequent ability of the public to master "the form
of the invention which he has understood with his intellect and identified with his
7
thought."
Inherency and experimental use doctrines, as applied under U.S. patent law
through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, have recognized benefit as a
common limitation to the exclusive rights of patent protection. The inherency
doctrine, 8 which will bar patent protection for discovery or recognition of what is in
the public domain, typically does not include instances where the claimed
combination has not benefited the public, such as by trace, incidental, or even, under
some circumstances, unrecognized presence in the prior art.
Conversely, the
experimental use doctrine 9 limits the exclusive right of a patentee to the benefit
afforded by his discovery, which, consistent with reconciliation of the propositions
underlying patent protection articulated by Renouard, does not include the right to
bar others from "exploration of the discovery made by his genius."10 Viewed from a
linking vantage point of benefit, these doctrines can be employed to reward those who
advance "the work of yesterday to serve the progress of tomorrow"1 1 without
diminishing the rights of the public in what has gone before.
2 Id.
3

at 40.

Id.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 54.
6Id. at 40.
7 Id
8 In

ro Seaborg, 328 F.2d 996, 997-98 (C.C.P.A. 1964).

9 See, e.g., Roche v. Bolar, 733 F.2d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
10RENOUARD, supra note 1, at 40.

11Id. at 19.
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I.

DISCOVERY AND EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS IN PATENT LAW

Willard Phillips, in his 1837 treatise, The Law of Patents for Inventions, states
that patent protection is founded on principals of equity: "[tihe granting of patents is
not, accordingly, a mere matter of favor, as it has sometimes been represented by
judges, but an equitable and just claim upon the government, as much so as the
claim to protection of individual industry and private property." 12 The equity is an
establishment of positive law, which recognizes that "an inventor has not,
independently of positive laws, an exclusive property in his invention, any longer
than he keeps it secret." 13 Otherwise, inventors are precluded from exploiting their
inventions, since "tihey can, in general, at most only lock up their secrets in their
own breasts, not being able to turn it to any advantage to themselves, except by
' 14
means of a law enacted in their behalf."
Following the logic of Renouard, that there is no natural exclusive right to
invention, 15 Phillips more broadly asserts that "the fact of one person being the first
inventor or discoverer, affords no pretense for disenfranchising others of the right, in
their turn, of making and using the same discovery." 16 Positive law must recognize,
or limit, the natural right of others who may independently make the same discovery
if it is to protect an inventor beyond his personal knowledge and ability to exploit his
invention without disclosing it. Specifically, Phillips states that protections under
positive law should be of limited term, but as a matter of practicality, must operate
as an exclusive right as against all others who have made the same invention
without any assistance from his ingenuity:
If it be then admitted that he is equitably entitled to the exclusive use
and sale for a time, against all others who do not make use of the
same invention independently of him, and without deriving any hint
or facility from his prior ingenuity or experiments, we have sufficient
ground for a law giving him the exclusive right against all others for
a time, since it is a matter of law of too much difficulty and intricacy
of proof, to distinguish the cases of others who have made the same
invention without any assistance from his ingenuity, from those of
mere imitations. The law, in order to be practicable and convenient
to be administered, must give the exclusive right. To this point the
law is only an equitable regulation, which does not propose to deprive
others of any right on behalf of inventors, but incidentally deprives
12 WILLARD

PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS; INCLUDING THE REMEDIES IN

LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN RELATION TO PATENT RIGHTS 6 (American Stationers' Co. 1837).
"3 Id. at 7 (quoting RENOUARD, supra note 1, at 32).

Id. at 8.
1 Id. at 4. Phillips stated:
M. Renouard, the author of an elaborate French work on Patents, goes into
particular discussion of the question whether an inventor has, by the principles of
universal equity, and independently of the positive law, an exclusive right to his
invention; and he very satisfactorily establishes the conclusion to which every
mind is constrained to yield assent, that no such natural right exists.

14

-d.
16 Id.
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them of a right, which they would otherwise have, because it is
17
necessary for the purpose of doing justice to inventors.
The rights that members of the community are deprived of by positive law are
stated by Phillips to be "first, that of discovering or inventing that same thing,
independently of the prior invention, and that of using or vending it for a limited
time; and second, the right of profiting by the prior invention or discovery of another,
for a limited time." 18 The "grounds and motives" of such laws are stated by Phillips
to be "in the first place, to indemnify inventors, in the second to secure to the public
the benefit of inventions, and stimulate ingenious minds to make improvements, and
in the third place to reward the inventors as public benefactors, according to the
importance of their invention ....
"19
As explained by Phillips: "[iut is as M.
Renouard says, an exchange between the two parties, the inventor on one side, who
grants the community a new art or machine, and the community on the other, which
20
grants in return to the inventor, indemnity and compensation."
Phillips also stated that, "the great mass of useful inventions is made up, and
must be, not of what is altogether new, but improvements in what is already
practised [sic],"21 and the reward to the inventor for his discovery under law should
be commensurate with the benefit conferred on the public by the improvement:
Though the property in a discovery, therefore, like that in land,
originates in and is created by legislation, the right to such property
exists to an imperfect degree, independently of the positive laws. In
this view, Mr. Rawle remarks, that upon the provisions of the
[Cionstitution of the United States on this subject, that it was not
intended thereby to create rights, but merely to regulate those
already existing. The inventor has a right to keep his secret, and if
he discloses it he has a just claim to remuneration and reward,
according to the amount of his expenditure, and the importance of his
22
improvement.
As a practical matter, however, as with the inability under positive law to
"distinguish the cases of others who have made the same invention without any
assistance from his ingenuity, from those of mere imitations," 23 there is, likewise, an
inability to distinguish between those who base an improvement upon the subject
matter of another inventor's exclusive right and those who invent the same
improvement by virtue of their own inventive faculty only in view of other prior art.
In other words, it is too difficult to discern discovery made possible by disclosure of a
patented invention from that made possible by the remainder of the art of which that

17Id. at 6.
18 Id. at 5.
19Id. at 17.
20
21

Id.
Id. at 9.

22 Id.

at 8-9 (citing William Rawle on the U.S. Constitution, c. 9, p. 1 0 2 (1825)).

23 Id.

at 6.
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disclosure is now a part. Therefore, the opportunity for subsequent discovery should
be reserved to the public as a matter of equity.
Phillips summarizes "the principles and motives of patent laws" as "1, the
securing to the inventor the remuneration of his outlay; 2, a reward for his ingenuity,
and the benefit he confers on the community; and 3, to encourage and stimulate
invention and improvements."2 4 To grant an inventor an exclusive right over
discovery would be a reward for his ingenuity at the expense of the object of
encouraging and stimulating subsequent invention and improvement. Although
contributions to the art are benefits to the community that may be granted
exclusivity on the basis of equity, discovery of those contributions are not part of that
benefit, since discoveries, in themselves, are not, and have never been, the basis for
grant of exclusive rights in patent law. Rather, only improvements based on
discoveries have been granted an exclusive privilege. Therefore, the natural right of
discovery is reserved to the community from the grant of exclusivity consequent to a
contribution of an improvement in the art. Any benefit to the community of an
improvement derived from subsequent discovery should be granted exclusivity that is
limited to the improvement based on the subsequent discovery, subject to an existing
exclusive right of the first inventor. The right to discovery is not part of the grant of
a patent because, in contrast to other benefits conferred upon the community by use
of an invention, society's ability to progress would be impeded, contrary to the
"principles and motives of patent laws." 25

II. GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF EXPERIMENTAL USE AND INHERENCY DOCTRINES
A. Experimental Use

1. DistinctionBetween Experimental Use and StatutoryExclusivity in Early Case
Law
A distinction between the benefit of an invention to the public for which an
inventor is to be rewarded, and discovery associated with it as a natural right
unimpeded by positive law, can be found in very early court decisions. The most
famous of these cases is Whittemore v. Cutter, 6 in which Justice Story introduced
what was later to become known as the "experimental use" 27 exception to patent
infringement:
Another objection is to the direction, that the making of a
machine fit for use, and with a design to use it for profit, was an
infringement of the patent right, for which an action was given by the
statute. This limitation of the making was certainly favorable to the
24
25

Id. at 16.

26

29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).
e.g., Roche v. Bolar, 733 F.2d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

Id.

27 See,
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defendant, and it was adopted by the court from the consideration,
that it could never have been the intention of the legislature to
punish a man, who constructed such a machine merely for
philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the
sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects. 28
This statement by Justice Story must, however, be taken in context with other
statements made in response to further arguments by the defendant to limit the
nature of infringing activity. For example, Justice Story answered an argument
"that the making of a machine is, under no circumstances, an infringement of the
patent" by quoting the literal language of the Patent Act of 1793 and its subsequent
revision in 1800, and by positing that the exclusive rights to "make, devise, use or
sell" the invention were each to be considered under the Acts to be a "substantive
ground of action." 29 With respect to the further argument by the defendant that the
making of a machine cannot be infringed because there can be no actual damages,
Justice Story made clear that "Ieivery violation of a right imports some damage, and
if none other be proved, the law allows a nominal damage."30 Giving literal effect to
the phrase "make, devise, use or sell" of the Patent Act, and denying an attempt to
escape infringement for lack of measurable damages, can only be reconciled with the
premise, "that it could never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a
man, who constructed such a machine merely for philosophical experiments, or for
the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described

28

Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1121.
Justice Story stated:
It is now contended by the defendant's counsel, that the making of the
machine is, under no circumstances, an infringement of the patent. The first
section of the act of 1793 expressly gives to the patentee "the full and exclusive
right and liberty of making, constructing, using and vending to others to be used"
the invention or discovery. The fifth section of the same act gives an action
against any person, who "shall make, devise, and use or sell" the same. From
some doubt, whether the language of the section did not couple the making and
using together to constitute an offence so that making without using, or using
without making, was not an infringement, the legislature saw fit to repeal that
section; and by the third section of the act of April 17, 1800, gave the action
against any person, who should "make, devise, use or sell' the invention. We are
not called upon to examine the correctness of the original doubt, but the very
change in the structure of the sentence affords a strong presumption, that the
legislature intended to make every one of the enumerated acts a substantive
ground of action.

29 Id.

Id.
30Id.

As stated by Justice Story:
It is further argued, that the making of a machine cannot be an offence,
because no action lies, except for actual damage, and there can be no actual
damages, or even a rule for damages, for an infringement by making a machine.
We are however of opinion, that where the law gives an action for a particular act,
that doing of that act imports of itself a damage to the party. Every violation of a
right imports some damage, and if none other be proved, the law allows a nominal
damage. On the whole, we see no reason for departing from the plain import of
the language of the statute, and this objection also must be overruled.
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effects,"' 31 by an understanding that such activity does not fall within the scope of the
phrase, "make, devise, use or sell," of the Act.
33
Sawin v. Guild 32 was decided in October of 1813, five months after Whittemore.
In Sawin, the plaintiffs asserted that seizure and subsequent sale of a patented
machine for cutting brad nails in settlement of a debt was an infringement of their
patent. 34 Justice Story distinguished between sale of a machine, as a compilation of
materials, from "the right, expressed or implied, of using the same in the manner
secured by the patent";35 that, to be a tortious sale under the statute, the purpose
must be that of depriving the owner of the "use and benefit of his patent," and not
"merely of depriving the owner of the materials."3 6 The court in Sawin reiterated
that to find infringement of a patent right required an intent to deprive the owner of
"the lawful rewards of his discovery" and not for "the mere purpose of philosophical
experiment, or to ascertain the verity and exactness of the specification." 37 The sale
of the machine, without the purpose of depriving the owner of the "use and benefit of
his patent," would, accordingly, put the purchaser at risk for infringement because
there would have been no transfer from the owner of the patent to the purchaser of
' 38
the right to use the machine "in the manner pointed out in the patent-right."
Profit, therefore, as a monetary gain, was partitioned from infringement of a patent

31 Id.
3'221

F. Cas. 554 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391).
at 554.
34 Id.
Justice Story summarized the plaintiffs' position as follows:
[T]he defendant is a deputy sheriff of the county of Norfolk, and having an
execution in his hands against the plaintiffs for the sum of $567.27 debt and costs,
by virtue of his office, seized and sold, on said execution, the materials of three of
said patented machines, which was at the time complete and fit for operation, and
belonged to the plaintiffs ....The plaintiffs contend that it cannot be so seized
and sold, and they rely on the language of the third section of the act of the 17th
of April, 1800, which declares that if 'any person, without the consent of the
patentee, his or her executors, first obtained in writing, shall make, devise, use, or
sell within, whereof the exclusive right is secured to said patentee, such person, so
offending, shall forfeit' ....
Id. (citations omitted).
3 Id. at 555.
36 Id.
3'7Id.
Justice Story stated:
This court has already had occasion to consider the clause in question, and
upon mature of deliberation, it has held that the making of a patented machine to
be an offence within the purview of it, must be the making with an intent to use
for profit, and not for the mere purpose of philosophical experiment, or to
ascertain the verity and exactness of the specification. In other words, that the
making must be with an intent to infringe the patent-right and deprive the owner
of the lawful rewards of his discovery.
Id. (citation omitted).
38 Id.
The court stated:
There is no pretence, in the case before us, that the officer had either sold or
guaranteed a right to use the machine in the manner pointed out in the patentright. He sold the materials as such, to be applied by the purchaser as he should
by law have a right to apply them. The purchaser must therefore act upon his
peril, but in no respect can the officer be responsible for his conduct.

33 Id.
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right; for a sale to be an infringement under the Patent Act, it must be in conjunction
with a deprivation of the right to exclusive use and benefit of the invention.
If, according to the decisions in Whittemore and Sawin, the Act of 1793 (as
amended by the Act of April 17, 1800) gave a cause of action "against any person,
who should make, devise, use or sell the invention," 39 and if there is no exception to
infringement for such activity because "every violation of a right imports some
damage," 40 then Justice Story's clarification of Whittemore in Sawin must mean that
the making of a machine "merely for philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of
ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects," 41 as
stated by the court in Whittemore, or, as stated by the court in Sawin, "for the mere
purpose of philosophical experiment, or to ascertain the verity and exactness of the
specification," 42 cannot be a "making, constructing, using, and vending to others to be
used" within Section 1 of the statute. 43 Further, because profit alone (in the absence
of depriving an inventor of an exclusive right to benefit from his invention) also is
inadequate to find infringement, it follows that making or using an invention "for the
mere purpose for philosophical experiment, or to ascertain the verity and exactness
of the specification 44 or "for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the
machine to produce its described effects,"' 45 even with the prospect of monetary gain
as a consequence, is not activity within the Patent Act, and no cause of action for
infringement should lie. In other words, the "lawful rewards of his discovery," and
"the use and benefit of his patent" recited by Justice Story in Sawin, is exclusive of
"philosophical experiments, or ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce
its described effects or the verity and exactness of the specification," 46 regardless of
47
whether there was, as stated in Whittemore, a "design to use it for profit."
Subsequent experimental use by the public of a patented invention has a
parallel in experimental use by another person prior to independent invention by a
patentee. For example, in Watson v. Bladen,48 Justice Washington held that prior
experimental use by Christian of a cracker making machine defeated the right of
patentee Treadwell:
But the point mainly relied upon by the plaintiffs counsel is, that no
evidence is given that Christian's machine was ever used within the
true meaning of that expression in the patent act. It is admitted that
an experiment was made with it, but this, it is argued, was not such a
using as the act intends. It surely cannot be denied that the act of
making crackers with it amounted to a using of it according to the
common and accepted meaning of that phrase; and I am quite at a
loss to imagine how this meaning can be varied by the particular
'3

Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).

Id.
41Id.
40

42
43
''

Sawin, 21 F. Cas. at 555.
Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318-23 (repealed 1836).
Sawin, 21 F. Cas. at 555.

4 Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1121.
46 Sawin, 21 F. Cas. at 555.
17 Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1121.
48 29 F. Cas. 424 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1826) (No. 17,277).
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motive which induced the inventor so to employ the machine. I can
discover nothing in the patent act which will authorize the court to
depart from the ordinary meaning of this expression, and to declare
that a machine which is put into operation for the sole purpose (if
such be the case) of trying its practical utility, is not used within the
49
meaning and intent of the sixth section of that act.
This case was considered by the court to be distinct from earlier cases, including
Boulton v. Bullf0 and Bedford v. Hunt,5 1 where "mere speculation of a philosopher or
a mechanician, which had never been tried by the test of experience, and never put
into actual operation by him .... would not deprive a subsequent inventor, who had
employed his labor and his talents in putting it into practice, of the reward due to his
ingenuity and enterprise."52 Justice Washington, nevertheless, found that these
earlier cases were consistent with his holding in Watson in that they "manifestly
contrast the confining of the invention to the closet of the inventor and a mere
speculative invention, with putting it into use, practice, or operation; and not the
putting of it into practice for the purpose of an experiment, with any other purpose
whatever." 53 In essence therefore, Justice Washington agreed with the earlier cases,
that "mere speculation of a philosopher or mechanician, which had never been tried
by the test of experience,"5 4 is inadequate to defeat the right of a later inventor, but
held that prior use of an invention, regardless of the experimental nature of that use,
is adequate to defeat a later inventor's right to patent protection:
Upon the whole, I am of opinion, that the experiment of this machine
made by Christian, in the year 1807, amounted to a using of it within the
true meaning of the sixth section of the patent act ....
If Christian's
machine was invented and used prior to the discovery of Treadwell, then
this patent is void, because it covers all the essential parts of Christian's
machine, without which it could not operate at all to produce the intended
55
result.
Similarly, a British case, Jones v. Pearce,56 distinguished between earlier use by
another that was "openly in public, so that everybody might see it, and had continued
9 Id. at 425-26. Section 6 of the Patent Act of 1793 provides a defense to infringement of
public use prior to discovery by the patentee:
Provided always, and be it further enacted, [tlhat the defendant in such
action shall be permitted to plead the general issue .... that the thing, thus
secured by patent, was not originally discovered by the patentee, but had been in
use, or had been described in some public work anterior to the supposed discovery
of the patentee .... in either of which cases, judgment shall be rendered for the
defendant, with costs, and the patent shall be declared void.
Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 6, 1 Stat. 318-23 (repealed 1836).
,0 126 Eng. Rep. 651 (1795) (C.P.).
51 3 F. Cas. 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 1,217).
52 Id. at 38.
)3 Watson, 29 F. Cas. at 426.
54 Bedford, 3 F. Cas. at 38.
Watson, 29 F. Cas. at 426.
' 1 Webst. Pat. Cas. 122 (K.B. 1831).
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to use the same thing up to the time of taking out the patent," which "would be a
ground to say that the plaintiffs patent is not new," from an unsuccessful
experiment, whereby the prior user "found it did not answer, and ceased to use it
altogether, and abandoned it as useless, and nobody else followed it up," which would
not suffice to defeat the patent. 57 Stated another way, activity was anticipatory only
if the benefit of the invention was derived by the public, regardless of the
experimental nature of the use.
Later cases expanded on a policy of defeating an inventor's exclusive rights for
lack of novelty only where the benefit of prior use was deemed to have been placed in
the public domain. For example, the Supreme Court in Gayler v. Wldei 8 held that
prior construction and use of a fireproof safe by a business owner for the purpose of
protecting his papers for several years did not constitute a statutory bar to later
patenting by an independent inventor of the same device.5 9 The Court affirmed an
instruction by the circuit court to the jury that upheld the right of the patentee
against the prior use. 60 Specifically, the jury was instructed:
[T]hat if Conner had not made his discovery public, but had used it simply
for his own private purpose, and it had finally been forgotten or abandoned,
such a discovery and use would be no obstacle to the taking out of a patent
by Fitzgerald or those claiming under him, if he be an original, though not
61
the first, inventor or discoverer.

57

Id.

at 124-25. The court instructed the jury as follows:
If on the whole of this evidence, either on the one side or the other, it appeared
that this wheel constructed by Mr. Strutt's order in 1814, was a wheel on the
same principles and in substance the same wheel as the other for which the
plaintiff [Jones] has taken out his patent, and that was used openly in public, so
that everybody might see it, and had continued to use the same thing up to the
time of taking out the patent, undoubtedly then that would be a ground to say
that the plaintiffs invention is not new, and if it is not new, of course this patent
is bad, and he cannot recover in this action; but if, on the other hand, you are of
opinion that Mr. Strutt's was an experiment, and that he found that it did not
answer, and ceased to use it altogether, and abandoned it as useless, and nobody
else followed it up, and that the plaintiffs invention, which came afterwards, was
his own invention, and remedied the defects, if I may so say, although he knew
nothing of Mr. Strutt's wheel he remedied the defects of Mr. Strutt's wheel, then
there is no reason for saying that the plaintiffs patent is not good ....

Id.
51 U.S. 477 (1851).
F Id. at 495. The Court summarized the prior activity as follows:
It appears that James Conner, who carried on the business of a stereotype
founder in the city of New York, made a safe for his own use between the years
1829 and 1832, for the protection of his papers against fire; and continued to use
it until 1838, which [sic] it passed into other hands. It was kept in his countingroom and known to the persons engaged in the foundry; and after it passed out of
his hands, he used others of a different construction.
58

Id.
60 Id. at 498.
61 Id. at 496 (quoting the circuit court).
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In finding no error in the jury instruction, 62 the Court explained what it believed
to be the intention of the legislature in the Patent Act of 1836, specifically sections 6
and 15.63 In particular, the Court admitted that Fitzgerald could not be the "original
and first inventor or discoverer" given what was known about the Conner safe "upon
a literal construction" of the Act. 64 However, to "carry into effect the intention of the
legislature," the Court stated that, to be consistent with the 15th section of the
Patent Act of 1836, the words "knowledge" and "use" under that section would have
to mean knowledge and use that is accessible to the public:
In the case thus provided for, the party who invents is not strictly speaking
the first and original inventor. The law assumes that the improvement may
have been known and used before his discovery. Yet his patent is valid if he
discovered it by the efforts of his own genius, and believed himself to be the
original inventor. The clause in question [section 15 of the Patent Act of
1836] qualifies the words before used, and shows that by knowledge and use
the legislature meant knowledge and use existing in a manner accessible to
65
the public.
The later, independent inventor should, therefore, not be deprived of the right to
a patent in view of knowledge or use that is not accessible to the public, because
"[tihe means of obtaining knowledge would not be within their reach; and, as far as
their interest is concerned, it would be the same thing as if the improvement had
never been discovered," 66 whereas:
It is the inventor here that brings it to them, and places it in their
possession. And as he does this by the effort of his own genius, the law
regards him as the first and original inventor, and protects his patent,

62 Id. at 498. ("Upon the whole, therefore, we think there is no error in the opinion of the
Circuit Court, and the judgment is affirmed.").
63 Id.at 496. The Court paraphrased sections 6 and 15 of the Patent Act of 1836 as follows:
The act of 1836, ch 357, § 6, authorizes a patent where the party has
discovered or invented a new and useful improvement, "not known or used by
others before his discovery or invention." And the 15th section provides that, if it
appears on the trial of an action brought for the infringement of a patent that the
patentee "was not the original and first inventor or discover of the thing
patented," the verdict shall be for the defendant.

...And in the 15th section, after making the provision just mentioned, there is a
further provision, that if it shall appear that the patentee at the time of making
his application for patent believed himself to be the first inventor, the patent shall
not be void on account of the invention or discovery having been before known or
used in any foreign country, it not appearing that it had been before patented or
described in any printed publication.

Id.
61 Id. ("Upon a literal construction of these particular words, the patentee in this case certainly
was not the original or first inventor or discoverer, if the Conner safe was the same with his, and
preceded his discovery.").
6 Id. at 496-97.
66 Id. at 497.
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although the improvement had in fact been invented before, and used by
6
others. '
As summarized by the Court: "But he would be the first to confer on the public the
benefit of the invention. He would discover what is unknown, and communicate
68
knowledge which the public had not the means of obtaining without his invention."
With respect to prior activities by Conner, the Court concluded that "[tihe public
could derive no benefit from it until it was discovered by another inventor," which, in
this case, was Fitzgerald, whose patent the Supreme Court held to be valid and
69
infringed.
Justices McLean and Daniel dissented in separate opinions. Justice McLean
asserted that if Conner abandoned his invention, it would be "given up to the public"
and, therefore, "fatal to the right of Fitzgerald," and that, regardless, the public had
access to the safe less than five years before Fitzgerald obtained his patent and,
therefore, as a matter of law, it could not have been lost to the public. 70 Justice
Daniel found that, contrary to the conclusion by the majority, Conner's activities
were public, 71 and challenged the presumption that the public is better benefited by
granting patent protection to a later, independent inventor rather than
acknowledging that placement in the public confers a benefit, regardless of the
circumstances:
It is said that patent privileges are allowed as incitements to inventions and
improvements by which the public may be benefited. This position, that
mby[sici be conceded in general, should not be made a means of preventing
the great and public purposes its legitimate enforcement is calculated to
secure. The admission of this principle leaves entirely upon the inquiries,
whether he is more the benefactor of the public who makes a useful
improvement which he generously shares with his fellow-citizens, or he who
studies some device which he denies to all, and limits by every means in his
power to a lucrative monopoly; and still more, whether the latter shall be
permitted to seize upon that which had already (as is here admitted) been

(37Id.

68 Id.

Id.

69Id. at 498.
70 Id. at 501 (McLean, J., dissenting). Justice McLean stated, in dissent:
When an invention is abandoned, it is said to be given up to the public, and this is
the sense in which the term abandonment is used in the patent law. Such an
abandonment would be fatal to the right of Fitzgerald.
Conner's safe, as it appears from the bill of exceptions, was used in his
counting-house, being accessible to every one, some six or eight years. In 1838 it
passed into other hands; but into whose hands it does not appear. In 1843,
Fitzgerald obtained his patent. How long before that he made experiments to test
the invention is not proved. At most, the time must have been less than five
years. This is a short period on which to found a presumption of forgetfulness.
The law authorizes no such presumption. It can never become the law. It is not
founded on probability or reason.
71 Id. at 507. (Daniel, J., dissenting). ("It is shown that Conner used his safe publicly; that is,

he concealed it from no one ....").
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given to the public, thereby to levy contributions, not only on the
community at large, but upon him even who has been its generous
benefactor. It was doubtless to prevent consequences like those here
presented, that the priority and originality of inventions are so uniformly
and explicitly insisted upon in all the legislation of Congress, as will
72
presently be shown.
Regardless of their differences of opinion about the facts in Gayler, the majority
opinion and those of the dissenting justices are all consistent in that they recognize
an overriding policy of awarding patent protection commensurate with the benefit
conferred on the public. As succinctly stated by Justice McLean in his dissent: "[t]he
law is adopted on a settled public policy, which, while it isjust to inventors, protects
73
the rights of the public."
An example of the comparison between what is "just to inventors," and the
"rights of the public," can be found in Byam v. Bullard,74 where the Circuit Court for
the District of Massachusetts found that sale of a patented device by the defendant to
the plaintiff patentee was not an infringement "per se." 75 The court relied on what it
phrased as "the general rule of common law," whereby volenti non fit injuria ("to a
willing person no wrong is done").76 Earlier cases, including Whittemore, Sawin, and
Jones, were distinguished by the court as holding that there was no damage and,
consequently, no cause of action:
Nor can I find any solid foundation on which to rest the right of a patentee
to support an action on the case for the violation of his exclusive right,
except that settled and reasonable common-law basis of all such actions,
injury and damage; injury by a violation of the incorporeal right, and
damage, at least nominal, presumed by the law to arise from such violation.
Such I understand to have been the principle proceeded upon by Mr. Justice
Story, in Whittemore v. Cutter, where he held that making a machine for a
philosophical experiment, or to test the sufficiency of the specification,
would not be an infringement; and in Sawin v. Guild, where he says the act
must be with intent to deprive the patentees of some lawful profit; and also
by Mr. Justice Patteson, in Jones v. Pearce, where he accepts the making of
a patented article for mere amusement, and not for profit. In these cases, in
as much as there was supposed to be no damage, there was thought to be no
action.77

Rather, by having sold the device to an agent of the plaintiff, the defendant in Byam
deprived the plaintiff patentee of the profit that would otherwise be gained, and yet
72

Id. at 506 (Daniel, J., dissenting).

73Id. at 501-02 (McLean, J., dissenting).
71 4 F. Cas. 934 (C.C.D. Mass. 1852) (No. 2,262).
75 Id. at 935 ("In this case, I am of opinion that the sale to the plaintiffs' agent was a sale to
them, and that such a sale is not, per se, an infringement.").
76 Id. at 934 ("As to the injury, the general rule of the common law is, 'volknti non fit injuria;'
and, in accordance with this maxim, no one can maintain an action for a wrong, where he has
consented, or contributed to the act of which he complains.").
77 Id. at 935 (citations omitted).
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no infringement was found because, by having cooperated in the sale, the plaintiffs
activities "must be supposed to have been done for his own benefit, or at least not to
have been to his loss."78 Therefore, the court effectively severed profit, either its gain
by an accused infringer or its loss by the patentee (both of which in this case were a
matter of fact), from infringement. Instead, the measure of infringement was
deprivation by the patentee of the benefit of his invention, which, as in Sawin, could
not be inferred by loss of profit. In Byam, by acquiring the device from the
defendant, the plaintiff patentee could not be said to have been deprived of such
benefit, as a matter of law.
The court in Byam also paraphrased Watson with approval, questioning "the
assumption" made in Whittemore, Sawin, and Jones, that there is no damage in
"making a machine for a philosophical experiment or to test the sufficiency of the
specification" 79 or in "the making of a patented article for mere amusement and not
for profit,"8 0 and stated that, if the assumption were correct, there would be no cause
of action for infringement.81 However, the court in Watson does not question any
such assumption. Rather, as discussed above, the court in Watson only stated that
the making of a machine by another prior to the discovery by a patentee is
8 2
anticipatory, regardless of any intent to use the machine only experimentally.
Therefore, despite the statement by the court in Byam, no question of infringement
was decided in Watson because the patent relied upon by the plaintiff was held to be
83
invalid as having been anticipated by prior activity in the public domain.
Byam stands for the proposition that the benefit of an invention is not
necessarily in its possession or in profit to be derived from it.84 Therefore, as in
Sawin, possession, without more, cannot be considered a deprivation of the benefit
conferred by a patent right, despite loss or gain of profit by the patent holder or the
public. Subsequent cases based infringement on whether the patentee was deprived
of the benefit of the invention. However, neither the experimental nature of the use,
nor profit derived by the sale of the invention, was determinative for the courts.
For example, the court in Poppenhusen v. New York Gutta Percha Comb Co.85
held that despite the fact that a use was experimental, and without profit, "the
product of that experiment," could nevertheless be an infringement if it was
78

Id. at 934. Judge Curtis, for the court stated:
Here, the plaintiffs not only consented, but cooperated; for, through their agents,
they were themselves the purchasers. As to the damage, it is true that, in
general, the law imports damage from the violation of a right, but I am not aware
that damage has ever been presumed by law from an act in which the plaintiff
cooperated, and which, therefore, must be supposed to have been done for his own
benefit, or at least not to have been to his loss.

Id.
79 Byam, 4 F. Cas. at 935 (paraphrasing Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass.
1813) (No. 17,600)).

80 Byam, 4 F. Cas. at 935 (paraphrasing Jones v. Pearce, 2 Webst. Pat. Cas. 125 (K.B. 1831)).
81 Byam, 4 F. Cas. at 935 ("And though I am rather disposed, with Mr. Justice Washington, in
Watson v. Bladen, to doubt whether the assumption is correct, that in such cases there is no
damage; yet if the assumption be correct, I think the inference is sound that no action lies.")
(citation omitted).
82 Watson v. Bladen, 29 F. Cas. 424, 426 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1826) (No. 17,277).
83 Id.
81
85

See Byam, 4 F. Cas. at 935.
19 F. Cas. 1059 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1858) (No. 11,283).
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employed by the agents of defendants "for their benefit; and if they adopted and
approved of it by selling it in the market [through their agent] .... they will be
deemed to have authorized the act, and will be bound by it."86 Therefore, despite the
fact that use of patented subject matter by the defendants was only experimental,
infringement of the patent could be found if the defendants benefited by activities
adopted and approved by their agent. Infringement was based on competition in the
market, which deprived the inventor of the benefit of his patent, regardless of profit.
In an opinion by the Supreme Court in Seymour v. Osborne,8 7 Justice Clifford
cautioned against regarding letters patent as monopolies, which, he stated, are
"created by the executive authority at the expense and to the prejudice of all the
community except the persons therein named as patentees."88 Rather he asserted
that letters patent should be considered "public franchises ... as matter of
compensation to the inventors for their labor, toil, and expense in making the
inventions, and reducing the same to practice for the public benefit, as contemplated
by the Constitution and sanctioned by the laws of Congress." 8 9 Therefore, as with
Renouard and Phillips, the Supreme Court expressly recognized patent protection as
a benefit conferred upon the inventor and the public rather than a privilege conferred
at the public's expense.

86Id. at 1063. The question posed to the jury by the court was as follows:

The next question, gentlemen, is: Has there been a violation or
infringement? It is said, gentlemen, that there has not been, for the reason that
whatever use was made of it was an experimental use-a use merely for
experiment, and not with a view to profit; and when there has been no profit and
no sale, it will not make a party liable, because the patentee would not be injured
by it. But where, gentlemen, it is done as a matter of business, where the product
of that experiment has been thrown into the market, to compete with the products
of the plaintiff, although he may call it an experiment, yet, if it is a matter of
business, and thrown into the market for the purpose of being sold, and is sold
with his other products, why, that will be such a use as will make the party liable.
...You are here to determine, gentlemen, whether these articles, manufactured
by their agent, he being in the employment of the corporation, whether he did it in
the business or employment of the corporation, whether it was for their benefit;
and if they adopted and approved of it, by selling it in the market, and thereby
took advantage of it, they will be deemed to have authorized the act, and will be
bound by it.

Id.
87
88
89

78 U.S. 516 (1871).
Id. at 533.
Id. at 533-34. The Court stated:
Letters patent are not to be regarded as monopolies, created by the
executive authority at the expense and to the prejudice of all the community
except the persons therein named as patentees, but as public franchises granted
to the inventors of new and useful improvements for the purpose of securing to
them, as such inventors, for the limited term therein mentioned, the exclusive
right and liberty to make and use and vend to others to be used their own
inventions, as tending to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, and
as matter of compensation to the inventors for their labor, toil, and expense in
making the inventions, and reducing the same to practice for the public benefit, as
contemplated by the Constitution and sanctioned by the laws of Congress.
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In another British case, cited by William Robinson, 90 Frearson v. Loe, 91 the
Chancery division held that "bona fide" experimentation, without the intention of
selling and making a patented invention, was not an infringement if the
experimental use was made "with the view of improving upon the invention the
subject of the patent, or with the view of seeing whether an improvement can be
made or not." 92 However, use of the patented machine for its intended purpose, in
this case, that of making screws, "with the view of trying the screws themselves," did
not rise to the level of "bona fide" experimental use. 93 The court held that testing of
the product of a patented machine was not an experimental use of the machine itself
94
and, therefore, was not exempt from infringement of the patent to that machine.
Therefore, infringement of the patent to the machine for making screws was not
found on the basis of profit derived from the machine. Rather, use of the patented
machine could not be considered experimental because the benefit of the machine,
that of making screws, had been obtained. Testing of the finished screws was not
considered to be experimental use of the machine that made them.
Unsuccessful experimental use was admitted to by the defendants in Albright v.
Celluloid Harness-Trimming Co.,95 "at their factory ... in the course of perfecting
their manufacture of harness-trimmings coated with celluloid." 96 The court found
"technical infringement," but only on the basis of testimony by both a superintendent
90 3 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 898 n.1 (1890).
91 (1878) 9 Ch.D 48.
92 Id. at 66-67. The court stated that:
[N]o doubt if a man makes things merely by way of bona fide experiment, and not
with the intention of selling and making use of the thing so made for the purpose
of which a patent has been granted, but with a view of improving upon the
invention the subject of the patent, or with the view of seeing whether an
improvement can be made or not, that is not an invasion of the exclusive rights
granted by the patent.

Id.
93 Id. at 67. The court explained:
He has made a machine, and, knowing it to be an infringement of patent, he
claims the right to make and use it, and his experiment is made to see how his
machine works. That is the experiment, as he calls it, putting his machine to
work from time to time, and then making screws according to the other patent,
and making the screws with the view of trying the screws themselves. It does not
appear to me, when I consider the circumstances under which the Defendant
made these alleged experiments, that I ought to treat this as coming within the
rule which prevents mere experiments being subject to the liability of action being
brought against those who make them ....

Id.
94

Id.

9 1 F. Cas. 320 (C.C.D.N.J. 1877) (No. 147).
96 Id. at 323. The court characterized the admission by the defendants as follows:

They admit in their answer that subsequent to the date of said letters patent
137,873, among other experiments made or caused to be made at their factory in
Newark, in the course of perfecting their manufacture of harness-trimmings
coated with celluloid, they tried dies of substantially the form and construction,
and having the same operation described in said letters patent; but such use was
only experimental, and the said experiment demonstrated the fact that harnesstrimmings coated with celluloid cannot be manufactured in dies thus constructed,
and that they accordingly abandoned the experiment.
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employed by the defendant, and by the plaintiff, of having seen infringing articles in
the defendant's factory. 9 By limiting the evidence of infringement to the testimony
of the superintendent and the plaintiff, the court, by inference, did not consider the
admission of experimental use in its determination. In excluding the admission, the
court seemed to draw a parallel with early experimental use by a third party prior to
patenting of the invention by the plaintiff, when a Mr. Sturgis made a pair of dies on
an experimental basis, which also was abandoned as unsuccessful:
Nothing was brought forward in the case which casts serious doubts on the
originality of the complainant's patent, except the Sturgis die, Exhibit No.
18, produced by the complainant. Mr. Sturgis says that, in the spring or
summer of 1865, he made a pair of dies to press up a composition with
which he wished to coat an iron buckle to imitate the stitched leather
buckle. He pressed up different compositions, experimenting with leather
and paper and cloth. He never made any quantity, or ever put any on the
market, "being a mere matter of experimenting." It does not appear that
these experiments were successful, as he testifies he abandoned
them .... Under these circumstances, what he did must be put in the
category of abandoned experiments. "He is the first inventor," says the
[Siupreme [C]ourt "and entitled to the patent, who, being an original
98
discoverer, has first perfected and adapted the invention to actual use."
Therefore, like the "experimental use" by the defendant, activity, including making
and using subject matter considered to be within the scope of patent protection, was
held by the court to be neither anticipatory nor an infringement, on the basis that no
benefit was derived. 99 In other words, experimental use, or, at least failed
experimental use, in and of itself, was considered to be neither anticipatory activity
that would bar a subsequent inventor from patent protection, nor infringement of an
issued patent that would provide a cause of action to a patentee. In neither case was
the benefit of the invention obtained, and, with respect to the defendant's admitted
experimental use, profit clearly was a motive.
As another example of the overriding nature of benefit over profit as a motive,
manufacture and experimental use of patented equipment by the Army was held in

97

Id.

The court summarized the basis for infringement as follows:
Their [the defendants'] superintendent, Lockwood, says that prior to July 1874, he
saw in their factory a die similar to Exhibit No. 8, which it is admitted was
constructed according to the patent under consideration, and the complainant,
Albright, testified that he visited the defendant's rooms in Newark, in October or
November, 1873, and saw there one large oval brace-buckle die and one or two
ring-dies constructed on the plan of Exhibit No. 8, and also buckles and rings,
which, from their general appearance, he believed had been pressed in these dies.
That seems to be the extent of the testimony as to the making and using the dies.
It is a technical infringement, and is sufficient to authorize an injunction
restraining their future use; but no reference will be ordered, as no damage or
profits have been shown or suggested.

Id.
98 Id.

at 322 (citation omitted) (quoting Whitely v. Swayne, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 685, 686 (1869)).
9 Id. at 323.
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Palmer v. United States0 0 to be the basis for recovery of a reasonable royalty only to
the extent that the equipment had been issued for use. 10 The Court of Claims held
that 10,500 sets of equipments manufactured by the Ordnance Department of the
Army, although they "may have been 'a huge experiment,"' in the absence of an
express license, the fact that their manufacture was an experiment provided to the
Ordnance Office "no more right to take for these experimental knapsacks the
claimant's invention than to take another man's leather."' 0 2 Despite finding an
exception for experimental use, however, the court held that "inventions which are
still in the stage of trial and experiment, and which are as likely to involve the
purchaser in loss as to bring him gain," had fallen into a class of value where "the
right to manufacture and use the first 10,000 would have been granted for a very
moderate royalty."10 3 Accordingly, the decision of the trial court was affirmed,
whereby the plaintiff "could not recover ... for equipments manufactured, but that
his recovery must be for equipments manufactured and used," which was only 9,027
of the 10,500 equipments manufactured. 0 4 Therefore, infringement was found
despite characterization of the manufacture and use of the patented device as
experimental, but compensation was awarded only to the extent to which benefit of
the invention could be presumed, for example, by use of the claimed device, rather
than simply by its manufacture. Again, the finding of infringement was independent
of an intent to use for profit, and rested solely on advantage gained by the utility of
the patented subject matter:
But where the validity of a patent is conceded, he who uses the invention
must judge for himself of its utility, and the government stands upon no
more irresponsible ground than the farmer who buys a right to make and
10 5
use a "patent hive" or pays for a license to sink a "drive-well."
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the decision by the United States Court of Claims
was affirmed. 0 6 With respect to "questions related to the character and amount of
use which the government had of the claimant's invention, and of the proper
compensation due therefor," the Court spoke with approval of the lower court
decision:
As to the questions relating to the character, and amount of use which the
government had of the claimants' invention, and of the proper compensation
due therefor, we do not see anything in the findings of the court below, or in
its conclusions deduced therefrom, to call for serious observation. What
evidence the court may have had on these points is not disclosed by the

100 20 Ct. Cl. 432 (1885).
101 Id. at 432.
102 Id. at 437-38.
103 Id. at 438.
104
105

106

Id.
Id. at 437.
United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262 (1888).
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record, and should not be, and the facts found are sufficient to sustain the
10
judgment. '
In the cases summarized above, experimental use was not considered to be a
function of public benefit. Anticipation of a patented article or process generally was
not found unless the product of prior experimental work by another became part of
the public weal. Similarly, activities conducted by another within the scope of the
exclusive right of an issued patent generally were not considered to be infringing if
the activities were only "philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining
the sufficiency" of the patented subject matter "to produce its described effects," as
stated in Whittemore,108 or "to ascertain the verity and exactness of the specification"
as stated in Sawin,109 despite an intent to profit by the result of such experiments,
because the patentee was not deprived of his exclusive rights unless he had been
deprived of a "use and benefit of his patent."110 In other words, experimental use, for
the purpose of scientific inquiry, or for ascertaining sufficiency of patented subject
matter for an intended use or the verity and exactness of a specification, as such,
were not proscribed under the Patent Act, regardless of an intent to profit by the
result obtained. Rather, for an accused infringer to make, use, or sell patented
subject matter within the scope of the Act, the patentee must be deprived of his
exclusive right to the use and benefit of the patent beyond its availability for
philosophical experiment, or ascertainment of the suitability of patented subject
matter or of the verity and exactness of the patent specification. Intent to profit was
not a threshold consideration.
In Standard Measuring Machine Co. v. Teague,111 the Circuit Court for the
District of Massachusetts held that, despite an admission by the defendant (who
owned a patent to an improvement of a machine patented by the plaintiff) that they
made "one machine like [the defendant's] patented improvement.., and exhibited
11 2
it," there was insufficient evidence to pursue the question of infringement further.
Specifically, the court found that, because the defendants did not admit use or sale of
that machine, there was no basis for infringement:
The only evidence of infringement is an admission by the defendants that
they made one machine like their patented improvement.., and exhibited
it at the mechanics fair, in Boston, in 1878. They do not admit that they
ever used or sold such a machine, but contend that it was made, or may
have been made, as a model or illustration of their own patent. We consider
the evidence of infringement of this patent insufficient to require us to
113
compare the inventions with each other.
Therefore, manufacture or, at least, admitted possible manufacture as a model or
illustration, of a patented machine, without more, i.e., use or sale, was an insufficient
107Id. at 272.
108Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).

109Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391).
110 Id.
111 15 F. 390 (C.C.D. Mass. 1883).
2

11

Id. at 392-93.

11:

Id.
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basis even to further investigate whether the machine was, in fact, within the scope
of the plaintiffs patent.
The Chancery Division, in United Telephone Co. v. Sharpies,114 which also is
cited by Robinson in his treatise, 115 held that importation of patented telephones and
transmitters to England, and their subsequent sale, "although to a foreign customer,
[of] an instrument which he knows would if made, sold, or used in this country be an
11 6
infringement of an English patent .... would be an infringement of such patent."
Those, indeed, were found to be the facts and, accordingly, the court held the patents
to be infringed. 117 In explaining the facts of the case, the court denied the argument
by the defense that the patented telephones and transmitters were imported and
used only on an experimental basis for the instruction of pupils. 118 The court found
that the purchase and use of the patented device for the purpose of instruction was,
in fact, a use. 119 However, the basis for this holding was not financial gain, but
whether the user, namely the instructor, was using the invention to his advantage:
I asked Mr. Goodeve whether he carried his proposition thus far, that there
could be no user of a patent unless it produced a direct pecuniary advantage
to the person who used it? At first, he seemed inclined to go so far, but I
think at last he receded from that position; because I put to him this very
obvious case: Suppose for example, if the Singer sewing machine were
protected by a patent, a man should buy a cheaper instrument which he
knows is an infringement of the patent, for some member of his household,
who uses it, let us say, for amusement simply, would that be a user in this
country or not? Without any doubt it would, although it did not produce to
or save him one farthing. Therefore Mr. Goodeve modified his proposition
to this, that "it must be a user for the purpose of advantage." Well, then, is
not the user which I had been describing a user for the purpose of
120
advantage?
The court did not hold that the students conducting the experiments were infringers,
and did not hold that experimental use per se was an infringement; the court only

I

(1885) 29 Ch.D. 164.
supra note 90, at § 898. Section 898 is entitled "No Act an Infringement unless
it Affects the Pecuniary Interests of the Owner of the Patented Invention." Id.
116United Telephone, 29 Ch.D. at 167.
117Id. at 166.
118 Id. at 167 ("The witness Sharples says, 'We use these instruments for the purpose of
experiment; the cost of them was so small that we could afford to allow our pupils to pull them to
pieces or experiment with them."').
119 Id. at 168. The court stated:
And to say that to buy a telephone which is an infringement of an English patent
for the purpose of instructing your pupils who are learning the business, to let
them use and experiment with it, to let them, if they please, pull it in pieces, for
the purpose of saving the expense of using the patent telephone and
experimenting with or pulling that to pieces, to say that that is not a user in this
country, is a thing to which I cannot accede. It seems to me plainly to be a user.
Id.
120Id. at 168-69.
115ROBINSON,

[6:373 2007]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

found that the use of a patented device to instruct others constituted a use that was
infringement. 121
Negation of public use by an inventor as being experimental and, therefore, not
depriving the inventor of a right to patent protection was found in Beedle v.
Bennett.122 In that case, the Supreme Court held that an inventor of a driven well
was entitled to patent protection despite having put down a well at his house and
publicly having driven such a well at a fairground for the use of soldiers in his
regiment more than two years before filing for patent protection, because such uses
were "merely experimental." 123 Section 7 the Act of March 3, 1839 was recited by the
Court:
And no patent shall be held to be invalid by reason of such purchase, sale,
or use prior to the application for a patent as aforesaid, except on proof of
abandonment of such invention to the public, or that such purchase, sale, or
use has been for more than two years prior to such application for a
patent.124
The Court upheld the validity of the patent and affirmed the lower court decision of
infringement by defendants who had used wells driven by "an ordinary well-driver"
on their farm for several years. 125 Therefore, as with anticipatory use by another,
prior use by an inventor would only bar patent protection if it had become part of the
public domain, and experimental use was not considered to be that type of activity.
1 26
In Bonsack Machine Co. v. Underwood,
the court held that, despite the
defendant's (Underwood's) argument that the "plaintiff permitted him to make the
one machine that he made, and that he has never used that machine for commercial
purposes," the machine was, in fact, used "for the purpose of selling the [defendant's]
patent." 127 The court relied on Sawin for the proposition that, "[to constitute an
infringement, the making must be with an intent to use for profit, and not for the
mere purpose of philosophical experiment."1 28 In Bonsack, the "defendant, besides
making a contract by which he gave a 60-days option to... an original co-defendant,
121

Id.at 168.
U.S. 71 (1887).
Id. at 77. The Court found the following:

122122
123

There is no evidence in the record of any use or sale of the invention by Green

Id.

before his application for a patent, and no evidence from which to conclude that
any use of any driven well by others before his application was consented to or
allowed by him, except in the instances mentioned at Cortland, which were
merely experimental tests, made by himself.
124 Id. (citing Patent Act of 1839, ch. 87, 88, 5 Stat. 353, 354 (effective Mar. 3, 1839)).
125

Boodle, 122 U.S. at 78.

126 73 F. 206 (C.C.E.D.N.C. 1896).
127Id. at 211. The court disagreed with the defendants' contention that even the one machine

was authorized in that the company which built the machine "was under contract not to construct
any other cigarette machine any part of which was substantially covered by the Bonsack patents."
Id. The plaintiff owned three patents, referred to as the "Hook," "Emery" and "Bonsack" patents.
Id. at 207. The defendants owned one patent, covering the "Underwood" machine, which was found
to fall within the scope of claim 2 of the "Hook" patent and of claim 13 of the "Emery" patent. Id. at
209-10.
128

Id. at 211.
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to purchase, has taken his machine to St. Louis, and assisted in organizing a
company in that city for manufacturing cigarettes under his patent."129 The court
found a basis "for an injunction upon well-grounded proof of the intention of [sic]
violate the patent right." 130 Therefore, despite the fact that the one machine made
with consent had never been used in commercial manufacture of cigarettes, it had
been used to develop the facility to deprive the patent owner of the exclusive ability
to exploit his invention, thereby exceeding the authorization granted under the
131
license from the plaintiff to make the one machine.
In Clerk v. Tannage Patent Co., 1 3 2 the Third Circuit held that:
[Miere expression of willingness to grant or sell licenses [by the patentee]
will not, of itself, confer upon any, the privilege to use the specialty of the
patent, and claim exemption from a charge of infringement on the ground of
being simply engaged in experimentally testing its desirability or utility. 133
This decision by the court does not expressly state that there is no experimental use
exception or that any such exception to infringement is contingent upon lack of
commercial intent.
The Circuit Court for the Eastern District of New York in Cimiotti Unhairing
Co. v. Derboklow,13 4 held that where, for a period of "nearly three years," a defendant
employed a patented machine to dehair pelts provided by customers in the ordinary
course of business, it was no defense for the defendant to "excuse this use of
infringing devices on the theory that defendant was 'experimenting' with the
machines in order to see if he could not discover some improvement."' 135 The court
concluded that "[t]his is not fairly within any legitimate use for experimental
purposes only." 136 Again, experimental use was denied as a defense to the inventor
because regular use over an extended period of time, without more, could not be
13 7
considered to be "for experimental purposes only."
Similarly, the Circuit Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in United
States Mitis Co. v. CarnegieSteel Co., 13 8 held that commercial use over a period of
several months in the course of business and for profit could not be excused on the
suggestion that it was "merely experimental."' 139 As with Clerk and Cimiotti, mere
129

Id.

130 Id.
131 Id.
("As for the alleged license, it is not contended that any consent was given to any
commercial use of the machine.").
132
133

84 F. 643 (3d Cir. 1898).
Id. at 644.

13M87 F. 997 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1898).
135

136

Id. at 999.
Id.

137 Id.
138
139

89 F. 343 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1898).
Id. at 351. The court stated:
The suggestion that the use of aluminum while the defendant was engaged
in the practice of the so-called "armor-plate process" was merely experimental
cannot be accepted. That was a commercial use, extending over a period of
several months, and involved a very large product. It was use in the course of
business and for profit.
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assertion that use was experimental while the benefit of the invention was being
derived was inadequate to escape a holding of infringement. However, as in those
earlier cases, the court did not hold that experimental use could not be a defense to
infringement if the experimentation was conducted with commercial intent.
The District Court for the Southern District of New York in Hoegger v. F.H.
Lawson & Co. 140 held that unauthorized sale by an agent of the defendant of a
sample wall cabinet manufactured by the defendant corporation, and arguably within
the scope of the plaintiffs patent claims, did not constitute infringement.1 4 1 As
stated by the court, "the mere sale to Mr. Carroll of the shopworn sample, under the
circumstances already described, is insufficient to establish an act of
infringement." 142 The court reasoned that the sale was an isolated incident that was
outside the scope of the agent's employment. 143 Mere sale, then, of the sample
manufactured by the defendant was not a deprivation of rights by the defendant
sufficient to constitute an infringement of the plaintiffs patent. However, like
Sawin, the court did not hold the purchaser of the patented device would be free to
use the patented article as a consequence of the sale. As will be recalled, the court in
Sawin, in fact, suggested that sale of the patented device that did not deprive the
patent owner "of the use and benefit of his patent," carries with it "no
pretense ... [that] guaranteed a right to use the machine in the manner pointed out
in the patent-right."144 It must be inferred that, as in Sawin, "the purchaser must
1 45
therefore act on his own peril."
In Scott & Williams, Inc. v. Hemphill Co., 1 4 6 the court held that use of a machine
"to convince buyers of its merit and as a way of making sample stock to send out to
the trade" was a "use" of the machine that constituted "much more than the mere
exhibition of an alleged infringing article, which was held in Hoegger v. F.H. Lawson
& Co., (D.C.) 35 F.2d 219, not to amount to an act of infringement."' 147 The contrast,
Id.
35 F.2d 219 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1929).
220-22 ("The defendant is an Ohio corporation. Its chief office and place of business
is at Cincinnati. It there manufactures wall cabinets (including a cabinet, model No. 925, of the type
claimed to infringe plaintiffs patent), laundry appliances, and various other articles.").
142 Id. at 222.
143 Id. at 221-22. The court stated:
The supplemental fact that a single shopworn sample- plainly sent to New
York by defendant and kept there by Mr. Newman solely for purposes of
exhibition and not for sale- was sold and delivered by Miss Reilly to Mr. Carroll
at the Lexington avenue office is not enough to convert that office into the kind of
place, prescribed by the statute- "regular and established" -for carrying on
defendant's business in New York. That seems obvious from mere statement.
This is particularly true since the incident was isolated and it cannot be fairly
inferred from the evidence that it occurred from the knowledge, much less the
sanction, of the defendant.
140

14,Id. at

... It follows that Mr. Newman was not "engaged in conducting" for defendant the
type of business required to render him subject to service as the agent of
defendant pursuant to Section 48 of the Judicial Code.

Id.
41 Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391).

Id.
14 F. Supp. 621 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1931).
147 Id. at 622 (referencing Hoegger v. Lawson & Co., 35 F.2d 219 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1929)).

145

146
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once again, is between use of a machine whereby the benefit of the machine, however
slight, is obtained, such as by demonstration of its operation, and that of "mere
exhibition," whereby no such benefit is obtained.
A patent to a method for separating crystals of guanine, also known as pearl
essence, from raw material, such as fish scales, was held by the District Court for the
District of Maine in PairpearlProducts v. Joseph H. Meyer Bros.,148 to be infringed
by defendants who claimed that use of soap was "experimental only, incidental to
their search for a new agent which they claimed to have discovered, and was not a
commercial operation." 149 The court found that "during these operations some two
hundred pounds of [soap] was used and that the resulting pearl essence, or the
principal part, was afterwards sold by the defendant and found its way into
commerce through the usual channels."150 Experimental use was denied as a defense
because the "amount of product, while not large, would be large enough to be
included in any accounting that would be taken."151 The court concluded that there
"is no doubt that the operations that the defendants referred to, using soap .... were
an infringement of the first patent in suit, assuming it's validity."1 52 Infringement,
therefore, was based on the benefit gained by practice of the claimed method; no
mention was made by the court of the purpose of the experimental use, which was
clearly commercial in nature.
In Ruth v. Sterns-RogerManufacturing Co., 153 the District Court for the District
of Colorado held that use by the Colorado School of Mines of patented machines and
cut up versions of patented machines in a laboratory was experimental. 154 The
doctrine of experimental use was summarized by the court:
The use of the patented machine for experiments for the sole purpose of
gratifying a philosophical taste or curiosity or for instruction and
amusement does not constitute an infringing use. The making or using of a
patented invention merely for experimental purposes, without any intent to
derive profits or practical advantage therefrom, is not infringement. 155

148

58 F.2d 802 (D. Me. 1932).

149 Id. at 804.
150 Id.
Ml Id.
152 Id. at 803-04.
153 13 F. Supp. 697 (D. Colo. 1935).
154 Id. at 703. The court described the use as follows:
The Colorado School of Mines, which is shown on table F as a purchaser of
parts, had various kinds of flotation machines, some of which were Minerals
Separation subaeration flotation machines, one Fahrenwald, and two Hunt
pneumatics. These machines were all used in a laboratory and were cut up and
changed from day to day. Their use was experimental. ...
The evidence is insufficient to show that the metal tank and flanges
contributed to the use of an infringing machine. With respect to the other sales of
parts, they were for use in laboratory machines used for experimental purposes,
and consequently did not contribute to an infringing use.

Id.
155

Id. at 713 (citations omitted).
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In holding that there was no "intent to derive profits or practical advantage" from the
patented invention, the court did not specify whether the experimental use by the
156
Colorado School of Mines had a business purpose.
Testing of patented radio receiver sets to determine operability and efficiency as
a step toward manufacture and sale of a defendant's product was held by the District
157
Court for the Eastern District of New York in Radio Corp. of America v. Andrea
not to be "experimental in the generally accepted connotation of that term," because
it was "not a scientific research," and "not pursued in the efforts to improve the set or
1 58
any element therein, nor, of course was the test one of curiosity or amusement."
The experimental use exception was described as "mere casual appropriation for
amusement or even scientific purpose" and, therefore, a "trifle," in contrast to "solely
commercial" testing, which was a "a step which defendants apparently deemed
1 59
necessary in the manufacture and sale of their product."
By this holding, the court implied that testing that was properly considered
"scientific research or an engineering inquiry," or "pursued in the efforts to improve"
a patented invention, would qualify as "experimental in the generally accepted
connotation of that term" and thus escape a holding of infringement, despite
commercial intent.1 60 Even so, the court narrowed the strict construction of Justice
Story's holding in Whittemore, which specifically excluded from infringement
construction of "a machine ... for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the
machine to produce its described effects."1 61 As previously discussed, infringement
must "deprive the owner of the lawful rewards of his discovery," which includes
deprivation of the patent owner "of the use and benefit of his patent."1 62 Justice
Story never considered "philosophical experiments" or "ascertain[ing] the sufficiency
of the machine to produce its described effects," or even "ascertaining the verity and
exactness of the specification" of a patent to be "trifles" that should be ignored by the
law as "mere casual appropriation for amusement."1 63 Rather, such uses simply were
outside the scope of the statutory exclusive right.
156

Id.

15 F. Supp. 685 (E.D.N.Y. 1936).
l , Id. at 687.
1, Id. The court stated the following:
It was not a scientific research or an engineering inquiry. It was not pursued in
the efforts to improve the set or any element therein; nor, of course, was the test
one of curiosity or amusement. It was a step which the defendants apparently
deemed necessary in the manufacture and sale of their product. ...
The statute does not limit the monopoly right conferred. Logically, it would
seem that any use of the invention is an invasion of the patentee's rights. It has
been repeatedly held that to sustain a patent it is not necessary that the patent
disclose that the inventor knew of or specified all the possible uses to which his
invention could be put. It should follow then that any use is within the exclusive
right of the patentee, though, of course, one can well understand that the law, not
concerning itself with trifles, would ignore a mere casual appropriation for
amusement or even scientific purpose. But in the present case the defendant's
use was solely commercial.
Id. (citations omitted).
160 See id.
161 Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).
162 Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391).
'63 Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1121.
157
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The District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, in Akro Agate Co.
v. Master Marble Co.,164 categorically held that experimental testing of patented
machinery employed to produce articles was not "an act of infringement" because the
articles, in this case, marbles, produced by the patented machine, were not
commercially sold.165 Specifically, citing Sawin and Bonsack, the court stated, as a
finding of fact: "t]hat the experimental testing by defendants of off-set rolls, for a
brief period before going into commercial production, in the period prior to the
adoption by defendants of their commercially used rolls without grooved offsets, was
not in law an act of infringement as marbles were not commercially sold."166
Experimental use was not a defense when customers benefited by the invention
in the ordinary course of business. For example, in Sprout, Waldron & Co. v. Bauer
Bros. Co.,1 67 the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio found that the
accused infringer operated a "sales-demonstration laboratory" that "operated on a
commercial scale," and "that in this laboratory defendant itself has actually practiced
the process of the Manson patent as a commercial operation as an adjunct to selling
defendants' machines, with the result that defendant is liable not only as a
contributory infringer but as a direct infringer as well."1 68 Under the findings of fact,
the court stated that "work was done for clients of defendant who paid for the work
and operation of these machines by defendant was on a commercial basis for
profit."1 69 The court held as a conclusion of law that experimental use was not a
defense "where the machines were used to operate upon customers' products in the
ordinary course of business." 170
1 71
In Northill Co., Inc. v. Danforth,
the court dismissed the defendant's
contention that he used anchors that "were made at his direction and for his benefit,"
only for "experimental purposes" because they "were evidently not made for
philosophical or amusement purposes but were made in connection with his business
as a manufacturer and salesman of anchors." 172 Unlike Akro Agate, there were, in
fact, commercial sales consequent to the accused infringing activity.1 73 The court in
Northill did not specify exactly what constituted the purported experimental use, but
clearly hinged its dismissal of experimental use defense on derivation of benefit of
the claimed invention by the accused infringer. 174
The court in Dugan v. Lear Avia, Inc.,1 75 in an action against a defendant who
had developed a system for use of radio beacons to automatically guide aircraft and
other vehicles, dismissed a portion of the suit because there was no manufacture for
sale of that particular embodiment.1 76 Despite commercial intent of the defendant's
activities, experimental use was successful as a defense with respect to those
18 F. Supp. 305 (N.D.W.Va. 1937).

'61

135 Id.at 333.
'66 Id. (citations omitted).
26 F. Supp. 162 (S.D. Ohio 1938).

617

Id. at 165.
16 Id. at 169.

168

170Id.
171

51 F. Supp. 928 (N.D. Cal. 1942).
at 929.

172Id.

17'Id.

Id.
55 F. Supp. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
176Id. at 229.

174

"75
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embodiments because the defendant "neither manufactured it for sale nor sold
any."177

In Chesterfield v. United States,178 the Court of Claims held that use by the
United States of a "422-19" alloy was "only for testing and for experimental
purposes," and not infringing because "the evidence shows that a portion of the 42219 alloy procured by the defendant was used only for testing and for experimental
purposes, and there is no evidence that the remainder was used other than
experimentally. Experimental use does not infringe." 17 9 The court asserted that the
experimental nature of the United States' use of another alloy also did not infringe
the plaintiffs patent claims:
Plaintiffs metallurgical expert testified that 6059 alloy was used
experimentally. As pointed out above, experimental use is not an infringing
use. It is noted that plaintiff has stated that 6059 alloy does not make full
use of the plaintiffs patented invention.
The claims in suit, if valid, are not infringed by defendant's use of the
18 0
accused 6059 alloy.
The United States clearly was not conducting experiments for the purpose of mere
amusement; the court recognized that the accused alloys were developed "for possible
181
use in the manufacturer of blades or buckets for superchargers and gas turbines."
By explicitly noting that the experimental work did not "make full use of the
plaintiffs patented invention,"1 82 the court implied that the nature of use of the
accused alloy did not confer on the United States the benefit of the patentee's
contribution to the art in exchange for which an exclusive patent right was granted.
Commercial application of a patented method was held by the court in Spray
Refrigeration Co. v. Sea Spray Fishing,Inc.,1 8 3 to be an infringement of plaintiffs
patent, despite assertions by the defendant that the method "was used on ...two
trips only for the purpose of experimentation as to the desirability of using this
method."1 84 The court distinguished the facts from Chesterfield and Dugan,
177 Id. ("The accused devices are represented by Exhibits 7, 8, 9 and 10.
Exhibit 9 can be
eliminated from consideration for it affirmatively appeared, without contradiction by plaintiff, that
defendant built that device only experimentally and that it has neither manufactured it for sale or
sold any.").
178 159 F. Supp. 371 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
17 Id. at 375.
180Id. at 376.
181 Chesterfield v. United States, 141 Ct. Cl. 838, 865 (1958). Specifically, the court stated, as a
finding of fact:
The three accused alloys were developed for possible use in the manufacture
of blades or buckets for superchargers and for gas turbines. The required physical
properties of alloys for use in high-speed superchargers and gas turbines are
different from the properties required of alloys for use in a cutting tool. Turbine
blades are required to withstand rotational stresses, corrosive action, thermal
shock, and impact stresses of a character not generally applied to cutting tools.
Id.
182 Chesterfield,159 F. Supp. at 376.
183 322 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1963).
181 Id. at 36.
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discussed above, by the fact that "in neither of those cases was the experimental use
coupled with a commercial use."18 5 Unlike the facts in Chesterfield and Dugan, the
defendants in Spray Refrigeration obtained a benefit of the claimed method by their
commercial application and, therefore, the experimental intent of the defendants' use
did not excuse them from a holding of infringement of the patentee's exclusive
right.18 6 As stated by the court in Spray Refrigeration:
The method described in the claims of the patent here in question was used
on one or two voyages of the Vagabond while that vessel was engaged in
commercial fishing operations of the kind which the patent was designed to
serve. Granting that the operators used the method experimentally it was
nevertheless, under these circumstances, an infringement of the patent
claims, and this without regard to whether the patented method proved to
18 7
be practicable, and preferable over other methods.
l
In Kaz Manufacturing, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Ponds, In8.,
88 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that use by the defendant of a "hybrid"
embodiment of patentee's claimed electric steam vaporizer, constructed from parts of
plaintiffs commercial models, in television advertisements to promote defendant's
product, was not an infringement of the plaintiffs patent.18 9 Relying on the cases
discussed above, including Ruth, Chesterfield, Dugan, and Bonsack, the court
summarized that "the purpose to which an unauthorized construction of a patented
article is put may determine whether the construction constitutes an infringement of
190
the patentee's rights."
The court recited, in a footnote, an analogy presented in the appellee's
(defendant's) brief "suggesting that one who that constructs a patented wall safe[,]
but uses it only as an anchor for his boat would not be a patent infringer since such
use would not be for the purpose of utilizing the teachings of the patent." 191 This
example, actually, is flawed, since, in Whittemore, Justice Story clearly stated, in
response to the assertion that "the making of a machine, is under no circumstances,
an infringement of the patent," that the "act of April 17, 1800 gave the action against
any person who should 'make, devise, use or sell' the invention." 192 The distinction,
instead, should be upon whether the benefit of the invention is gained. Therefore, a
more apt analogy would be to say that, although there would be no infringement if
the patented wall safe were immersed for experimental purposes only, such as for the
185 Id. ("In Chesterfield, the court quoted with approval that part of the Dugan opinion in
which Judge Rifkind pointed out that while the device there in question was built experimentally
the alleged infringer 'has neither manufactured it for sale nor sold any."').
186 Id. at 36-37.
187Id.
188 317 F.2d 679 (2d Cir. 1963).
189 Id. at 681. The Kaz court stated that "[s]ince the construction and single use of the hybrid

vaporizer in the commercial formed the only basis for plaintiffs claim of infringement, Judge Tyler's
granting of defendant's motion for summary judgment on count 1 was proper." Id. (citation
omitted).
190 Id. at 680.
191 Id. at 681 n.3.
192 Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600) (citation
omitted).
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purpose of determining whether it would sink, there would be a cause of action for
infringement in tying off one's boat from the sunken safe in the process of making
that determination.

2. Subordination ofExperimental Use to CommercialIntent
Although stated in dicta, since the patent at issue was held to be invalid, Trial
Judge Cooper for the Court of Claims of the United States in Douglas v. United
States 93 found that providing facilities at air bases for demonstrations of infringing
aircraft did not establish liability under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 as a use "by or for the
United States," nor was there liability consequent to the observation of
194
demonstrations of the infringing aircraft by representatives of the United States.
The fact that purchase of the accused aircraft occurred after expiration of the patent
was not sufficient to establish that actions conducted prior to its expiration were
infringing.195 The court concluded that, at most, the earlier activities could be
evidence of intent and "intent is not a sufficient basis on which to establish
196
liability."
The court then reviewed arguments made by the defendant that "it is not liable
for the reason that its only use of those items was experimental."'1 97 The court
disagreed, stating that "[tihe facts here plainly show that defendant's activities fall
outside the scope of permissible use that would be afforded under any statement of
the experimental use rule."1 98 In coming to this conclusion, however, the court cited
many of the cases discussed above and inaccurately characterized the vast majority
of precedent as holding "that the experimental use defense is not available where the
use, although of an experimental nature, was in connection with the user's
business." 199 The court conceded that, "[siome few courts, where only a single
193 181 U.S.P.Q. 170 (Ct. Cl. 1974). The opinion in Douglas was later modified in a per curiam
decision that did not incorporate the portions of Trial Judge Cooper's earlier opinion relating to
infringement. See Douglas v. United States, 510 F.2d 364 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
191Douglas, 181 U.S.P.Q. at 176. The court stated:
To establish liability under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, there must be a manufacture
or use by or for the United States. Clearly, the Harriers were not manufactured
either by or for defendant. Nor was there a use of the Harriers by the United
States, the only operational use being by the British. This leaves only the
question of whether the demonstration was a use for the United States.
It is concluded that it was not. Defendant's role was solely that of providing
the facilities and observing the demonstration. Although a sales demonstration
may be an infringing use, plaintiff has cited no authority for the proposition that
the observer of the demonstration can be held liable as an infringer.
Id. (citation omitted).
195 Id. ("To be actionable, an act of infringement must be shown to have occurred prior to the
expiration of the patent. The only proven action of defendant was procurement of the Harrier and
that occurred after expiration of the patent.").
196 Id. ("At most, this would suggest that, at the time of the demonstration, defendant intended
to procure the accused aircraft. However, intent is not a sufficient basis on which to establish
liability.").
197 Id.

198 Id. at 177.
199 Id. at 176.
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isolated use as been involved, have allowed the defense even though the alleged
experiments were plainly related to a commercial operation."200 However, it was the
opinion of Trial Judge Cooper, in the "very restricted circumstances under which the
defense has been permitted suggests, as at least one court has observed, that the
defense is nothing more than an expression of the maxim de minimis non curat lex.
20 1
Radio Corp. ofAmerica v. Andrea, supra."
The decision by the District Court for the Eastern District of New York, in Radio
Corp. of America, to which Judge Cooper refers in Douglas, denied the defense of
experimental use because the tests conducted were "to determine the operability and
efficiency" as "a step which the defendants apparently deemed necessary in the
manufacture and sale of their product," and, therefore, "not experimental in the
generally accepted connotation of that term." 20 2 The court in Radio Corp. ofAmerica
did not use the phrase, "de minimis non curat lex," but, rather, said that "one can
well understand that the law, not concerning itself with trifles, would ignore a mere
casual appropriation for amusement or even scientific purpose." 20 3 As discussed
above, however, the many cases in the century and a half between Whittemore and
Douglas do not bear out the conclusion of the court in Douglas that experimental use
constituted a defense to infringement because of its trivial or petty ("de minimis")
nature. Rather, in the cases discussed above, experimental use was successfully
invoked in defense of activities that, as aptly characterized by the court in Radio
Corp. ofAmerica, were directed to "scientific research or an engineering inquiry" that
were "pursued in the efforts to improve" a patented invention "or any element
therein." 204 Moreover, in almost every case, and contrary to the statement by the
court in Douglas, the experimental use was conducted "for the purpose of furthering
205
the legitimate interests of the user."
2 07
20 6
Two cases, Ordnance Engineering Corp. v. United States and Chesterfield
were identified by the court in Douglas as suggesting "that experimental use is
applicable in other than de minimis situations." 208 The Douglas court explained that,
in Ordnance Engineering,"the deduction for experimental use was uncontested, the
court making no reference to the doctrine [of experimental use] in its opinion," and,
regarding Chesterfield,"there was no evidence as to the use of the bulk of the alloy so
it was simply treated in the same manner as the small part that was found to have

200

Id.

Id. at 177 (citing Radio Corp. of Am. v. Andrea, 15 F. Supp. 685, 687 (E.D.N.Y. 1936). The
court considered case precedent where the "experimental use" defense has been successfully applied
and concluded that "[m]ost certainly, in none of the cases from other federal courts has the defense
been permitted where there was a pattern of systematic exploitation, extending over a prolonged
period, of a plurality of the accused devices for the purpose of furthering the legitimate interests of
the user." Id.
202 Radio Corp., 15 F. Supp. at 687.
201

20:3Id.
204

Id.

Douglas, 181 U.S.P.Q. at 177.
32 U.S.P.Q. 614 (1936).
207 Chesterfield v. United States, 141 Ct. Cl. 838 (1958).
208 Douglas, 181 U.S.P.Q. at 177.
205
206
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been used experimentally." 20 9 The court did not point out portions of the opinion in
Chesterfield, discussed above, that stated, "[e]xperimental use does not infringe. 2 10
Trial Judge Cooper, in Douglas, appeared to reflect the opinions of an article in
the Journal of the Patent Office Society, which he referred to as "a more complete
exposition of the development of the experimental use defense." 211 The author of the
article, Mr. Richard E. Bee, argued that the "experimental use exception does not
represent sound law," and that, where it is applied, "the rule should be strictly
2 12
construed and held inapplicable where a business purpose or profit motive exists.
In conducting his analysis, Bee began with a quotation from Robinson on patents,
stating that, where "experiments are conducted with a view to the adaptation of the
invention to the experimentor's business, the acts of making or of use are violations
of the rights of the inventor and infringements of his patent."213 Bee also quoted
from Corpus Juris and Corpus Juris Secundum and commented that, "like Robinson,
they both carefully qualify the exception by adding 'This rule, however, cannot be
invoked for the protection of one who uses a patented invention commercially, as in
the course of business or for profit."' 214 Bee acknowledged that "there may be reasons
of public policy for granting certain persons in certain circumstances immunity from
the normal operation of the patentee's rights" and included, as examples, "college and
government research scientists," but concluded that "it does not necessarily follow
that experimental research conducted by a private industrial concern in order to
develop products to compete with patentee's products should be granted an
215
exemption."
Bee reviewed several of the cases discussed above, but dismissed, as inconsistent
with case precedent, decisions, such as Dugan and Akro Agate, where experimental
use was successfully employed as a defense, as appearing to be "clearly wrong"
because they "appear to imply that any use which is in the nature of an experiment is
not an act of patent infringement if the machine or the product made by the machine
is not sold." 21 6 Bee noted that the courts in both Dugan and Akro Agate relied on
Bonsack.217 Experimental use was raised as a defense in Bonsack, but dismissed by
the court because the "machine has not been made simply as an experiment, but has
been used for profit."21 8 As discussed above, the defendant in Bonsack obtained the
intended benefit of the machine by its use and relied on that benefit to his advantage;
any experimental aspect was overridden by the defendant's promotional activities.
The courts in both Dugan and Akro Agate based application of experimental use on

209 Id.

Chesterield 141 Ct. Cl. at 846.
Douglas, 181 U.S.P.Q. at 176 n.3 (citing Richard E. Bee, Experimental Use as an Act of
PatentInfringement,39 J. PAT OFF. SOC'Y 357 (1957)).
212 Bee, supra note 211, at 377.
213 Id.
at 358 (quoting Robinson, supra note 90).
214 Bee, supra note 211, at 377 (quoting 48 C.J., Patents § 496 (1929); 69 C.J.S., Patents § 288
210
211

(1951)).

Id. at 359.
Id. at 375.
217 Id.
("Both cases rely on the earlier case of Bonsack Machine Co. v. Underwood which, in
turn, relies on Justice Story's opinion in Sawin v. Guild.").
218 Bonsack Mach. Co. v. Underwood, 73 F. 206, 211 (C.C.E.D.N.C. 1896).
215
216
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the distinction from Bonsack that there was no commercial sale. 219 However, Bee
further noted that the court in Bonsack relied, in turn, on Sawin, which, as
paraphrased by Bee, "said there should be an intent to use for profit and did not say
that there must be an actual use for profit," 220 and based his conclusion that Dugan
and Akro Agate were wrongly decided on this distinction:
In both the Dugan and Akro Agate cases, the experiments were conducted
in the ordinary course of business and with a view towards future profits,
which would seem to be an intent to use for profit .... Accordingly, the
Dugan and Akro Agate cases would appear to be clearly wrong in so far as
221
they require an actual sale to defeat the experimental use exception.
Bee was correct in reciting the portion of Justice Story's opinion, which stated
that there "must be the making with an intent to use for profit,"' 222 but did not recite
the context in which Justice Story's statement was made. Recalling Sawin, although
a machine within the scope of the patent and owned by the patentee was seized and
sold in foreclosure of a debt by the plaintiff, neither the defendant, nor the purchaser
put the machine sold into operation. 223 The court in Sawin held that there was no
infringement because there was "no pretence ... that the officer had either sold or
guaranteed a right to use the machine in the manner pointed out in the patentright." 224 Focusing on what Justice Story refers to as "the use and benefit" of a
patent, rather than "intent to use for profit," 225 renders Dugan and Akro Agate
consistent with other cases summarized by Bee in which, unlike Dugan and Akro
Agate, the court did not uphold an experimental use defense. 226 In all of the cases
summarized by Bee, except for Beedle, where the Supreme Court held that there was
infringement by a defendant's use of a patented well installed without the consent of
the patentee in a house rented by the defendant, 227 the infringing uses were "clearly
in the course of business." 228 In Dugan and Akro Agate, for example, the use was
held by the court in each case to be solely experimental, that is, a "philosophical

219

See Akro Agate Co. v. Master Marble Co., 18 F. Supp. 305, 333 (D.C.N.D.W.V. 1937) ("That

the experimental testing by defendants of offset roles ... was not in law an act of infringement as
marbles were not commercially sold."); Dugan v. Lear Avia, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 223, 229 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.
1944) ("Exhibit 9 can be eliminated from consideration for it affirmatively appeared, without
contradiction by the plaintiff, that defendant built that device only experimentally and that it has
neither manufactured it for sale or sold any.").
220 Bee, supra note 211, at 375.
221

Id.

Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391).
Id. ("The purchaser, at the sheriffs sale, has not, at any time since, put either of the said
machines in operation; and the whole infringement of the patent consists in the seizure and sale by
the defendant as aforesaid.").
224 Id. at 555.
222
223

225

Id.

226

See Bee, supra note 211, at 375.
See Beedle v. Bennett, 122 U.S. 71, 77 (1887).
Bee, supra note 211, at 373. For example, with reference to the holding in Akro Agate, Bee

227
228

stated that "[the court in this case appears to be clearly wrong. The use of the patented mechanism
was clearly in the course of business." Id.
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experiment," having as its purpose discovery, which, like sale, alone, is not a "use and
229
benefit" that deprives the owner of the lawful rewards of his discovery.
Cases decided after Douglas,for a time, preserved experimental use as a defense
to infringement as it had been applied historically. For example, in Pitcairn v.
United States, 230 the court denied the Government's contention that the plaintiff
should not be compensated for "any aircraft used by the defendant for testing,
evaluational, demonstrational or experimental purposes," because "every new
helicopter must be tested for lifting ability, for the effect of vibration on installed
231
equipment, flight speed and range, engine efficiency, and numerous other factors."
The court held that such tests are "intended uses ... in keeping with the legitimate
business of the using agency," and that, therefore, "[experimental use is not a
defense in the present litigation." 23 2 The court found that there was "no evidence in
defendant's offer of proof that any of the helicopters to which defendants'
'experimental use' contentions pertain were built solely for experimental
purposes." 233 The court, however, was careful to note that "static test mechanisms"
and "experimental helicopters" designed, developed, and manufactured under
"[n]umerous research and development contracts" were excluded by the plaintiff from
litigation. 23 4 Therefore, the court in Pitcairnwas consistent with earlier decisions
that excluded from infringement those activities that were conducted solely for
experimental purposes, albeit in a commercial setting, and also was consistent with
cases, such as, for example, Radio Corp. of America, discussed above, where factory
235
testing preliminary to shipment was denied protection as "experimental use."
Interestingly, however, the court in Pitcairn specifically commended the view
expressed by Trial Judge Cooper in his opinion in Douglas "as a well reasoned and
historical analysis":
Defendant has also referred to the experimental use portion of Trial Judge
Cooper's opinion and report to the court in Douglas v. United States ....
While the trial judge's discussion of the experimental use rule in various
courts is not the law of the case in Douglas, it is a well reasoned and
236
historical analysis.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar
2 7
PharmaceuticalCo.,
3 faced, for the first time, the question of infringement by use of

229 See Akro Agate Co. v. Master Marble Co., 18 F. Supp. 305, 333 (N.D.W.Va. 1937); Dugan v.
Lear Avia, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 223, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
2,30 547 F.2d 1106 (Ct. Cl. 1976), as amended on reh'g(1977).
231 Id. at 1125.
2,32 Id. at 1125-26 ("Tests, demonstrations, and experiments of such nature are intended uses of

the infringing aircraft manufactured for the defendant and are in keeping with the legitimate
business of the using agency. Experimental use is not a defense in the present litigation.").
23:

Id. at 1125.
("Plaintiff has excluded from its present claim static test mechanisms manufactured for

231 Id.

defendant. Numerous research and development contracts were entered into by the defendant and
various manufacturers for the design, development and manufacture of experimental helicopters
and none of those specific helicopters are the subject of this litigation.").
235 Radio Corp. of Am. v. Andrea, 15 F. Supp. 685, 687 (E.D.N.Y. 1936).
2,36 Pitcairn,547 F.2d at 1126.
2 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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a patented article, a drug, to conduct federally mandated pre-marketing tests. 238 The
court reversed the decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, which denied a permanent injunction requested by Roche on
the basis that "Bolar's use was de minimis and experimental."' 23 9 The Federal
Circuit, in summarizing the experimental use exception, as previously applied, noted
that "Bolar concedes, as it must, that its intended use of flurazepam hcl does not fall
within the 'traditional limits' of the experimental use exception as established in
these cases or those of other circuits." 240 According to the court, the experimental use
exception should be narrowly construed, and Bolar's concession was determinative:
Its concession here is fatal. Despite Bolar's argument that its tests are
"true scientific inquiries" to which a literal interpretation of the
experimental use exception logically should extend, we hold the
experimental use exception to be truly narrow, and we will not expand it
under the present circumstances. Bolar's argument that the experimental
241
use rule deserves a broad construction is not justified.
The "narrow" construction applied by the Federal Circuit was derived from case
precedent, beginning with Justice Story's opinion in Whittemore and Robinson's
treatise, The Law of Patentsfor Useful Invention. 242 The court also referenced Bee's
article, discussed above, from the Journalof the Patent Office Society, and, like the
court in Pitcairn, complimented Trial Judge Cooper's nonprecedential opinion in
Douglas:
Douglas has no precedential value here since the Court of Claims never
affirmed the part of the trial judge's opinion dealing with experimental use;
moreover, Trial Judge Cooper's well-reasoned analysis of the experimental
use rule concluded that no case had permitted a pattern of systematic
exploitation of a patented invention for the purpose of furthering the
legitimate business interests of the infringer. The authority of Trial Judge
Cooper's views rests on his reputation as a fine patent lawyer, and on their
243
own intrinsic persuasiveness.
Pitcairn was cited as "the most persuasive of the Court of Claims cases
concerning the experimental use defense," and Judge Nichols, for the court in Roche,
quoted a portion of Pitcairn, stating that 'tests, demonstrations, and
experiments ... [which] are in keeping with the legitimate business' of
238
239
240

Id. at 858.
Id. at 861.
Id. at 863.

241 Id.
212 Id. at 862 ("The so-called experimental use defense to liability for infringement generally is
recognized as originating in a opinion written by Supreme Court Justice Story while on Circuit in
Massachusetts."). The court in Roche referred to Justice Story's opinion in Whittemore v. Cutter.
Id. The court further stated, "Professor Robinson firmly entrenched the experimental use exception

into patent law when he wrote his famous treatise, W. Robinson, The Law of Patents for Useful
Inventions § 898 (1890) .... Id.
213 Roche,

733 F.2d at 863.
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the ... [alleged infringer] are infringements for which 'experimental use is not a
defense."' 244 However, the Roche court did not mention that the plaintiff in Pitcairn
excluded from litigation "static test mechanisms" as well as "experimental
helicopters" designed, developed, and manufactured under "[n]umerous research and
development
contracts.., entered
into by the
defendant
and various
manufacturers."' 245 Other cases relied upon by the defendant in Roche, such as
Ordinance Engineeringand Chesterfield, were dismissed as providing "no guidance
concerning the boundaries of an appropriately applied experimental use rule" 246 or as
"pure obiter dictum."247
The court in Roche did not create new law. Rather, like the courts in several
earlier cases, including Douglas and Pitcairn,testing, as a prerequisite to sale of a
product, either as a demonstration or for assurance of suitability, was not considered
to be "philosophical inquiry." 248 Rather, courts consistently held such use to be an
infringement of a patentee's exclusive right to benefit from his discovery. The
difference in Roche was that the court was required to consider federally mandated
testing that, if delayed until expiration of the patent, would, effectively, extend the
249
patent term.
According to the Roche court, Bolar argued "that even if no establisheddoctrine
exists with which it can escape liability for patent infringement, public policy
requires that we create a new exception to the use prohibition." 250 The court
explained the dilemma as follows:
Because most FDA-required testing is done after a patent issues, the
remaining effective life of patent protection assertedly may be as low as 7
years. Litigation such as this is one example of how research-oriented
pharmaceutical companies have sought to regain some of the earning time
251
lost to regulatory entanglements.

244

Id.

215

Soo Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1125 (Ct. Cl. 1976), as amended on reh'g

(1977).
246

Roche, 733 F.2d at 863 ("The Ordnance Engineeringcase provides no guidance concerning

the boundaries of an appropriately applied experimental use rule other than flatly stating that a
device must have been 'built for experimental purposes."').
247 Id. ("In Chesterfield, the court's flat declaration that 'experimental use does not infringe' is

pure obiter dictum.").
248 Douglas v. United States, 181 U.S.P.Q. 170, 176 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
Trial Judge Cooper
distinguished between a "sales demonstration" as an infringing use from the mere act of observation
of a sales demonstration:
Although a sales demonstration may be an infringing use, plaintiff has cited no
authority for the proposition that the observer of the demonstration can be held
liable as an infringer. The planes having been owned and operated by the British
and the demonstration having been promoted and financed by them for the
purpose of inducing a purchase of the aircraft, there was no taking by the United
States and no use for the United States.
Id. (citation omitted).
249 Roche, 733 F.2d at 864.
250 Id. at 863.
251 Id. at 864.
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The court declined to adopt a new construction of the existing law of
infringement in view of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"), and
presumed that Congress was aware of its effect:
Simply because a later enacted statute affects in some way an earlier
enacted statute is poor reason to ask us to rewrite the earlier
statute.... Rather, because "laws are presumed to be passed with
deliberation, and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the same
subject," T. Sedgwick, The Interpretation and Construction of Statutory
Law 106 (2d Ed. 1874), we must presume Congress was aware that the
FDCA would affect the earning potentiality of a drug patent, and chose to
permit it. Although arguably Title 21 and Title 35 are not laws on the
"same subject," we note that during Congress' deliberations on the 1962
amendments to the FDCA, it considered the relationship and interaction of
252
the patent laws with the drug laws.
In Deuterium Corp. v. United States, 253 the plaintiff, Deuterium Corporation,
sued the United States for infringement of U.S. 4,123,506, which was directed to a
process for removing hydrogen sulfide from geothermal steam. 254 The purported
infringing activity was conducted in a pilot plant owned by ETC Laboratories, Inc.
256
("EIC").255 The court held that there was no literal infringement of the patent.
Judge Rader, in dictum, disagreed with the defendant's assertion that use of the heat
exchanger in the pilot plant, even if within the scope of the '506 patent, fits within
252 Id. (citing S.Rep. No.1744, 87th Congress, 2d Sess., roprintedin 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2884,
2911-15). The portion of the Senate report referenced by the court in Roche appears, in fact, to be
openly hostile to patent protection for drug products:
In the major European countries the method historically followed is that
exemplified by West Germany, which does not grant patents on drugs [sic]
products, per se, but does grant them on drug processes, with the protection
extending to the product as long as it is manufactured by that process; i.e., the
patent protection of the product disappears upon the discovery of an alternative
process, which frequently takes place in the drug industry; in testimony before the
Antitrust Subcommittee Mr. P.H. Federico, examiner in chief of the Patent Office,
acknowledged that the manufacture of drugs is particularly susceptible to the
development of alternative processes. Incidentally it should be noted that the
special treatment long accorded drug patents in these countries has not spread to
other industries.
From the experience of Germany and other countries which have similar
methods of patent protection for drug products, it is obvious that an excellent
record of performance can be achieved in the development of new drugs under a
patent system which grants much weaker patent protection than is accorded in
the United States.
1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2913-14.
253 19 Ct. Cl. 624 (1990).
254 Id. at 625.
255 Id.
("Plaintiff contends the United States used the process in a heat exchanger at The
Geysers geothermal power plant in California .... The heat exchanger HX103 was a part of EIC's
pilot plant at The Geysers. During its tests, EIC modified HX103, originally designed as a cooling
component, to preheat the reactant used to clean steam.").
256 Id. at 631 ("In the case at bar, steps (d) and (f) of claim 57 are absent from the accused
HX103 process. Therefore, the heat exchanger did not infringe the '506 patent.").
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the experimental use exception to patent liability. 257 Writing for the court, Judge
Rader categorized earlier opinions that declined to impose an experimental use
exception, including Douglas, Pitcairn, and Roche, as applying a "purpose test,"
which he defined by use of a quotation from Trial Judge Cooper's opinion in Douglas:
Indeed, the Court of Claims trial judge proceeded to apply a purpose test for
application of the doctrine:
At no time were the accused devices used for amusement, to satisfy idle
curiosity, or for philosophical inquiry; to the contrary, each use was in
keeping with the legitimate business of the using agency and served a
25
valuable governmental and public purpose. 8
The "purpose test" was applied in Pitcairn,according to Judge Rader, in the following
quotation from that court's opinion:
Use for such purposes is use by or for the Government and is compensable.
Obviously every new helicopter must be tested for lifting ability, for the
effect of vibration on installed equipment, flight speed and range, engine
efficiency, and numerous other factors.
Tests, demonstrations and
experiments of such nature are intended uses of the infringing aircraft
manufactured for the defendant and are in keeping with the legitimate
business of the using agency. Experimental use is not a defense in the
259
present litigation.
With respect to Roche, Judge Rader stated that the "Federal Circuit applied the
purpose test and determined that Bolar's use was 'solely for business reasons and not
for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity or for strictly philosophical inquiry."' 260 The
court's decision in Roche was broadly characterized by Judge Rader's conclusion that
"[tihe Federal Circuit declined to apply the experimental exception to unauthorized
26 1
uses with 'definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes."'
Judge Rader framed application of the experimental use defense in terms of
whether the activities were "in keeping with the legitimate business of the using
agency," or had "definite, cognizable and not insubstantial commercial purposes,"
affirmative answers to which would bar application of the experimental use
doctrine. 262 However, such analyses do not distinguish between the acts of discovery
without otherwise benefiting from an invention, which have never been considered to
be infringing activities regardless of commercial intent, and activities that do
otherwise benefit from a claimed invention (even if the activities are only

257 Id.

at 635 ("Finally, the experimental use exception does not apply to the EIC pilot

program.").
258 Id. at 631 (quoting Douglas v. United States, 181 U.S.P.Q. 170, 177 (Ct. Cl. 1974)).
259 Id. at 631-32 (quoting Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1125-26 (Ct. Cl. 1976)).
260 Id. at 632 (quoting Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir.

1984)).
261 Id. at 632 (quoting Roche, 733 F.2d at 863).
262 Id.
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preparatory, such as in Roche and Pitcairn),which have always been considered to be
263
infringing uses, even if they are not commercially motivated.
Infigen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Technology, Inc. 264 appears to be a relatively early
case directed to the question of whether use of patented research tools could be
considered an exception to infringement under experimental use doctrine. 265 The
patent, as the court stated, was "directed to a process for activating bovine oocytes
(unfertilized eggs) for use in cloning." 266 The defendants argued that it should be for
a jury to decide "whether science-and mankind-benefits when researchers ... use
otherwise patented technology as controls or otherwise in their university-based
research laboratories." 267 The court disagreed, stating that "it is up to Congress to
decide whether there should be an infringement exception for university-based
research laboratories." 268 The court then went further and remarked that, although
"[there is a common law experimental exception to infringement.., its scope has
never been explored in detail."2 6 9 Nevertheless, the court stated that the defendants'
use of the claimed cloning technique and culture media was "for commercial

263

Id.

Judge Rader, nevertheless, correctly stated in a footnote to his discussion of the decision

by the court in Roche, that Title II of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
of 1984, specifically 35 U.S.C. § 271(e), "did not disturb the Federal Circuit's enunciation of the
parameters of the experimental use exception." Id. at n. 14. In other words, authorization under the
statute to "make, use, or sell, a patented invention (other than a new animal drug or veterinary
biological product . . . ) solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of
information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs," carved out,
in response to the decision by the court in Roche, a statutory exception where, historically,
experimental use doctrine would not apply, namely, testing conducted in anticipation of sale; such
tests were not conducted for the purpose of discovery, but as a prerequisite to commercial
distribution. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006).
Also, interestingly, Judge Rader addressed a recommendation by the defendant to adopt
"the objective standards" employed to negate the prohibition against activities considered to be
"public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to" an application under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Deuterium, 19 Ct. Cl. at 632. Judge Rader distinguished between experimental
use as an exception to public use or sale from experimental use as an exception to infringing use on
the basis that the former "protects an inventor's intellectual property for the period of development
and testing prior to patent application," while the latter "narrows the scope of intellectual property
protection." Id. Judge Rader concluded that "the broader objective standards developed to protect
an inventor during experimentation prior to patent application do not apply to experiments by a
potential infringer." Id.
Judge Rader's distinction between the two experimental use doctrines is founded on the
premise that discovery, as an activity, is embraced within the inventor's exclusive right, and so fails
to consider the inconsistency inherent in permitting indefinite public experimentation in the course
of reducing an invention to practice, and yet denying protection of the same right of discovery to the
public after an exclusive right has been granted. Id. In other words, both types of experimental use
deal with discovery related to an invention; to the extent that experimental use by an inventor is
not, even though public, a contribution to the art (because suitability for use has not yet been
established), there is a parallel with experimental use by an otherwise infringer because discovery,
as a consequence of experimental use, does not confer on the user any benefit of the patented
invention other than the opportunity to learn about it. Id.
264 65 F. Supp. 2d 967 (W.D. Wis. 1999).
265 Id. at 982.
266 Id. at 969.
267 Id. at 981.
268 Id.
269 Id.
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purposes" and not "merely to satisfy the curiosity of researchers" and, therefore, did
270
not qualify for exception to infringement under the experimental use doctrine.
In this case, then, the court, consistent with the previous applications of the
experimental use doctrine in the vast majority of cases, declined to apply the
experimental use exception when the benefit of the invention claimed was conferred
by the accused activities. The defendants' practice of the claimed cloning techniques
and use of the claimed culture media in those experiments was not an investigation
of that claimed subject matter, but rather a use, the benefit of which advanced the
defendants' objective of developing transgenic cattle. The fact that development of
transgenic cattle was for commercial purposes was immaterial; infringement of the
claimed cloning technique and use of the claimed culture media would properly have
been found regardless of whether the defendant had a commercial intent.

B. Inherency

1. Benefit in the PriorArt as a Threshold
Inherency is related to the idea that anticipation can only be found by
deprivation of the public of the benefit of otherwise patentable subject matter.
Accidental or unwitting practice of subject matter that was later independently
developed and patented was addressed by the Supreme Court in Tighman v.
Proctor.271 The Court upheld the validity of a patent, directed to the separation of
fatty acids from glycerin by exposure in the presence of water to elevated
temperature and pressure, over several patents and known processes, which the
Court acknowledged as possibly conducting, albeit "accidentally and unwittingly," the
process claimed in Tilghman's patent. 272 However, in each of these instances, the
Court held that, because the process was incidental and went unappreciated, the
mere fact of its prior occurrence was insufficient to deprive Tilghman of his right to
273
patent protection.
The first instance of accidental anticipation recited by the Court was "Perkins's
steam cylinder," which employed tallow to lubricate a piston. 274 The Court found
that the possible earlier presence of fatty acids in "scum which rose on the water
issuing from the ejection pipe" of the steam cylinder, although being the result of the
270

Id.

The court stated, specifically:

It is undisputed that defendants used plaintiffs patented activation methods
and culture media in their cloning experiments and that the purpose of those
experiments was to develop transgenic cattle that could be used for commercial
purposes, including the production of transgene products.
These were not
"philosophical" experiments or experiments carried out merely to satisfy the
curiosity of researchers; they were done as part of the ongoing business activities
of defendant Advanced Cell. No common law research or experimentation
exception is applicable.

Id.
102 U.S. 707 (1880).
Id. at 711.
Id. at 711-12.
274Id. at 711.
271
272
2
73

[6:373 2007]

A New Day Yesterday

process claimed by Tilghman, would not represent an anticipation because "[those
engaged in the art of making candles, or in any other art in which fat acids are
desirable, certainly never derived the least hint from this accidental phenomenon in
275
regard to any practicable process for manufacturing such acids."
Likewise, the Court held that a water barometer and a method for purifying fats
and oils for manufacture of soap did not to anticipate Tilghman's patented process
because, if they produced fatty acids by the method patented by Tilghman, the fact of
their production went unappreciated:
The accidental effects produced in Daniell's water barometer and in
Walther's process for purifying fats and oils preparatory to soap-making,
are of the same character [as that of Perkins's steam cylinder]. They
revealed no process for the manufacture of fat acids. If the acids were
accidentally and unwittingly produced, whilst the operators were in pursuit
of other and different results, without exciting attention and without its
even being known what was done or how it had been done, it would be
276
absurd to say that this was an anticipation of Tilghman's discovery.
A prior patent, directed to boiling fat in a reduced amount of water and at a
significantly lower temperature and pressure than described by Tilghman in his
specification, also was considered not to be anticipatory:
Nor do we regard the patent of Manicler, which was taken out in 1826, as
anticipating the process of Tilghman. It is true that he directs a mixture of
fat with about one-quarter of its weight of water to be placed in a boiler, and
subjected to a heat sufficient to create a pressure equal to one atmosphere
above the natural atmospheric pressure (to about 2500 Fah.) ....

It is

probable, therefore, that any decomposition of the fat which may have been
produced by this process was due to the steam formed and passing through
the fat, as no means appears to have been adopted for keeping up the
277
mixture of the fat and water.
In parallel to the discussions above with respect to experimental use of patented
processes that were held to not anticipate later discovery because the public never
benefited as a result, the Court further held that an attempt to put the process
described in the Manicler patent into practice was nothing "but an abandoned
experiment." 278 The Court did not specify whether production of fatty acids by
Tilghman's patented process was considered a necessary consequence of the earlier
known process. Rather, the Court found that the public did not benefit by fatty acids

2 5 Id.
276

277

Id. at 711-12.
Id. at 712.

278
Id.
("But we have no evidence that the process was ever successful in
practice.... Evidently, therefore, this was but an abandoned experiment, since we never hear any
more of it from 1826 down to the trial of this cause.").
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generated in the prior art. Tilghman made an independent discovery, 279 and was
28 0
entitled to an exclusive right to his process under a patent.
In subsequent cases, inherent anticipation hinged on whether benefit of the
patented subject matter was obtained at the expense of the public. Manufacture,
use, and even sale required that the benefit of the invention be part of the public
domain to constitute anticipation.
Consideration of inherency in holdings of patentability and infringement can be
found again in Carnegie Steel Co. v. CambriaIron Co. 281 There, the Supreme Court
held that a process for production of steel that collected molten iron from separate
furnaces in a "dominant pool" prior to further processing was not anticipated by
earlier patents or activities which also collected molten metal from multiple furnaces,
but, unlike the claimed method, did not require or suggest reservation of any portion
of the amounts pooled in the reservoir. 28 2 For example, with respect to an earlier
patent to Deighton, characterized as "the closest approximation to the principle of the
Jones invention," 28 3 the Court quoted the object of the process from the Deighton
patent, as follows:
Instead of manufacturing Bessemer iron or steel from pig iron, which has to
be melted in cupolas, my invention also consists in taking the molten metal
directly from the blast furnace to the converter, in which case I prefer to
arrange the Bessemer plant in a line at a right angle to a row of two or
more blast furnaces, and place a vessel to receive the molten metal tapped
from two or more blast furnaces to get a better average of metal which will
be more suitable for making Bessemer steel or metal of uniform quality, the
vessel or receiver being placed on a weighing machine so that any required
28 4
weight may be drawn or tapped from it and charged into the converter.
Even though the Deighton process could be operated in a manner within the scope of
the Jones patent, the Court held that there was no such disclosure, whereby a
"constant quantity of molten iron should always be kept in such a reservoir to serve
as a basis for such mixture and an equalizer of the different discharges." 28

5

The fact

279

Id. at 713 ("We are satisfied Tilghman was the original discoverer of this process.").

280

Id.

at 708 ("Upon renewed consideration which has been given to the subject, the court is

unanimously of opinion ...
process....").

that the patent of Tilghman must be sustained as a patent for a

185 U.S. 403 (1902).
See id. at 415.
283 Id. at 418 ("The English patent to Deighton of 1873, for 'improvements in the arrangement
and mode of working an apparatus for the manufacture of Bessemer steel,' contains the closest
281
282

approximation to the principle of the Jones invention. If this does not anticipate, none does.").
281
285

Id. at 419.
Id. at 419-20. The Court stated:
While Deighton seems to have conceived the idea that uniformity of product
was necessary to the successful use of the direct process, and might be attained by
mixing the discharge from several blast furnaces in an open reservoir, standing
between the furnaces and the converter, the dominant idea of the Jones invention,
that a constant quantity of molten iron should always be kept in such reservoir to
serve as a basis for such mixture and an equalizer of the different discharges, does
not seem to have occurred to him .... There is nowhere in the specification a
suggestion of supplying to and withdrawing from the reservoir small amounts at a
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that some "residuum" of metal would be left in ladles employed by methods of the
prior art was considered to be "merely an incident of the operation of the ladle,"
which was "of no substantial benefit in securing uniformity of the product" and,
therefore, not anticipatory of the Jones patent. 286 With respect to inherency, even the
mixing necessary to use of a common ladle among several furnaces was not sufficient
to defeat the validity of the patent if that mixing was a "matter of indifference or
287
accident."
The validity of the Jones patent hinged on the benefit to the art contributed by
his discovery:
It should be borne in mind that this process was one not accidentally
discovered, but was the result of a long search for the very purpose. The
surprise is that the manufacturers of steel, having felt the want for so many
years, should never have discovered from the multiplicity of patents and of
processes introduced into this suit, and well known to the manufacturers of
steel, that it was but a step from what they already knew to that which they
had spent years in endeavoring to find out. It only remains now for the
wisdom which comes after the fact to teach us that Jones discovered
28 8
nothing, invented nothing, accomplished nothing.

time, a constant quantity of metal being retained in the reservoir for the purpose
of equalizing the different products of the blast furnaces.

Id.
286

Id. at 429. As stated by the Court:
An attempt was made to show that the Jones invention was anticipated by
the practice common in steel works prior thereto, of tapping iron from cupola
furnaces into a receiving ladle, which became known as the Bessemer cupola
ladle, from which it was poured into the converters. Molten iron was tapped from
several cupolas into this ladle, from which a charge was drawn and delivered to
the converter vessel. Of course, if the ladle were of greater capacity than was
necessary to charge a single converter, a residuum of metal would be left in it; but
this seems to have been merely an incident of the operation of the ladle, which
was used primarily for storage, and to have been of no substantial benefit in
securing uniformity of product, which can only be obtained by making the receiver
of larger size and retaining a considerable quantity of metal in it after each
discharge.

287

Id. at 445. The Court stated:
Discarding now all that does not bear directly upon the validity of the Jones
patent, and dropping all superfluity of words, let us determine exactly what Jones
has contributed, if anything, to the art of making steel. He undoubtedly found
reservoirs of small size in use in which were poured from receiving ladles enough
molten metal to fill them, and from which a sufficient amount was discharged to
supply a converter, usually about half the size of the reservoir. But in these cases
the fact whether any particular amount of metal was left in a reservoir was
treated as a matter of indifference or accident, although there must have been
necessarily some incidental mixing; and probably the metal as it ran into the
converters approximated more nearly to uniformity than when it ran into the
reservoir.

288

Id. at 445-46.

Id.

Id.
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Similarly, the possibility of occurrence by actions of an accused infringer would
require consideration of whether the benefit of the claimed invention was gained,
regardless of intent:
This proposition that the application of this patent depends upon the
individual intent of the operator overlooks the essential nature of a process
patent. The directions and specifications of such a patent are addressed to
those engaged and skilled in the art. It professes to disclose a method of
procedure, not the particular instrumentality that may be employed. It
may be, as suggested, that one person may, and in ignorance of the
patented method, make use of a reservoir merely as such, and without any
desire to avail himself of the patented process; but such a fact would not
289
deprive the discoverer of the process of the protection of his patent.
In dissent, Justice White, with whom Chief Justice Fuller and Justices Harlan
and Brewer concurred, paraphrased the majority opinion as adopting the views of the
290
circuit court:
The opinion of this court now, as did that of the Circuit Court, expressly
concedes that reservoiring of molten metal was well known in the art at the
time the Jones patent was applied for, and that mixing was the inevitable
result of such reservoiring, but it is decided that this fact did not operate to
deprive the Jones method of novelty or to relieve the defendant from the
291
charge of infringement.
The dissent framed the issue as "whether the defendant, in reservoiring its molten
metal, irrespective of the supply and demand, intentionally retained in the reservoir
a considerable residuum." 292 However, by hinging the decision on the intent in the
prior art or by the accused infringer, while conceding that placing molten metal in a
reservoir was well known at the time the Jones patent was issued, the majority
conferred, according to the dissent, an exclusive right "to do the very thing which the
Court admits was well known at the time the patent to Jones was issued,"293 with the

289

Id. at 441.

Id. at 453 (White, J., dissenting) ("This court now reverses the decree of the Circuit Court of
Appeals, adopts the views of the Circuit Court, and in effect affirms the decree of that court.").
291 Id. at 453-54 (White, J., dissenting).
292 Id. at 451 (White, J., dissenting).
293 Id. at 456-57 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White stated in his dissent:
290

Aside from this, it seems to me the concession that the placing of molten
metal in a reservoir for use as required was well known at the time the Jones
patent was issued, is inconsistent with the ruling now made, that the Jones
patent validly embraced the retention in a reservoir of a mass of such metal, now
described by the court as a dominant pool ....
If it be meant by the court that the
right to reservoir carries with it the right to draw off or retain at will, unless the
person reservoiring intends to retain a residuum for a particular purpose, the
reasoning reduces itself again to the proposition that the Jones patent covers, not
the process described therein, but the mind and intention of the individual who
may exercise the right to reservoir molten metal ....
In other words, I fail to see
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consequence being "to put the patentee in a position where, without invention on his
part, and without the possession by him of lawful letters patent, he is allowed to
exact tribute from the steel and iron-making industry, whenever those engaged in
such industry desire to increase their plants or to more conveniently and
satisfactorily conduct their operations so as to keep pace with the natural evolution
of modern industrial development." 294 In other words, the dissent objected to
granting a patent for what they viewed as recognition of advantages of a natural
result of a well known practice, summarizing their opinion of the majority decision,
as follows:
But this is only to say that whilst the Jones method was old, it must be
treated as new because of the conduct of individuals in applying the method
and their intentions. And this reduces itself to the proposition that the
Jones patent as construed covered the mere intention or mind of persons.
The reasoning is equally applicable to the distinction which is asserted to
exist between storing and the mixing incidental thereto, and mixing with
incidental storage. The mere form of expression cannot create a distinction
295
where none exists, or destroy a law of nature.
In essence, the dissent dismissed the incidental nature of mixing found in prior
art methods, as did the majority, but with the opposite result, namely, that the
dissent found intent to be the distinction between "incidental" results and Jones
claimed method, whereby intent was not, in and of itself, a claim limitation that
would distinguish the method from the prior art.296 In contrast, the majority held
that intent, as expressed as an objective in the patent specification, conferred a
physical distinction on the method, whereby variation in molten metal composition
was suppressed, thereby providing an advantage over the prior art that deserved
recognition. 297 However, for both the majority and the dissent, the crux of the
decision was whether the public was being deprived of a benefit that existed prior to
the exclusive patent right granted, or whether the inventor had contributed by his
invention a benefit to the public that did not previously exist, and for which an
exclusive right, therefore, should be granted.
In Kuehmsted v. FarbenfabrikenofElberfeld Co., 298 the patentable distinction of
a therapeutic formulation of acetyl salicylic acid, or "aspirin," over well-known
formulations of the same compound was based on the fact that the patentee,
Hoffmann, "produced a medicine indisputably beneficial to mankind - something
new in a useful art, such as our patent policy was intended to promote," whereas the
prior art, described by "Kraut and his contemporaries, on the other hand, had
produced only, at best, a chemical compound in an impure state."299 The court
how the exclusive right can be conferred to do the very thing which the court
admits was well known at the time the patent to Jones was issued.
Id.
294
295
296
297
298
299

Id. at 487 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 455 (White, J., dissenting).
See id. at 446-87.
See id. at 410-46.
179 F. 701 (7th Cir. 1910).
Id. at 705.
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summarized the distinction as follows: "In the one case the mass is made to yield
something to the useful arts; in the other case what is yielded is chiefly interesting as
a fact in chemical learning."300 As in earlier cases, therefore, an exclusive right was
contingent upon contribution to the useful arts, and knowledge, in this case
"chemical learning," did not meet that threshold.
Similarly, in Union Carbide v. American Carbide,3 1 a claim directed to
crystalline calcium carbide was upheld as valid in view of an earlier publication by a
German chemist, Woehler.30 2 The Woehler publication described a method for
formation of acetylene from calcium carbide.303 The court addressed, as two distinct
arguments by the defendant, questions of novelty of the claimed invention.3 0 4 The
first argument by the defense assumed that calcium carbide produced according to
the teachings of the Woehler publication was amorphous rather than crystalline, but
that, nevertheless, "the patent is not for a new product, but for a new form of an old
product, having the same composition, properties and uses as the old."305 The court

30 6
stated, in response, that "patentable novelty" can be based on superior properties,
30 7
and that the superior properties were a consequence of the crystalline form.
Moreover, the court pointed out that the Woehler publication represented no more
than a "laboratory experiment" which, although "generally recognized in treatises
upon chemistry," did not result in any "appreciable amount of calcium

carbide ...

made by any person before the present patentee came into the field. 30 8

'300Td

'301181 F. 104 (2d Cir. 1910).
302 Id. at 106.
'303 Td,
'301Soo id. at 105-06.
305 Id. at 106.
'306Id. at 106-07. The court stated:
In determining the question of patentable novelty, there can be no hard and
fast rule. Each case must be decided upon its own facts. Mere change of form in
and of itself does not disclose novelty. A new article of commerce is not
necessarily a new article patentable as such. But patentable novelty in a case like
the present may be founded upon superior efficiency; upon superior durability,
including the ability to retain a permanent form when exposed to the atmosphere;

Id.

upon a lesser tendency to breakage and loss; upon purity, and, in connection with
other things, upon comparative cheapness.
So, supplementing other
considerations, commercial success may properly be compared with mere
laboratory experiments.

I307
Id. at 107. The court stated:
Now, broadly comparing amorphous and crystalline carbides, we are
convinced that the complainants' expert was substantially correct in testifying as
follows: "Usually speaking the amorphous substance is less dense, more soluble,
has a lower melting point and less hardness. That would seem to mean in all
probability, even between equally pure compounds, that bulk for bulk.., the
amorphous would be the inferior material ......

Id.
308

Id. at 106. As stated by the court:
There is nothing to indicate that that [sic] which Woehler did was anything more
than to make and describe a laboratory experiment, and, although his work was
generally recognized in treatises upon chemistry, it does not appear that any
appreciable amount of calcium carbide was made by any person before the present
patentee came into the field.
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According to the court, the product of the method described by Woehler was "put to
no practical use," in contrast to the claimed crystalline carbide of the patent, which
was a "great commercial success." 30 9 Commercial success, therefore, overcame the
argument that crystallinity was a "mere change of form" that should not confer
patentability on the claimed product:
For these reasons, it is held that the product possesses the requisite
patentable novelty. And we must regard this conclusion as not only well
founded in law, but as most just. To hold an important discovery which has
given to the world a commercially new product - a product the high utility
of which must be conceded - not entitled to protection for want of novelty,
would, as it seems to us, be applying the patent statute to defeat itS
310
fundamental purposes.
As in Kuehmsted, patentability was based on contribution of a practical use, which
was contrasted with "chemical learning" in the prior art of Kuehmsted, and "mere
laboratory experiments" in that of Union Carbide. 11 Previous activities of those who
did not contribute a therapeutic or practical use, respectively, were inadequate to
deny exclusive rights to those who did.
As a second defense, the defendant in Union Carbide purported to show that
experiments following the teachings of the Woehler reference "demonstrate the
crystallinity of the Woehler carbide."3 12 The court, however, held that novelty was
not defeated because there was "little information concerning the process of making
calcium carbide" in the Woehler article 313 and the defendant had not carried the
burden of establishing that crystallinity was a consequence of following its
teachings. 31 4 "Patentable novelty" of the claimed invention consequent to a practical
contribution to the useful arts was considered to be an issue distinct from the
potential lack of certainty in producing a crystalline product by following the
teachings of a published article; contribution to the useful arts was distinguished
from experimental work as a whole, and was a separate consideration from the
Id.
309 Id. at 107 ("It is also quite clear that Woehler published a mere result of a laboratory
experiment which was put to no practical use. Crystalline carbide, on the other hand, has been a
great commercial success, and has furnished the foundation for important industries.").
'10 Id. at 107-08.
311 See Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co., 179 F. 701, 705 (7th Cir. 1910); Union
Carbide, 181 F. 104 at 107.
312 Union Carbide, 181 F. at 108 ("But it is contended that experiments made by the
defendant's witnesses for the purposes of this suit demonstrate the crystallinity of the Woehler
carbide.").
,313 Id. ("Now, as already pointed out, the Woehler article furnished very little information
concerning the process of making calcium carbide.").
'3

1 Id. at 108-09. The court stated:

The burden is upon the defendant to establish crystallinity, not upon the
complainant to disprove it, and, among other things, we cannot ignore the
possibility that the defendant's witnesses may have attributed the crystallinity of
the calcium cyanamide in the product to the calcium carbide. Consequently the
Woehler product, whether correctly represented by the earlier compound or by the
result of recent experiments, must be held not to anticipate.
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inevitability of inherent results in prior art teachings as a threshold consideration to
defeat patentability.3 1 5 The court also grouped experimental use by others with those
of the inventor as activities that were inadequate to obviate the right to patent
protection:
We find experimental uses of the product before that time. We find
that Lord Kelvin in a foreign country put some of the carbide in water, and
lighted the gas which was generated. We find that the patentee gave
samples of the product to different persons for experimental purposes. But
it is well settled that an inventor has the right to experiment in perfecting
his invention and demonstrating its utility, and we are not satisfied that
the patentee in this case did anything more. We think that the proof fails to
establish that there was any public use of the invention more than two
3 16
years prior to the application for the patent.
Therefore, "experimental use," regardless of whether it was conducted by the
inventor or another, was not considered by the court to be a "public use" that would
prohibit patent protection.
The Supreme Court in Diamond Rubber Co. of New York v. ConsolidatedRubber
Tire Co.317 also suggested that the utility of something new could be evidence of
novelty.318 Again, from the point of view of "substantial" or "patentable" novelty
relative to what was known in the art, recognition and contribution to the useful arts
were identified as the "tests" of an invention, regardless of the straightforward
nature that it may seem to have in retrospect:
Knowledge after the event is always easy, and problems once solved present
no difficulties, indeed, may be represented as never having had any, and
expert witnesses may be brought forward to show that the new thing which
seemed to have eluded the search of the world was always ready at hand
and easy to be seen by a merely skillful attention. But the law has other
tests of the invention than subtle conjectures of what might have been seen
and yet was not. It regards a change as evidence of novelty, the acceptance
31 9
and utility of change as a further evidence, even as demonstration.
Another embodiment of the principle in Kuehmsted, that patentable distinction
can be based on achievement of a practical purpose,3 20 can be found in the decision of
Judge Learned Hand in Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K Mulford.3 21 In that case, the
claimed invention was directed to adrenaline in a relatively pure state.3 22 As in
Kuehmsted,3 23 the court in Parke-Davisupheld patentability of the claimed subject
id. at 107-10.
Id. at 109.
220 U.S. 428 (1911).

315 See
'316

'317
318 Id. at 435.

'319 Id.

'320 Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co., 179 F. 701, 705 (7th Cir. 1910).
321 189 F. 95, 103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911).
'32 Id. at 101-03.

'323 Kuehmsted, 179 F. at 705.
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matter over prior art, despite the possibility that the physical product claimed might
be the same, but for a difference in purity, because the consequence of the difference
in purity made it "available" for use. 324 Therefore, "it became for every practical
purpose a new thing commercially and therapeutically." 325 As was also the case with
Kuehmsted, and with Union Carbide, the court in Parke-Davis implied that
knowledge, without any evidence of a practical result, is insufficient to defeat
patentability:
That the change here resulted in ample practical differences is fully proved.
Everyone, not already saturated with scholastic distinctions, would
recognize that Takamine's crystals were not merely the old dried glands in
a purer state, nor would his opinion change if he learned that the crystals
were obtained from the glands by a process of eliminating the inactive
organic substances. The line between different substances and degrees of
the same substances is to be drawn rather from the common usages of men
3 26
than from nice considerations of dialectic.
327
The Supreme Court in Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co.
upheld the validity of a patent directed to paper making machinery in view of prior
art that achieved the same result, but in a different way and for a different
purpose.3 28 The inventor, Eibel, discovered the cause of limitations in the speed at
which a Fourdrinier machine for making paper could be operated. 329
His

'321 Parke-Davis, 189
'325

F. at 103.
Id. The court stated:

Nor is the patent only for a degree of purity, and therefore not for a new
"composition of matter."... [b]ut, even if it were merely an extracted product
without change, there is no rule that such products are not patentable. Takamine
[the patentee] was the first to make it available for any use by removing it from
the other gland-tissue in which it was found, and, while it is of course possible
logically to call this a purification of the principle, it became for every practical
purpose a new thing commercially and therapeutically. That was a good ground
for patent.
Id. (citations omitted).
326 Id.
ModifedPark-Davisand Co. v. H. K. Mulford, 196 F. 496, 497-500 (2d Cir. 1912). The
court reversed the portion of Judge Hand's decision in the lower court as to the validity and
infringement of claims that could be considered to be so broad as to embrace substances which have
"never been associated with suprarenal gland tissue." Id. The court further stated:
Two important questions then arise: Is there anything in the specification
and prior art which indicates that this claim may be sustained without giving it so
broad a construction?
Giving it the broad construction, was Takamine's
contribution to the art such that he is entitled to make and hold so comprehensive
a claim?
We are averse to entering into the investigation necessary to answer the
second question, until it is seen whether or not the art is going to produce a
substance which has never been associated with suprarenal gland tissue and
which nevertheless responds to the requirements of these claims ....
Id. at 499-500.
327 261 U.S. 45 (1923).
'28 Id. at 56-66.
329 Id. at 52. The court explained:
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improvement was to increase the "speed of the stock by substantially tilting up the
wire and giving the stock the added force of the downhill flow. ' 330 As a consequence,
Eibel was successful in increasing the speed at which Fourdrinier machines could be
run, from about 500 to in excess of 700 feet per minute. 331 Eibel's improvement was a
332
tremendous commercial success.
The degree of pitch of the wire was not an element of any of the claims in Eibel's
patent.3 33 Instead, the court relied on distinctions in the practice of Eibel's claimed
invention, as described in the specification, in combination with "a different purpose
to be accomplished," in evaluating the invention relative to the prior art:
The Eibel invention is distinguished from the prior art in two ways: First, in
that the pitch of the wire was for a different purpose to be accomplished, not
at the dandy roll some [twenty] or more feet from the breast roll, but at a
point [nine] or [ten] feet from there; and, second, by the fact that to achieve
his purpose a high or substantial pitch must be given to the wire, while only
33 4
a small or trivial pitch was needed for the drainage of the prior art.
The defense argued that, regardless of whether the prior art had recognized "the
advantage of speeding up the stock to an equality with the wire, yet the necessary
effect of their devices was to achieve that result and therefore their machine
anticipated Eibel." 335 In response, the Court stated that "we find no evidence that
any pitch of the wire, used before Eibel, had brought about such a result as that
sought by him" and that, "if it had done so under unusual conditions, accidental
results, not intended and not appreciated, do not constitute anticipation."'33 6 The
Court also clearly linked patent protection to the significance of the contribution
made to the art by a new discovery or invention:
In administering the patent law, the court first looks into the art, to
find what the real merit of the alleged discovery or invention is and whether
it has advanced the art substantially. If it has done so, then the court is
liberal in its construction of the patent, to secure to the inventor the reward
he deserves. If what he has done works only a slight step forward, and that
which he says is a discovery is on the borderline between mere mechanical
Eibel concluded that this was due to the disturbance and ripples in the stock as it
was forming at a point between the breast roll and the first suction box, caused by
the fact that at that point the wire was traveling much faster than the stock, and
if at that point the speed of the flowing stock could be increased approximately to
the speed of the wire, the disturbance and rippling in the stock would cease and
the defects would disappear from the paper product.

Id.

330 Id.
331 Id. at 55.

332 Id.
("The defendant's witnesses without exception refer to that disclosure [of Eibel's
discovery] as something that surprised and startled the paper-making trade. It spread, to use the
expression of one witness, like wild fire.").
333 Id. at 50-51.
334 Id. at 58.
335 Id. at 66.
336 Td,
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change and real invention, then his patent, if sustained, will be given a
narrow scope and infringement will be found only in approximate copies of
the new device. It is this differing attitude of the courts toward genuine
discoveries and slight improvements that reconciles the sometimes
apparently conflicting instances of construing specifications and the finding
337
of equivalents in alleged infringements.
Therefore, the intention, or purpose, to be accomplished was a factor in determining
"real merit of the alleged discovery or invention" and "whether it has advanced the
art substantially," to thereby justify patent protection and the scope of protection
338
granted to the discoverer.
The claimed invention in Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., et a]. v. Silica Products
Co. 3 3 9 was a "waterproof plastic" that included a "gelantinizable 'reversible colloid,'
such as dry bentonite" disseminated within material such as concrete, stucco, and
plaster of Paris. 3 40 The court upheld the validity of the patent to Collings in view of
prior art patents that employed bentonite because the mention of bentonite in those
references was not for the purposes of waterproofing, and that the "plasticity or
plastic condition referred to in the specification and in some of the claims is merely
an incident to one stage of the mixture." 341 Accordingly, despite technical inclusion in
the specification of the prior art patents of all the elements of certain claims, validity
was upheld because there was no mention of, nor was there inherent in the teachings
of the prior art, the object of Collings patent; the benefit of the invention claimed by
Collings was not necessarily obtained by following the teachings of the identified
art.342

With respect to infringement, the defendants contended that "the result of their
use of bentonite is to produce a water-tightening and not a waterproofing in the
finished product, and, in support of this contention, that they use a different agent
for waterproofing.
...
343 In response, the court stated that "all that need be said is
that defendants have followed the process of the patent with substantial
closeness." 344
The court hinged infringement on whether the benefit [i.e.,
waterproofing] of Collings' patented invention was gained, albeit imperfectly: "[1ff in
some slight particular there has been a variance and the result has been a product
inferior in waterproofing to the product of the patent, this will not avoid
infringement.
'One does not escape infringement by practicing invention
imperfectly. ' ' 345 The court concluded that "[e]ven if the defendants used the
bentonite, as is claimed, for plasticity and water-tightening, and not for

337 Id.
338

at 63.

Id.

3399
48 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1931).

Id. at 504.
at 505 ("In considering these prior art patents, it should be borne in mind that the prime
object sought in the Collings patent, original and reissue, is the waterproofing of concrete, stucco,
etc. The plasticity or plastic condition referred to in the [prior art] specifications and in some of the
claims is merely an incident to one stage of the mixture.").
'32 Id. at 505-06.
343Id. at 508.
340

'3'Id.

'M Id.
'31

Id. (quoting Gibbs v. Triumph Trap Co. (C.C.A.) 26 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1928)).
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waterproofing, this would not avoid infringement. The purpose and intent of the
'
defendants is immaterial."346
The link between anticipation and infringement in Kansas City was not intent.
Rather, stated objects of prior art teachings were indicative of whether the benefit of
Collings' patented invention was gained, just as, with respect to infringement, the
test was whether the defendants gained the benefit obtained by practicing the
patented invention, regardless of intent. The parallel between anticipation and
infringement was not consistency between stated objects in the prior art and intent of
the accused infringers, but whether the prior art and the accused infringers obtained
the benefit to be achieved by practicing the claimed invention; intent in both cases
was immaterial.
Inherency was at issue in Hansgirg v. Kemmer,347 where adequate support for
provoking an interference depended upon inherent disclosure in Kemmer's
application of separating dust from vapor in a process for producing substantially
pure magnesium. 348 The court agreed with Hansgirg that the necessary method step
was not inherent in the "possible use of a bound briquette." 349 Relying on several
prior cases, the court stated "[i]nherency, however, may not be established by
probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a
350
given set of circumstances is not sufficient."
The court then went on to state, without citing precedent, that "performance of
the questioned function" can be established if it is the "natural result" of the
"operation as taught," and, further, if "the disclosure is sufficient to show that the
natural result flowing from the operation as taught would result in the performance
of the questioned function, it seems to be well settled that the disclosure should be
regarded as sufficient. "35 1 Therefore, as contemplated by the court in Hansgirg,a
"natural result" is the necessary consequence of a "given set of circumstances." '3 52
Contribution to the art as a practical matter was relied upon by Judge Learned
Hand in Dewey & Almy Chemical Co. v. Mimex Co., Inc. 353 There, Judge Hand for
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held one patent, directed to
use of latex to seal tops of tin cans, to be invalid, and upheld the validity of another,
directed to a particular form of latex.3 54 Judge Hand, in dicta, commented on the
relevance of teachings that were known in the art, but did not provide "the chance of

316 Kansas City, 48 F.2d at 508.
347102 F.2d 212 (C.C.P.A. 1939).

Id. at 214.
'319 Id. The court stated:
It is contended by Kemmer, and found by the board, that the binding around the
briquette acted as a screen through which the vapor passed during the process of
vaporizing and that the critical element of the counts was, therefore, disclosed in
the meagre sentence relating to the possible use of a bound briquette .... [T]his
interpretation of the counts is certainly not the meaning which the patentee gave
in his application.
'318

Id.
3M-Id. at 214 (emphasis added).
l Id.
J
352Id.

124 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1942).
3F,
Id. at 986, 990-91.
353
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profit."3 55 Specifically, and similarly to his reasoning in Park-Davis,Judge Hand
suggested that "elements" in the art, if commercially unavailable, should be
discounted because they do not offer the opportunity for exploitation that is to be
rewarded by grants of a patent:
The difficulty in the case at bar is not therefore that the invention consisted
only of a substitution of material, but that the necessary setting did not
exist for any invention at all. It is not important that latex had been known
for many years, and that a convenient method of shipping it had been
known for eight years. We should not count elements that were not
commercially available; a substance, long known to chemists, but not upon
the market, is practically as impotent upon the art as though it were
unknown. The assumption of the law is that the chance of profit from the
exploitation of the patent will stimulate discovery, and profit presupposes
3 56
that the materials are at hand.
Judge Hand dismissed a prior art reference as nonanticipatory because of lack of
consistency in the results obtained by the teachings provided by the reference:
No doctrine of the patent law is better established than that a prior
patent or other publication to be an anticipation must bear within its four
corners adequate directions for the practice of the patent invalidated. If the
earlier disclosure offers no more than a starting point for further
experiments, if its teaching will sometimes succeed and sometimes fail, it
does not inform the art without more how to practice the new invention, it
has not correspondingly enriched the store of knowledge, and if it is not an
357
anticipation.
Therefore, utility of knowledge made available to the public was a consideration in
determining the anticipatory effect of a reference.
A lower court decision upholding the validity of a patent directed to salts of 1phenyl-2-aminopropane was affirmed by the Third Circuit of the United States
358
Circuit Court of Appeals, in Smith, Kline & French Laboratoriesv. Clark & Clark.
An earlier paper authored by a German scientist, Edeleano, and published in 1887,
described the equivalent base of the claimed salt. 359 Although no clear link was made
between the utility and novelty of the claimed invention, it appears that the court
took a constrained view of the prior art in order to uphold the patentee's exclusive
right:
While the question of what constitutes anticipation is one of law, as open for
determination by this court as by the court below, the facts on which the
35
3

Id. at 987.
Id.

,7 Id. at 989.

157 F.2d 725, 726-29 (3d Cir. 1946).
Id. at 728 ("We think the inference is possible that Edeleano actually prepared
betaphenylisopropylamine. In any event Edeleano's phenylisopropylamine must be taken as the
equivalent of Alles' base, viz., l-phenyl-2-aminopropane, or amphetamine.").
358
359
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legal defense of anticipation is to be based must be found by the court
below ....
We cannot say that the learned trial judge was in error in his
conclusions as to Edeleano's disclosures. He found that Edeleano's work did
360
not constitute anticipation of Alles' claim.
The patent claims, which broadly embraced any salt of 1-phenyl-2-aminopropane,
including amphetamine sulfate, a drug that "has proved itself to be of great
importance in the treatment of narcolepsy, post-encephalitic parkinsonism, chronic
exhaustion, psychoneurosis and depression, acute and chronic alcoholism ... [and] of
singular importance in counteracting the effects of barbiturate poison," 36 1 were
upheld as valid, partly as a consequence of a high degree of usefulness of the
invention:
That Alles' contribution was of great therapeutic use and value may not be
doubted. Following his discovery, physicians had at hand a drug which
could affect, even create, mood. Alles' discovery is close to pioneer
invention. His patent is entitled to a liberal construction in aid of the claim
under consideration. We conclude that the court below committed no error
when it found claim 1 of the patent valid. That the defendants have
362
infringed it is clear.
Novelty, again, hinged on utility of claimed subject matter, relative to what was
known in the art, in Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp.363 The subject
patent claimed a "vitamin B(12)-active composition comprising recovered elaboration
products of the fermentation of a vitamin B(12)-activity producing strain of Fungi"
exhibiting activity of"at least 440 L.L.D. units per milligram and less than 11 million
L.L.D. units per milligram."3 6 4 The court held that previous development of an assay
for "an unidentified substance in liver which stimulated the growth of rats" and
employment of a microorganism, Lactobacillus lactis, Dorner, ("LLD"365), did not
deprive the claimed subject matter of patentability by the mere fact that certain
materials tested positive. 366 Rather, the activities of Dr. Shorb, who had developed
360 Id. at 728-29.

361 Id. at 729 n.14.
362 Id. at 729.
363 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1958).
364 Id. at 157-58.
36 Id. at 159. The court explained:
Dr. Mary S. Shorb, a bacteriologist employed by the Department of
Agriculture, undertook the development of an assay, or test, for "Factor X," an
unidentified substance in liver which stimulated the growth of rats. She selected
for investigation a microorganism, Lactobacillus lactis, Dorner, which has high
nutritional requirements. She found that the growth of this organism in an
amino acid basal medium to which clarified tomato juice had been added was
stimulated by the further addition of liver extracts, yeast, orange juice and other
substances. Since she did not know the identity of the active principle in either
clarified tomato juice or in growth stimulants, she referred to them, respectively,
as the TJ, or tomato juice, factor and the LLD factor, after the name of the
organism she was studying.
Id.
366 Id. at 164.
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the assay, were dismissed by the court for lack of conception of the significance of her
discovery, 36 7 which positively identified the presence of what was known at that time
as "anti-pernicious anemia factor," and later classified as vitamin B(12).368 The court
considered Dr. Shorb's failure to recognize the significance of her results as fatal to
defendant's arguments that her work rendered patentees' claimed invention
unpatentable:
The contention that there was lack of invention in the work of the
patentees rests principally upon the work of Dr. Shorb ....
For her
provision of a tool of great assistance to them, the patentees must have been
grateful to her, but there is nothing to suggest that she ever envisioned
anything in the nature of the compositions developed by the patentees, or,
indeed, that she ever supposed that anti-pernicious anemia activity might
369
be found in any material other than liver.
The court summarized the lack of significance of Dr. Shorb's activities as follows:
No support can be found in the record for a finding that Dr. Shorb told
anyone, or even thought, that the anti-pernicious anemia principal might be
found in fermentation materials. It is conceivable that some other scientist
with the knowledge of the day might have found significance in Dr. Shorb's
observations, which she overlooked, but the record does not show that
anyone did.370

367 Id.

at 160-61. As stated by the court:

Dr. Shorb, in speculating that her assay might be responsive to the antipernicious anemia factor in liver, knew it was responsive to some substance or
substances.... In her search for a stable TJ factor to be substituted for tomato
juice, she actually examined fermentation materials. Some of these she found
inhibited the growth of Lactobacillus lactis, Dorner; others, promoting growth,
were found to contain both the TJ factor and LLD activity, but the presence of
LLD activity was significant to her only because it required that she discard the
material for further investigation as a substitute for tomato juice. From all that
appears, such observation of LLD activity in fermentation materials (as her
earlier observation of such activity in yeast, a fermentation product, and other
materials) did not produce the faintest notion that the anti-pernicious anemia
principal might be present. Such observations were merely a disappointment,
marking another failure in her search for a stable TJ factor.
Id.
38

Id. at 159-60. The court summarized:
Beginning in 1938, employees in Merck's research laboratories had worked
upon the isolation of the anti-pernicious anemia factor in liver.
After much additional analysis and investigation, officials of Merck decided
the pure material could be classified as a vitamin. Since it was water-soluble, it
was placed in the 'B' group and was assigned the number 12, all lower numbers
having been appropriated.

Id.
39 Id. at 160.
370 Id. at 161.
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Moreover, the court relied on "therapeutic and commercial worth" to distinguish
a difference in kind of the patented composition from unpatentable differences in
"degree of purity":
The compositions of the patent here have all of the novelty and utility
required by the Act for patentability. They never existed before; there was
nothing comparable to them. If we regard them as purification of the active
principal in natural fermentates, the natural fermentates are quite useless,
while the patented compositions are of great medicinal and commercial
value. The step from complete uselessness to great and perfected utility is a
long one. That step is no mere advance in the degree of purity of a known
product. From the natural fermentates, which, for this purpose, were
wholly useless and were not known to contain the desired activity in even
the slightest degree, products of great therapeutic and commercial worth
have been developed. The new products are not the same as the old, but
371
new and useful compositions entitled to the protection of the patent.
In other words, novelty and utility, as threshold conditions for patent protection,
were both contingent upon the existence of a beneficial contribution to the art and
value as an item of commerce. The court closed by reciting the portion of the
Supreme Court opinion in Diamond Rubber Co., stating that "[the law] ... regards a
change as evidence of novelty, the acceptance and utility of change as further
evidence, even as demonstration."' 372
Therefore, as in several cases already
discussed, beneficial contribution to the art was evidence, and even a demonstration,
of novelty prerequisite to grant of patent protection.
In InternationalNickel Co., Inc. v. FordMotor CO., 37 3 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York confirmed the validity of a patent held
by International Nickel Company, Inc. ("INCO") directed to an improved formulation
of iron, whereby a small amount of magnesium was employed to cause graphite to
assume a spheroidal rather than flake form. 374

Earlier activities by Mack Truck

Company, which included formation of valve seat inserts exhibiting "changes in
graphite structure attributable to the retention of magnesium ... [that] produced,
though to a lesser degree, the same desirable characteristics present in nodular
iron" 375 of INCO's patented product, did not amount to anticipation because Mack

was "not merely ignorant of the scientific phenomena underlying nodular iron," but
"in fact Mack never consciously pursued the product here in question for any
purpose."3

76

Mack's failure to appreciate what it had produced "merely by chance"

nullified any anticipatory affect of its activities:
'37

Id. at 164.

372

Id. at 165 (quoting Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Rubber Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428, 435

(1911)).
'373

156 F. Supp. 551, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).

374

Id. at 554.
Id. at 559.

'37

'37 Id. at 560. The court found that:

Mack was not merely ignorant of the scientific phenomena underlying nodular
iron. It is not that Mack knew it had a new iron but failed to appreciate that its
unique properties were due to an alteration in graphite shape. Not only was
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Here Mack never sought to manufacture nodular iron, the product which
INCO has discovered. Indeed it was unaware that it had done so and had
no idea of the significance of retained magnesium. Where the allegedly
anticipating product was produced merely by chance and never recognized
nor appreciated, one who later discovers and recognizes the product may
3 77
patent it.
The policy behind the court's holding, once again, linked the exclusive rights granted
under a patent to contribution to the art. Where prior activity did not make the
contribution that was later attributable to a patent applicant, exclusive rights would
not be denied:
The Patent Law seeks to reward those who teach the public how to
perform, process or construct things which the public theretofore was
unable to do because of insufficient information. If a product or process is
accidentally produced and unrecognized by the prior art, it is unlikely that
the opportunities which it presents would be within the reach of the general
378
public.
In In re Seaborg, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed a decision
by the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent and Trademark Office rejecting
claims directed to "element 95" and "the isotope of element 95 having the mass
number 241," under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for lack of novelty under what the solicitor of the
Patent Office referred to as "inherency doctrine."3 79 Reflecting the logic of Merck &
Co. v. Olin Mathieson where patent rights were upheld as "new and useful
compositions of matter" within the "meaning of § 101 of the Act,"3 8 0 and despite
earlier activities that did not recognize the significance of the compositions that were
Mack unaware that it had created a new iron but in fact Mack never consciously
pursued the product here in question for any purpose. Nor did it ascribe any
meaningful function to retained magnesium. Mack sought merely a means for the
degasification of iron.

Id.
377
'378

Id. at 561.
Id. at 562 (citation omitted).

'379

328 F.2d 996, 996-97 (C.C.P.A. 1964). The court summarized the issue as follows:
The issue here arises by application of what both the appellant and the
solicitor termed the "inherency doctrine", [sic] which, as we understand it, is a
Patent Office doctrine which infers a lack of novelty in a product under
35 U.S.C. § 101 if a comparable process for making the product is found to exist in
the art.

380

Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson, 253 F.2d 156, 162 (4th Cir. 1958). The court in Merck &

Id.
Co. v. Olin Mathieson stated:
The fact that the product, itself, is not a "new and useful *** machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter," within the meaning of § 101, is fatal to
the product claims. The facts here, however, are far from the premise of the
principle. Until the patentees produced them, there were no such B(12) active
compositions. No one had produced even a comparable product. The active
substance was unidentified and unknown.
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claimed, the court in Seaborg characterized "inherency doctrine" as being "broader"
than the analysis conducted to find anticipation, and "establishe[d] a broader basis
for refusing a patent than is required by the courts in finding anticipation of an
issued patent."

38 1

The court contrasted the facts in Seaborg with those of an earlier case of
inherency, In re Wiegand,38 2 where patentability was denied on the basis of unspoken
production of a claimed product, by distinguishing the appealed claims from the
allegedly inherent teachings of U.S. Patent Number 2,708,656 issued to Fermi"et a].
on the uncertainty that the claimed product was produced and that, even if produced,
the presence of the claimed subject matter would be undetectable. 38 3 The court
recited with approval statements regarding patentability by the Board of Appeals in
a companion appeal, concluding that, in instances of unpredictability in the result,
"conception and reduction to practice are necessarily concurrent." 384
In effect, a parallel was drawn by the court in Seaborg between patentability
and anticipation as a function of predictability, on one hand, and the necessity of
conception, where certainty in the result could not be established, on the other. As a
product of the facts in Seaborg, the court declined to hold that the uncertain and
undetectable result of the teachings of the Fermi patent anticipated the appellant's
claimed invention. 38 5 The court approved of the conclusions of the appellant's brief,
to wit:
There is no positive evidence that americium was produced inherently in
the natural uranium fuel by the operation of the reactor for the times and at
the intensity mentioned in the exemplary statement relied upon by the
Patent Office ...

[if the one billionth of a gram were produced, it would

have been completely undetectable, since it would have been diluted with
the 40 tons of intensely radioactive uranium fuel which made up the
'381In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d at 997.
'382
383

182 F.2d 633, 638 (C.C.P.A. 1950).
In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d at 998-99. The court stated:
The record before us, unlike the record in the Wiegand case, is replete with
showings that the claimed product, if it was produced in the Fermi process, was
produced in such minuscule amounts and under such conditions that its presence
was undetectable. There was no question in the Wiegand case but that carbon
black had been produced by the furnace process of the prior art ....

Id.
'381 Id. at

999. The court referred to this companion board decision, as follows:
In the companion appeal.., the board.., stated what we consider to be the
fact here, that:
... The exhibits submitted, considered in the most favorable light, do not show
that appellant could predict with any degree of definiteness the properties or
characteristics of the new elements or specify with any certainty the exact
procedures which could be followed, without the exercise of more than the
ordinary skill of the art, to prepare these elements. Indeed, in view of the
unpredictability both as to the character of the product elements and of the
processes by which they might be achieved, it is particularly reasonable to hold,
as the court did in Smith v. Bousquet that conception and reduction to practice
are necessarily concurrent for an invention of this kind.
Id. (citation omitted).
'385

Id.

[6:373 2007]

A New Day Yesterday

reactor. The possibility that although a minute amount of americium may
have been produced in the Fermi reactor, [the fact that] it was not identified
(nor could it have been identified), would preclude the application of the
38 6
Fermi patent as a reference to anticipate the present invention.
The court, therefore, followed the policy stated by Judge Learned Hand, requiring
that prior teachings enrich "the store of common knowledge" as a prerequisite to
anticipation under patent law. 38 7 The court quoted Judge Hand from his opinion in
Dewey &Almy, discussed above, as follows:
No doctrine of the patent law is better established than that a prior
patent or other publication to be an anticipation must bear within itS four
corners adequate directions for the practice of the patent invalidated. If the
earlier disclosure offers no more than a starting point for further
experiments, if its teaching will sometimes succeed and sometime fail, if it
does not inform the art without more how to practice the new invention, it
has not correspondingly enriched the store of common knowledge, and it is
not an anticipation. 388
Therefore, a result that is uncertain in the prior art, combined with a lack of
conception of that result in the art, would not bar grant of a patent right for lack of
novelty.
"Benefit to mankind" was the criterion necessary to establish anticipation by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in Chas. Pfizer &
Co., Inc. v. Barry-Martin Pharmaceuticals,Inc. 38 9 There, the court stated that a
demonstration that "prior art fermentation procedures [which] did not produce the
recoverable amounts of tetracycline in which the Examiner was interested, but only
trace amounts of no practical significance," 390 was not sufficient to negate the validity
of later patent claims: "Since the prior art Aureomycin fermentation broths and
antibiotics contained insufficient tetracycline to be of any benefit to mankind, they do
391
not as a matter of law negate the validity of Conover's patent claims."
The court relied on the holdings in Keuhmsted, Parke-Davis,and Merck v. Olin
Mathieson, to assert that production of the claimed compound only in a laboratory,
where, "if produced naturally, would decompose within minutes,"392 and, regardless,
only produced in "trace amounts, unrecognized and of no use," did not invalidate a
patent directed to that product. 393 The court stated that there was "[n]o evidence to
sustain the defendant's contention that tetracycline is a natural product that was
386 Id,

'387 Id. at 997.
388

Id.

'389 241 F. Supp. 191, 194 (S.D. Fla. 1965).
390 Id. at 193.
391 Id. at 194.
392 Id. at 193 ("There is no evidence that tetracycline has ever been recovered, produced,

isolated or even identified other than in a laboratory. The defendant witness, Dr. Wallis, testified
that tetracycline, Aureomycin and terramycin, if produced naturally, would decompose within
minutes due to their sensitivity to alkali.").
39 Id. at 194.
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produced. The prior existence of tetracycline in Aureomycin in trace amounts,
unrecognized and of no use does not invalidate the patent. ''"
The court appeared unwilling to defeat patentability, especially in view of the
significance of the discovery made by the inventor, which the court characterized as
"of unquestioned benefit to mankind":
The discovery of tetracycline by Dr. Conover was, as described by Dr.
Wallis, a "marvelous" and "great" discovery. This discovery, which was
most unobvious and involved scientific imagination, perseverance and skill,
has been of unquestioned benefit to mankind.
Tetracycline is now
considered the best of the broad spectrum antibiotics and has largely
replaced Aureomycin due primarily to a much lower incidence of toxic side
3 95
effects in its use.
At least with respect to the court's opinion in Chas. Pfizer, even certainty of
production of a claimed compound, where the compound was present only in "trace
amounts, unrecognized and of no use," and, therefore, of no "benefit to mankind,"
3 96
would not invalidate patent claims.
3 97
Inherency was also the issue in In re Marshall.
The Court of Customs of
Patent Appeals held that a claim directed to a method for weight control that
included anesthetizing nerve endings in the digestive tract was not anticipated by
entries in the Physicians' Desk Reference ("PDR") teaching the anesthetic
oxethazaine, which was disclosed by the patent applicant as a suitable anesthetic for
practicing the claimed invention, because "the primary reference, the PDR, does not
disclose every material element of the claimed subject matter."3 9 8 The PDR taught
use of oxethazaine to treat various disorders, including esophagitis, gastritis, peptic
ulcer and irritable colon syndrome. 399 The court specifically held that "[i]f anyone
ever lost weight by following the PDR teachings it was an unrecognized accident"
and, therefore, the claimed method was not anticipated by the PDR because "[a]n
400
accidental or unwitting duplication of an invention cannot constitute anticipation."
Consistent with earlier holdings, establishment of certainty, or, at least, recognition,
were prerequisite in In re Marshallto establishing a contribution to the art sufficient
to constitute an antecedent benefit in the public domain that would deprive a later
inventor of the right to patent his discovery. 401
Similarly, in another case, Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic
Antitrust Actions v. Pfizer Inc.,40 2 co-production of a claimed antibiotic, tetracycline,
3N
3

Id.

Id. at 193.

578 F.2d 301 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
Id. at 304 ("Applying this rule of law to the present case, we must reverse the board's
rejection of claims 1-4 under 35 U.S.C. § 102 since the primary reference, the PDR, does not disclose
every material element of the claimed subject matter.").
3
Id. ("The PDR, however, teaches using drugs containing the anesthetic oxethazaine to
inhibit release of the acid-stimulating hormone, gastrine, in order treat esophagitis, gastritis, peptic
ulcer and irritable colon syndrome.").
'397

398

Id.
o Id.

400

402

498 F. Supp. 28 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
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in prior art processes for the production of chlortetracycline (Aureomycin) was not to
be anticipatory, because the claimed tetracycline was produced only in "small
amounts" and was "unrecognized at the time." 403 The court accepted both the
examiner's statement during the course of prosecution that "it appeared that
tetracycline and tetracycline hydrochloride were inherently produced by the prior art
fermentation processes described in the Duggar and Niedercorn patents" 40 4 and a
summary of an interview with the examiner in which the applicant stated:
The Examiner made it clear that he would not insist on a categorical
averment that the fermentation broths prepared according to cited patents
contained no tetracycline whatsoever.
He evidently appreciates the
impossibility of proving its non-existence and isnot concerned about useless
trace amounts which cannot be separated from the broths by methods now
40 5
recommended for recovery of the new antibiotic.
The court found that "[nio evidence has been presented to this Court that
anyone prior to the Conover invention had any knowledge of the therapeutic benefits
of tetracycline,"' 40 6 and concluded that the patent claims directed to tetracycline were
valid, despite trace amounts having been "coproduced during the preparation of the
earlier antibiotic Aureomycin according to the prior art Duggar and Niedercorn
fermentation processes." 40 7 The court referenced several cases as precedent for "the
basic principle that prior unrecognized co-production or use will not bar a patent on a
408
later invention of the same product or process."
°
The United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in In re OelriCh4 9
reversed a decision by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences rejecting claims
03

Id. at 35. This case is directed to related patents, but is otherwise distinct from Chas. Pizor

v. Barry-Martin Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 241 F. Supp. 191 (S.D. Fla. 1965). In In re Coordinated
PretrialProceedings, the court stated:
The government has contended that information that small amounts of
tetracycline may have been produced under the prior art Duggar and Niedercorn
processes was withheld from the Patent Office because it would have barred
issuance of the Conover Patent. That contention is incorrect. Coproduction of
small amounts of tetracycline in the prior art which was unrecognized at the time
of the Conover invention could not act as a bar to a patent on tetracycline.

In re CoordinatedPretrialProceedings,498 F. Supp. at 35.
401
405

Id.

Id. at 31.
Id. at 34. The court made clear its acceptance of the summary provided by the applicants:
Rule 2 of the Patent Office specifies that all business with that Office must
be transacted in writing, and that the actions of the Patent Office will be based
exclusively on the written record .... [The Examiner] Lidoffs failure to indicate
any disagreement with the statement can only mean that he accepted them as
accurate.

I06Id. at 36.
407Id. at 32.

408 Id. at 36 ("There have been many other adjudications which have confirmed the basic
principal that prior unrecognized coproduction or use will not bar a patent on a later invention of
the same product or process." (footnote omitted)). The court cited, as an example, Chas. Pfizer & Co.
v. Ba-rry Martin Pharmaceuticals,Inc. 384 F. Supp. 191 (S.D. Fla. 1965), as also affirming the
validity of the Conover patent.
409 666 F.2d 578 (C.C.P.A. 1981).

[6:373 2007]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

because the express teachings of the prior art reference relied upon as being
inherently anticipatory did not inevitably result in "means for generating
4 10
a ... carrier frequency ... less than the minimum system resonant frequency."
The court relied on language from Hansgirg, discussed above, which stated that
"[ilnherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities .... If,
however, the disclosure is sufficient to show that the natural result flowing from the
operation as taught would result in the performance of the questioned function, it
seems to be well settled that the disclosure should be regarded as sufficient." 41 1 The
language of Hansgirgwas applied by the court to equate "the natural result flowing
from the operation" with inevitability:
The relationship between the carrier frequency and the system critical
frequency - the former below the latter . . .
cannot be said to be "the
natural result flowing from the operation as taught." The Oelrich patent
instructs that the device is "adapted to receive a carrier frequency
substantially in excess of the particular system critical or resonant
frequency ...... Given this express teaching, a 'means for generating
a ... carrier frequency ... less than the minimum system resonant
412
frequency" is not inevitably present.

2. The Role of Recognition
Judge Newman for the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Continental
Can Co., U.S.A. v. Monsanto Co.413 vacated a lower court summary judgment of
anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) of a patent claim directed to a container having
hollow ribs. 414 Judge Newman asserted that a finding of inherent anticipation can
rely on extrinsic evidence, but that "[s]uch evidence must make clear that the
missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the
reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill."415 In re
Oelrich was cited by Judge Newman for support, which quoted Hansgirgto the effect
that, although the "mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of
circumstances is not sufficient," if "the disclosure is sufficient to show that the
natural result flowing from the operation as taught would result in the performance
41 6
of the questioned function," then "the disclosure should be regarded as sufficient."
Therefore, Judge Newman in Continental Can, like the court in earlier decisions
addressing inherent anticipation, filled the "gap in the reference," created by silence
with respect to a specific teaching, by resorting to a determination of whether the
teaching was, although silent, nevertheless part of the public domain. 41 7 As phrased
in the quotation from Hansgirg,and relied upon by Judge Newman in Continental
410 Id. at 581.

"I Id. (quoting Hansgirg v. Kemmer, 102 F.2d 212, 214 (C.C.P.A. 1939)).
412 Id.
at 581-82.
413 948 F.2d 1264 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
41 Id. at 1269.
415

416

Id. at 1268.
Id. at 1269.

417 Id. at 1268.
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Can, the factor overriding whether "a certain thing may result from a given set of
circumstances" in an assessment of inherency was whether the critical teaching was
a "natural result flowing from the operation as taught."418 For Judge Newman,
apparently, a determination of the "natural result" sufficient to inherently anticipate
a patent claim was contingent upon the necessary presence of missing descriptive
matter in combination with recognition by persons of ordinary skill in the art that
the missing teaching was present. 419 In essence, to be properly a part of the prior art
and, therefore, in the public domain, the test required by Judge Newman was not
merely presence, but recognition of presence of missing teachings by those skilled in
the art. Only then could an inventor be deprived of a grant of an exclusive right in
exchange for his contribution to the public of the knowledge of his discovery.
The CAFC in Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco, Inc. 420 held invalid U.S. Patent No.
4,111,727, issued to Clay, and its reissue, U.S. Re. 33,788, as being anticipated by
either of two U.S. patents. 421 The patents that were held invalid (the original patent
and its reissue) were both directed to ammonium nitrate and fuel oil ("ANFO")
blasting compositions. 422 The lower court held, in two separate decisions, that the
limitation of "sufficient aeration ... to enhance sensitivity" was an inherent property
of the compositions taught by earlier patents to Egly and Butterworth and that,
423
therefore, the claimed patent and its reissue were anticipated by their teachings.
Judge Rader, in affirming the lower court decisions, referenced Titanium Metals
Corp. v. Banner124 for the proposition that "[i]nherency is not necessarily coterminous
with the knowledge of those of ordinary skill in the art," and that "[artisans of
ordinary skill may not recognize the inherent characteristics or functioning of the
prior art."425 The court in Titanium Metals relied on In re Wilder#26 and In re
Legriee,427 which required an anticipatory reference to be "enabling," to uphold the
subject patent. 428 "The implication" of the lower court, according to Judge Rich in

418

Id. at 1269.

419 Id. at 1268.
421

190 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1343.

422

Id.at 1344.

423

Id. at 1345. The court summarized the two lower court decisions, in part, as follows:
The only element of the Clay patent claims which is arguably not present in
the prior art compositions is "sufficient aeration ... entrapped to enhance
sensitivity to a substantial degree." The trial court determined that "sufficient
aeration" was an inherent element in the prior art blasting compositions within
the overlapping ranges.

420

Id.

After the reissue patent issued, the district court conducted a second bench
trial, in January 1996, on the issues of phase two.... Despite the PTO's
consideration of the Egly and Butterworth references during prosecution of the
reissue, the district court concluded that IRECO had overcome the Clay reissue
patent's presumption of validity under 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994) by clear and
convincing evidence.
42I 778 F.2d 775, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
425 Atlas Powder Co., 190 F.3d at 1347.
426 429 F.2d 447, 451 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
427301 F.2d 929, 944 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
428 Titanium Metals, 778 F.2d at 778.
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Titanium Metals, "being that the Russian article perhaps does not enable one to
know all the things that the plaintiffs inventors disclosed in their application, such
as the range limits of the alloying ingredients Mo and Ni and the corrosion
resistance." 429 The court in Titanium Metals reversed the lower court's decision
because "it is immaterial, on the issue on their novelty, what inherent properties the
430
alloys have or whether these applicants discovered certain inherent properties."
The CAFC in Titanium Metals quoted Wilder as follows:
However, recitation, in a claim to a composition, of a particular property
said to be possessed by the recited composition, be that property newlydiscovered or not, does not necessarily change the scope of the subject
matter otherwise defined by that claim. ... We start with the proposition
431
that claims cannot be obtained to that which is not new.
Summarizing, the court on appeal in Titanium Metals stated that "lit is also an
elementary principle of patent law that when, as by a recitation of ranges or
otherwise, a claim covers several compositions, the claim is 'anticipated' if one of
43 2
them is in the prior art."
Reflecting the reasoning of Titanium Metals, Judge Rader in Atlas Powder
asserted inherency as a function of public freedom to "make, use, or sell prior art
compositions or processes, regardless of whether or not they understand their
complete makeup or the underlying scientific principles which allow them to
operate." 433 Judge Rader summarized that, "la]n inherent structure, composition, or
function is not necessarily known," 434 and that "li]nsufficient prior understanding of
the inherent properties of a known composition does not defeat a finding of
435
anticipation."
In Titanium Metals and Atlas Powder,therefore, the issue was whether claimed
subject matter could be considered novel on the basis of properties present but not
made explicit in teachings of the prior art. The holding by the CAFC in each case
was that discovery and explicit identification of properties inherent in compositions
otherwise fully disclosed in a prior art reference could not confer novelty in a patent

429

Id.

430 Id. at 782.
431
432

Id. (quoting In re Wilder, 429 F.2d at 450).
Id. (citing In re Petering, 49 C.C.P.A. 993 (1962)).

Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Judge Rader stated:
This court concluded [in Titanium Metals] that the claimed alloy was not novel,
noting that "it is immaterial, on the issue of their novelty, what inherent
properties the alloys have or whether these applicants discovered certain inherent
properties." This same reasoning holds true when it is not a property, but an
ingredient, which is inherently contained in the prior art. The public remains free
to make, use, or sell prior art compositions or processes, regardless of whether or
not they understand their complete makeup or the underlying scientific principles
which allow them to operate. The doctrine of anticipation by inherency, among
other doctrines, enforces that basic principle.
Id. (citation omitted).
4 Id. at 1348-49.
4
Id. at 1349.
43
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claim. 43 6 The court in both cases required novelty in the composition, regardless of
whether properties identified in the claims were made explicit in the reference, or
were even otherwise recognized by one skilled in the art, as a prerequisite to patent
protection. 437 Judge Rich, in Titanium Metals, and Judge Rader, in Atlas Powder,
further implied that patent protection cannot be granted where the public would be
excluded from the right to make, use, or sell compositions otherwise known in the
art.
In both cases, therefore, the question was whether discovery of existing
properties could bestow patentability. However, there is a difference between failing
to recognize an inherent property of a composition in the prior art that is within the
scope of a claimed composition, and failure of a component in the prior art, either
alone or as part of a composition, to contribute any properties to the composition. In
other words, whether claimed subject matter can properly be found to be within the
public domain can depend not simply on its existence in the prior art, but also
whether the public benefited by its presence. Failure of a property of a component of
a composition in public use to confer an effect on the public, in combination with
failure to recognize the existence of that component in that composition, should not
defeat a later claim to that component, or to a composition that benefits from that
property.
MEHL/Biophile v. Sandy Milgraum438 distinguishes between "occasional" and
"natural" results, and provides a basis for making this distinction in view of the
benefit conferred on the public. 43 9 Judge Rader, for the CAFC, held that U.S. Patent
No. 5,059,192 ("the '192 patent") directed to a "method of hair depilation," by
substantial vertical alignment of laser light over a hair follicle opening "to damage its
papilla so that hair re-growth is prevented and scarring of the surrounding skin is
avoided,"440 to be invalid as being inherently anticipated by the teachings of a prior
art published article to Polla 441 that "inherently teaches substantially vertical
alignment over hair follicle openings." 442 The patent owners argued that, in addition
to failing to disclose "substantially vertical alignment" or "hair depilation," there
could be no damage to papilla by the teachings of the article because guinea pigs,
which were the subject of testing by the method taught in the article had been
epilated [i.e., hair removed by the roots] prior to treatment. 443 The court disagreed,
quoting a portion of the Polla article, which stated that "disruption of melanosomes
deep in the hair papillae was observed." 444 Vertical alignment was held by the court
445
to be a "natural result flowing from the operation as taught" by the Polla article.
The court considered depilation [i.e., removal of hair] to be the necessary result of the
teaching of the article, regardless of the author's intent, stating that "to the extent
Id. at 1350; Titanium Metals, 778 F.2d at 783.
3:" Atlas Powder, 190 F.3d at 1350; Titanium Metals, 778 F.2d at 783.
438 192 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
139 Id. at 1365-66.
410 Id. at 1364.
441 Id.
at 1366 (referring to Luigi L. Polla et al., Melanosomes Are a Primary Target of a
Switched Ruby LaserIrradiationin GuineaPig Skin, J. INVESTIGATIVE DERMATOLOGY (1987)).
442 Id.
443 Id. at 1365.
" Id. at 1366.
1
Id. (quoting In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581 (C.C.P.A. 1981)).
136"
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the embodiment in the patent achieves hair depilation, so does the Polla method.
Where, as here, the result is a necessary consequence of what was deliberately
intended, it is of no import that the article's authors did not appreciate the
results."

44 6

In contrast, the teachings of another reference, the "RD-1200 Manual," which
was directed to a method of removing tattoos, was held by the court in
MEHL/Biophile not to be inherently anticipatory because "[tihe record discloses no
necessary relationship between the location of a tattoo and the location of hair
follicles," and, therefore, "an operator of the RD-1200 laser could use the laser
according to the manual without necessarily aligning the laser 'substantially
vertically over a hair follicle opening."' 447 The court held "[t]he possibility of such an
alignment does not legally suffice to show anticipation .... Occasional results are not
448
inherent."
As discussed previously, cases directed to accidental or occasional anticipation
have not made clear whether lack of inherent anticipation is based on lack of
certainty in the results of the method taught in a reference or on the inconsequential
nature of the results of the method presumed to fall within the scope of a patent
claim. Application of a benefit analysis distinguishes between the RD-1200 Manual
and Polla article as references. Specifically, regardless of whether following the
teachings of the RD-1200 manual would inevitably result in at least occasional
substantially vertical alignment of a laser over a hair follicle opening, there was no
evidence of the damage to papillae that, according to the claims in the subject patent,
was the measure of depilation in the treated subject. 449 The teachings of the Polla
article, by way of contrast, clearly identified damage to papillae. 450 Therefore,
despite the fact that in neither reference was it evident that hair was present at the
treatment site, and the fact that substantial vertical alignment of the laser was
arguably an occasional occurrence according to the teachings of both references, it
was only in the Polla article that the benefit of the claimed method, that of damage to
papillae consequent to the laser treatment, was clearly obtained.

C. Benefit as the Link Between Experimental Use and Inherency Doctrines
A parallel can be drawn between infringement by use of a device that
occasionally, or accidentally, infringes claims and the effect of occasional or
accidental occurrence in the prior art on claimed subject matter. The claim at issue
in Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp.45 1 was directed to a method which,
unintentionally, was performed by an apparatus designed by Service Engineering
Corp. ("SEC") to inject vaccine into the chorioallantoic sac ("CAS") through the
eggshell of chicken embryos. 452 As stated by the per curiam opinion of the CAFC, the
trial record indicated that tests conducted by a professor at the University of
446 Id.

447

Id. at 1365.

448

Id.

4

See, e.g., id. at 1365.
Id. at 1366.

4 0

451 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
452 Id.
at 1346.
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Delaware, Dr. Rosenberger, who was retained by SEC, "showed that ... most
injections penetrated beyond the CAS and into the amnion/yolk sac - areas covered
by the '630 patent," which was the subject patent of litigation. 453 During testing of
454
the prototype, SEC, as alleged by Embrex, offered the device for sale.
The majority opinion upheld the lower jury verdict of infringement and reversed
in part a holding by the lower court that "an offer to sell a device cannot infringe a
455
method patent without evidence of the device's actual use to carry out the method."
In view of the commercial purpose of tests conducted by SEC, the court categorically
dismissed experimental use as a defense to infringement, and implied that an
experimental use defense was equivalent to one of de minimis damages:
In this case, SEC's acts of hiring Drs. Davis and Rosenberger, and the
doctors' acts injecting eggs with vaccine cannot be deemed experimental use
or de minimis. While SEC tries to cloak these tests in the guise of scientific
inquiry, that alone cannot immunize its acts. The district court determined
on the record before it that SEC performed the tests expressly for
commercial purposes. SEC's chief commercial purpose was to demonstrate
to its potential customers the usefulness of the methods performed by its in
ovo injection machines. Just because SEC was unsuccessful in selling its
machines does not confer infringement immunity upon SEC for its
infringing acts. This court therefore affirms the district court's denial of
456
JMOL on infringement.
Judge Rader, in a concurring opinion, broadly condemned both de minimis and
experimental use as "excuses" for infringement, stating that "Ib]ecause the Patent
Act confers the right to preclude 'use,' not 'substantial use,' no room remains in the
law for a de minimis excuse. Similarly, because intent is irrelevant to patent
infringement, an experimental use excuse cannot survive." 457 Judge Rader used the
holding by the Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton-Davis Chemical
Co.458 to assert that experimental use, as a defense to infringement, should be
precluded even in the "extraordinarily narrow form recognized in Roche." 459 To the
extent that experimental use might survive, Judge Rader further stated that "the
slightest commercial implication will render the 'philosophical inquiry/experimental
use' doctrine inapplicable, as occurs in the court's resolution today."460

453 Id. at 1347.

4 Id.
45 Id. at 1352.
456 Id. at 1349.
F7 Id. at 1352 (Rader, J., concurring).
520 U.S. 17 (1997) (holding that the doctrine of equivalents continues to exist and that this
question is for a jury to decide).
4 Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1353 (Rader, J. concurring) ("The Supreme Court's recent reiteration
that infringement does not depend on the intent underlying the allegedly infringing conduct, to my
eyes, precludes any further experimental use defense, even in the extraordinarily narrow form
recognized in Roche.").
460Id. (Rader, J., concurring).
458
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Judge Rader, in discounting experimental use as a defense on the basis of the
legal maxim that "i]ntent is not an element of infringement," 46 1 did not recognize the
irony in his consequent use of commercial intent to restrict application of that
doctrine. Experimental use, by definition, is a statement of intent, as is the phrase
"commercial implication," and related phrases, such as those employed by Trial
Judge Cooper (e.g., "for the purpose of furthering the legitimate business interests of
the infringer,")462 and in Roche (the phrase, e.g., "commercial purposes").463 Even
Justice Story in Whittemore made reference to infringement as "a design to use it for
profit," with the "limitation" that "it could never have been the intent of the
legislature to punish a man, who constructed such a machine merely for
philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the
machine to produce its described effects." 464 Both "commercial" and "experimental"
uses, as characterizations, inherently carry with them statements of intent.
Although intent is inherent in any assessment of use as "experimental," it is also
inherent in assessing use as "commercial." The distinction, however, between an
infringing use, and one that is not infringing because it is experimental, is not
whether there are "commercial implications," which historically have been present in
almost all successful applications of the experimental use defense, but whether the
benefit of the claimed invention made available by the patentee has been gained by
its use. If the benefit of the invention has been obtained, then there is infringement.
On the other hand, if use of the claimed invention is limited to discovery or
"ascertainment of sufficiency of its described use," then there is no infringement;
protection afforded to the patentee is limited to the benefit provided to the public,
and does not extend to the public's right of discovery, because such an extension
would preclude, or retard, further contribution to the public weal of improvements.
Subsequent improvement may be the subject of distinct exclusive rights.
In Embrex, use of a device, although intended to avoid infringement of a patent
directed to injection of vaccines into chick embryos, obtained the benefit of the
claimed method because, in fact, "most injections penetrated beyond the CAS and
into the amnion/yolk sac - areas covered by the '630 Patent."465 Offer for sale of the
device was, in itself, insufficient; benefit of the claimed method, in violation of
Embrex's exclusive right, could only be found by "the devices' actual use to carry out
the method." 466 Therefore, a holding of infringement would be consistent with case
precedent, including cases where the experimental use doctrine was successfully
invoked despite the presence of commercial intent in experimental activities
conducted.
The link between possibility of occurrence and inherency in prior art teachings
was made clear in Elan Pharmaceuticals,Inc. v. Mayo Foundation("Elan J")467 where
161Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1353 (Rader, J. concurring) (quoting Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v.
Warner-Jenkins Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1519 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
462 Roche, 733 F.2d at 863.
463 Id.

4 Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).
465Embrex, 216

F.3d at 1347.

466Id. at 1352 ("This court also reverses-in-part because, as a matter of law, an offer to sell a

device cannot infringe a method patent without evidence of the device's actual use to carry out the
method.").
467304 F.3d 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Elan I].
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Judge Newman held that a prior art patent, U.S. Patent No. 5,455,169 to Mullan, did
not anticipate claims of two patents, U.S. Patent Nos. 5,612,486 and 5,850,003
directed to transgenic rodents carrying a genetic mutation, known as the "Swedish
mutation," that causes abnormal enzymatic cleavage in the brain of a protein,
amyloid precursor protein ("APP").468 The result of the abnormality is accumulation
of plaques in the brain principally composed of a protein fragment called betaamyloid peptide ("betaAP"). 469 The district court held that the teachings of the
Mullan patent were anticipatory because they would, as summarized by the CAFC,
"be expected to produce a statistically small percentage of transgenic mice, and some
of these mice would be expected to produce detectable [amino terminal fragment] on
enzymatic cleavage." 470 Reversal by the CAFC was based on the propositions that,
"[w]hen anticipation is based on inherency of limitations not expressly disclosed in
the assertedly anticipating reference, it must be shown that the undisclosed
information was known to be present in the subject matter of the reference," and that
"[an inherent limitation is one that is necessarily present; invalidation based on
inherency is not established by 'probabilities or possibilities."' 471 For support, Judge
Newman quoted Judge Learned Hand:
If the earlier disclosure offers no more than a starting point for further
experiments, if its teaching will sometimes succeed and sometimes fail, if it
does not inform the art without more how to practice the new invention, it
has not correspondingly enriched the store of common knowledge, and it is
472
not an anticipation.
Judge Dyk dissented from the majority opinion on the premise that there "is simply
no basis in our law to support the proposition that the source of proof for inherency
must be found in the prior art and cannot be found in the patentee's own disclosure
or other source" and concluded that "the majority's contrary conclusion is incorrect as
473
a matter of law."
The following year, the decision was vacated and substituted with a new opinion
also written by Judge Newman ("Elan JJ").474 Instead of holding that the Mullan
reference was not anticipatory, Judge Newman rephrased the issue in the new
opinion as one of enablement, 475 whereby "[tihe disclosure in an assertedly
anticipating reference must be adequate to enable possession of the desired subject
matter." 476 Accordingly, the question of anticipation was reversed and remanded
back to the district court for a determination "of whether the Mullan reference
enabled persons of ordinary skill in the field of the invention to make the desired

168

Id. at 1223-24.

469 Id.
470

Id. at 1228.

471Id.
472 Id.

at 1229 (quoting Dewey & Almy Chem. Co., v. Mimex Co., 124 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir.

1942)).
473Id. at 1233 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
471Elan Pharms. v. Mayo Found., 346 F.3d 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Elan
475

II].
Id. at 1054 ("We conclude that Elan's arguments are more properly characterized as

enablement arguments rather than as inherency arguments.").
476Id. at

1055.
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mutated mouse without undue experimentation." 477 Therefore, despite the fact that
only occasional success could be expected, a prior art reference could be anticipatory
as an inherent teaching of a claimed invention if the reference could be considered
enabling, thereby constituting possession and benefit of the invention by the public
prior to an inventor's subsequent discovery.
In In re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation,478 the CAFC affirmed a lower court
decision holding invalid three patents directed to cultivating and consuming sprouts
47 9
to reduce carcinogen levels in animals and thereby diminish the risk of cancer.
The plaintiff, and licensee of the patents, Brassica Protection Products LLC
("Brassica") argued that the claims of the subject patent were not inherently
anticipated by prior art descriptions of the same sprouts and their consumption
because "at most, one following the prior art would have a possibility or probability of
producing a food product high in Phase 2 enzyme-inducing potential." 480 As stated by
Brassica, the "fact that one following the prior art might have selected seeds meeting
48 1
the limitations of the claims is not sufficient to establish inherent anticipation."
In response, the court discounted Brassica's argument of a lack of certainty by
stating that the prior art taught selection of sprouts rich in glucosinates and high in
Phase 2 enzyme-inducing potential, because all the sprouts in that art were
identified as "suitable for eating."48 2 The court held that, because the sprouts were
all in the public domain and described as suitable for consumption, it was
"unnecessary for purposes of anticipation for the person sprouting these particular
cultivars to have realized that they were sprouting something rich in glucosinates
and high in Phase 2 enzyme-inducing potential."48 3 In other words, the court
disregarded Brassica's argument that inherency, as a doctrine of anticipation,
requires certainty of presence, and instead relied on an over-riding certainty that the
public had been benefiting by ingestion of sprouts selectively cultivated and
consumed by the method of Brassica's claims. To uphold the patents in the face of
such evidence would deprive the public of the right to continue to benefit from the
anti-carcinogenic effect of certain sprouts, the discovery of which was the basis for
obtaining patent protection:
Thus, according to Brassica, the prior art fails to meet the "identifying"
steps of the claims because it does not specify which cultivar should be
sprouted. However, all of the appropriate cultivars that are identified in
Brassica's patents are in the public domain.... Brassica cannot credibly

177

478
179
18

Id. at 1057.

301 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1345.
Id. at 1349.

481 Id.
2

1d. at 1351 ("Numerous prior art references identify these same sprouts as suitable for
eating.... These references therefore meet the claim limitations of identifying seeds to use in order
18

to have sprouts with the inherent properties of glucosinates and high Phase 2 enzyme-inducing

activity.").
483 Id.
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maintain that no one has heretofore grown and eaten one of the many
48 4
suitable cultivars identified by its patents.
Therefore, application of both the experimental use defense and the doctrine of
inherency are linked in these cases by whether the benefit of the claimed invention is
obtained by its use.

D. Application ofExperimental Use andInherency Doctrinesin the Absence of
Benefit
The CAFC again roundly criticized any attempt to defend use of a claimed
invention as experimental, except in the very narrow form articulated in Roche and
Embrex, in Madey v. Duke University.4 5 The dispute arose as a consequence of use
by Duke University ("Duke") of laser equipment patented by Dr. John M. J. Madey
("Madey") without his consent. 48 6 The lower court held that use of the patented
technology by Duke did not infringe because the uses "were solely for research,
academic, or experimental purposes," 48 7 and, therefore, embraced by the doctrine of
experimental use which, according to the district court, includes uses that are solely
"for experimental, non-profit purposes." 488 The CAFC, quoting Roche and Embrex,
severely narrowed the experimental use defense from the interpretation given to it
by the district court, stating that "use does not qualify for the experimental use
defense when it is undertaken in the 'guise of scientific inquiry' but has 'definite,
cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes,"' 48 9 and that "use is
disqualified from the [experimental use] defense if it has the 'slightest commercial
implication."' 490 Duke, according to the CAFC, had "legitimate business objectives,
including educating and enlightening students and faculty" and that, "so long as the
act is in furtherance of the alleged infringer's legitimate business and is not solely for
amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry, the act does
not qualify for the very narrow and strictly limited experimental use defense." 491 The
CAFC further held that "the profit or non-profit status of the user is not
determinative."492
493
The district court had relied, in part, on Ruth v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. CO.,
494
which applied the experimental use defense in the context of an academic setting.
The CAFC in Madey dismissed the holding in Ruth as that of "a case that is not

4M Id,

485 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
486 Id
487

1999)).
488
489
490

Id. at 1361 (quoting Madey v. Duke Univ., No. 1:97 CV 1170, slip op. (M.D.N.C. Dec. 1,
Id. at 1355 (quoting Madoy v. Duke. slip op., at 10)).
Id. at 1362 (quoting Roche v. Bolar, 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
Id. (quoting Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).

4' Id.
492 Id.

49 13 F. Supp. 697 (D. Colo. 1935).

491 Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362 (noting the district court cited Ruth, which held that the
experimental use defense applied in the educational context, to support its decision).

[6:373 2007]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

binding precedent for this court," 49 5 but nevertheless went on to explain how the
holding in Ruth was inconsistent with Embrex, Roche and Pitcairn:
Thus, the combination of apparent lack of commerciality, with the nonprofit status of an educational institution, prompted the court in Ruth,
without any detailed analysis of the character, nature and effect of the use,
to hold that the experimental use defense applied .... This is not consistent
with the binding precedent of our case law postulated by Embrex, Roche
496
and Pitcairn.
Ruth, however, can be construed in a manner that is, in fact, consistent with
Embrex, Roche and Pitcairn, as well as other cases where experimental use was
applied as a defense, both successfully and unsuccessfully. Specifically, the court in
Ruth stated that the "machines were all used in the laboratory and were cut up and
changed from day to day. Their use was experimental."' 497 The court in Ruth did not
base application of experimental use as a defense on the fact that the Colorado School
of Mines was an academic institution. Rather, consistent with the definition of the
"experimental use" exception recited in Embrex, Roche, and Pitcairn,and discussed
above, the court held that, where "the sole purpose" was that of "gratifying a
philosophical taste or curiosity or for instruction and amusement," the "making or
using of a patented invention merely for experimental purposes, without any intent
to derive profits or practical advantage therefrom, is not an infringement."' 498 It is
not clear from the statement of facts in Ruth whether practical advantage of the
claimed subject matter was gained by the Colorado School of Mines' use of the
machines purchased from Stearns-Roger, the defendant in the case, or whether the
uses were conducted as "philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining
sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects," as stated by Justice Story
in Whittemore.499 However, neither is it clear from the facts in Madey whether use of
the patented laser technology was in pursuit of discovery related to operation of the
claimed technology or, instead, to obtain the practical advantage of the technology in
pursuit of other research goals. Relying on a distinction between philosophical
inquiry into the operation of a patented device and exploitation of the benefit
provided by operation of the device, the holding in Ruth, which arguably was limited
to philosophical inquiry into the operation of claimed subject matter (in that the
machines were "cut up and changed from day to day"), is consistent with the holding
in Madey, where Duke, in contrast, at least appeared to benefit by operation of the
patented laser to conduct research.
In Schering Corporation v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 500 Judge Rader, for
the CAFC, held that a patent directed to descarbethoxyloratidine ("DCL") was
anticipated by a patent that taught loratidine (which differed from DCL only in that
loratidine substituted a hydrogen on DCL with a carbethoxyl group), because DCL
195 Id. ("The district court supported its conclusion with a citation to Ruth... a case that is not
binding precedent for this court.").
196 Id.
(citation omitted) (emphasis added).
197 Ruth, 13 F. Supp. at 703 n.155.
498 Id. at 713.
'99 Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).
500 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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was a metabolite of loratidine. 5 1 Judge Rader further stated that "this court rejects
5
the contention that inherent anticipation requires recognition in the prior art." 02
Rather, according to Judge Rader, "inherency places subject matter in the public
domain" and "a limitation or the entire invention is inherent and in the public
domain if it is the 'natural result flowing from' the explicit disclosure of the prior
art."50 3 Judge Rader at least implicitly tied inherency to the benefit provided by "the
natural result flowing from" prior art teachings by stating that, in addition to being a
"necessary consequence of administering loratidine to patients," DCL, as a
metabolite, "provides a useful result, because it serves as an active non-drowsy
antihistamine."' 50 4 Interestingly, Judge Rader distinguished Seaborg, which upheld
patent validity, not on the basis of uncertainty, but "because the process would have
produced at most one billionth of a gram of the isotope in forty tons of radioactive
material, i.e., the isotope would have been undetectable,"' 50 5 whereas, "[1un this case,
DCL forms in readily detectable amounts as shown by the extensive record evidence
of testing done on humans to verify the formation of DCL upon ingestion of
loratidine." 50 6 In other words, the presence of an anticipatory material in the prior
art at levels so low as to be undetectable was not enough to defeat the patent claims
for lack of novelty, not because presence of the material was undetectable, as such,
since, according to Judge Rader, inherency does not require recognition in the art,
but, rather, because such low levels would not produce a "useful result," as was
evidenced by the presence of "readily detectable amounts" of DCL in humans
consequent to ingestion of loratidine. 50 7 The presence of "at most one billionth of a
gram of the isotope in forty tons of radioactive material" under the facts of Seaborg,
as a "natural result flowing from" the prior art teachings, was not only unrecognized,
but conferred no benefit to the public in contrast to the "useful result" provided by
50 8
the unrecognized presence of DCL as a metabolite of loratidine.
Judge Newman dissented from an order issued later that year that denied
petitions for a panel rehearing and for a rehearing en banc. 509 In her dissent, she
argued strenuously that, "[wihen all of the elements of the claim are not shown in the
prior art, precedent requires that the missing element was nonetheless known to be
01Id.at 1382. The court stated:
The district court did not err in finding that the '233 patent discloses
administering loratidine to a patient, and that DCL forms as a natural result of
that administration. The district court correctly concluded that DCL is inherent
in the prior art. Without any genuine issues of material fact, the district court
correctly granted summary judgment that claims 1 and 3 are invalid as
anticipated by the '233 patent.
Id.
Id. at 1377.
Id. at 1379.
F-1Id. at 1378 ("DCL is a necessary consequence of administering loratidine to patients. The
record also shows that DCL provides a useful result, because it serves as an active non-drowsy
antihistamine.").
505 Id. at 1379.
5o6 Id.
,07Id. ("In sum, this court's precedent does not require a skilled artisan to recognize the
502

503

inherent characteristic in the prior art that anticipates the claimed invention.").
5o0 Id. (distinguishing its facts from those of In -re Seaborg, 328 F.2d 996, 996-97 (C.C.P.A.
1964)).
,09 Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 348 F.3d 992 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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present in the subject matter of the reference, and that the claim is directed to the
' 51
known subject matter."
Judge Newman concluded that "[p]recedent is directly
contrary to the panel's holding that although no one knew of the existence of DCL, it
is unpatentable because it in fact existed." 511 Judge Lourie also dissented from the
denial of petition for rehearing en banc "because it is an extraordinary decision,
512
effectively precluding virtually all patents on human metabolites of drugs."
According to Judge Lourie, the panel decision "holds that an enabling disclosure of
'how to make' metabolites is provided by the mere recitation that one can administer
a prior art compound to humans," 513 precluding them from patent protection without
any of those metabolites ever being identified. Moreover, Judge Lourie asserted the
issue to be a matter of law, rather than public policy:
In any event, we deal here with issues of patent law, not policy or equity,
and to hold that a patent on a product, with a minimal disclosure of
administering it to a human or other subject, anticipates a later application
on a metabolite, of which no mention appears whatsoever in the patent,
51 4
cannot be correct.
In effect, both Judges Newman and Lourie viewed the panel decision as a sweeping
denial of exclusive rights to compounds that, although present as metabolites, had
51 5
yet to be recognized.
As can be seen from Madey and Schering, lack of consideration of benefit in
application of experimental use and inherency doctrines has resulted in widely
divergent opinions about the scope of patent protection that is to be afforded as a
matter of law.

,10 Id. at 994 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 995 (Newman, J., dissenting).
512 Id. (Lourie, J., dissenting).
513 Id. at 996 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
' Id. (Lourie, J., dissenting).
515 The debate continues over the requirement of recognition in inherency analyses. On April
23, 2007, the CAFC rendered an opinion in In re Omeprazole Patent Litigation in which Judge
Rader for the majority held that claim 1 of U.S. 6,013,281, directed to a process for preparing an oral
formulation of a gastric acid inhibiting drug (an FDA approved version of which is known as
Prilosec®), was inherently anticipated by the teachings of a published Korean patent application. In
re Omeprazole Patent Litigation, Nos. 04-1562, 04-1563, 04-1589, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 9233, at
*21-23 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 23, 2007). Inherency was found, despite the fact that the Korean applicant
"disavowed a subcoating and disclosed no process conditions to form a separating layer in situ." Id.
at *19. Judge Newman in her dissent bluntly stated: "What is unknown cannot 'anticipate."' Id. at
*35. Assuming agreement could be reached as to whether the critical in situ formation of a
separating layer resulted from following the teachings of the Korean patent application, the
question of inherent anticipation might be facilitated by determining whether the separating layer
forms in an amount sufficient to provide a benefit. In such an analysis, only if benefit cannot be
established would recognition of in situ formation of a separating layer "when viewed by persons
experienced in the field of the invention," as dictated by Judge Newman, be required. Id. at *37.
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II.

CONSIDERING BENEFIT IN SOME RECENT CASES

Three recent decisions by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, two of
which have been appealed and decided upon by the Supreme Court, illustrate the
effects of current interpretations of the inherency and experimental use doctrines,
and how modifications of these doctrines to incorporate considerations of benefit
could alter the decision in each case. These cases, SmithKline Beecham Corp. v.
Apotex, 516 Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., v. Laboratory Corporation of America
Holdings517 and Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA 518 are distinct from each
other in that SmithKline Beecham and Metabolite come to opposite decisions in view
of the facts under the doctrine of inherency, while the CAFC in Integra held that safe
harbor under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (1) "does not globally embrace all experimental
activity that at some point, however attenuated, may lead to an FDA approval
process." 519 Each of these cases, nevertheless, presents fundamental problems that
are rooted in misconceptions of the scope of protection to be provided in exchange for
making an inventive contribution to the public domain.

A. SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex
In SmithKline Beecham, the court held that, the presence of paroxetine
hydrochloride ("PHC") hemihydrate, although undetected and even undetectable, in a
PHC anhydrate composition of the prior art, was an inherent and invalidating
anticipation of a later claim to the hemihydrate. 520 As a corollary, 521 the court held
516 403 F.3d, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2887 (2006).
517 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cart. dismissed, 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006).
518 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
519 Id. at 867.
520 SmithKline Beecham, 403 F.3d at 1344-48. The court stated:
The record shows, and SmithKline admits through its proffered arguments,
that producing PHC anhydrate according to the '196patentinevitably results in
the production of at least trace amounts of anticipatory PHC hemihydrate.
...SmithKline would have the court infer from this argument that it is possible
to make pure PHC anhydrate according to the '196 patent in unseeded conditions.
The district court, however, properly dismissed this logic noting that 'existence
and detection are not the same thing.' The district court went on to explain that
PHC hemihydrate may have existed in undetectable amounts since Ferrosan first
produced PHC anhydrate in the 1970's, particularly because the technology to
detect PCH [sic] hemihydrate in small amounts did not exist until 1985.
.... Because the record contains clear and convincing evidence that production of
PHC anhydrate in accordance with the '196 patent inherently results in at least
trace amounts of PHC hemihydrate, this court holds that the '196 patent
inherently anticipates claim 1 of the '723 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).

In summary, this court reverses the claim construction of the district court
and holds that claim 1 of the '723 patent covers any amount of crystalline
paroxetine hydrochloride hemihydrate without further limitations.
Id. (citations omitted).
521 Id. at 1341. The court made the connection between anticipation and infringement explicit:
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that production by Apotex of PHC anhydrate would infringe claims directed to the
hemihydrate, even if the amount of the hemihydrate were not present in
"commercially significant amounts," as required by the district court, 522 and even if
the amount of hemihydrate present were undetectable, thereby affirming the lower
court holding of infringement. 523
Accordingly, certainty of presence, albeit
undetectable, of a compound in the prior art inherently anticipated later claims to
the compound, and, by the same token, if the claim were valid, production of
compositions that include certain, but undetectable amounts, of the claimed
compound would be held to be an infringement of such claims. Both inherent
anticipation and infringement would be found as a matter of law, regardless of
detectability, and regardless of any consideration of the effect of the presence of the
compound in either the anticipated prior art or the infringing composition. However,
consideration by the court of whether any benefit of PHC hemihydrate was obtained
by the "trace amounts" consequent to prior art methods of manufacture of PHC
anhydrate, or in later production of PHC anhydrate by Apotex, may have impacted
the outcome if one of those activities, but not the other, were sufficient to affect the
524
properties of the product.

B. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. v. Laboratory Corporation of America Holding
The CAFC in Metaholite upheld a district court holding that denied a motion for
judgment as a matter of law ("JMOL"), awarding enhanced damages and granting a
permanent injunction against Laboratory Corporation of America Holding
("LabCorp") for infringing a claim directed to a method for detecting a deficiency of
cobalamin or folate in warm-blooded animals. 525 The claimed method of U.S. Patent

Because Apotex seeks to practice the prior art, and because that practice
infringes, the next logical inquiry involves anticipation. That is, if the prior art
infringes now, logically the prior art should have anticipated the claim before
filing of the '723patent. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. BenVenue Labs., Inc.,
246 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (restating the maxim that "that which would
literally infringe if later in time anticipates if earlier").
SmithKline Beecham, 403 F.3d at 1341.
522 Id. at 1335 ("On the question of claim construction, the district court limited claim 1 to PHC
hemihydrate in commercially significant amounts.").
523 Id.
at 1341 ("Having interpreted claim 1 to cover PHC hemihydrate without further
limitation, this court turns to infringement ....
This court, therefore affirms the district court's
finding that Apotex's product will infringe under this court's claim construction.").
524 At least one benefit of PHC hemihydrate was articulated, but then never further
considered, by the court:
In March 1985, Alan Curzons, a chemist in SmithKline's Worthing, England
laboratory, discovered a new crystalline form of PHC while attempting to improve
PHC production. Curzon's test results established that the new product was the
hemihydrous form of PHC (PHC hemihydrate). Ferrosan's original form was
anhydrous PHC (PHC anhydrate). PHC anhydrate comprises crystals of PHC
without bound water molecules. PHC hemihydrate comprises PHC crystals with
one bound water molecule for every two PHC molecules. PHC hemihydrate proved
more stable, and thus more easily packaged and preserved, than PHC anhydrate.
Id. at 1334.
525 Metabolite Labs., Inc., v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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No. 4,940,658 ("the '658 patent"), the patent in suit, included the steps of "assaying a
body fluid for an elevated level of total homocysteine," and "correlating an elevated
level of total homocysteine in said body fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin or
folate." 526 The court found that the "prosecution history [of the '658 patent] ties the
preamble directly to the 'correlating' step,"' whereby the "recitation of the intended
use in the preamble makes this invention a method for detecting a vitamin
deficiency."5 27 An allegation of invalidity for inherent anticipation in view of a prior
art reference by Refsum disclosing, according to the court, "that total homocysteine
should be used to investigate 'perturbations of homocysteine metabolism in humans
during disease or pharmacological interventions that affect metabolism of one-carbon
compounds,"' was dismissed. 528 Specifically, the court held that Refsum "simply
invites further experimentation" and that "an invitation to investigate is not an
inherent disclosure. 52 9
A per curiam opinion by the Supreme Court, without further explanation,
dismissed a writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.5 30 In dissent, Justice Breyer,
with Justices Stevens and Souter, argued that the question on which certiorari was
granted, of "[wihether a method patent... directing a party simply to 'correlate' test
results can validly claim a monopoly over a basic scientific relationship ... such that
any doctor necessarily infringes the patent merely by thinking about the relationship
after looking at a test result," should be decided, despite the fact that the legal basis
for the question, that of utility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, was not raised by LabCorp in
the lower courts. 531 On the issue of patentability of the claimed subject matter,
Justice Breyer stated that "the correlation between [total] homocysteine and vitamin
deficiency set forth in claim 13 is a 'natural phenomenon,"' and, therefore,
"respondents have simply described the natural law at issue in the abstract patent
language of a 'process."'53 2 According to Justice Breyer, "that correlation is an
unpatentable 'natural phenomenon,' and I can find nothing in claim 13 that adds
533
anything more of significance."

526

527
528
529

Id. at 1358-59.
Id. at 1362.
Id. at 1367.
Id.

("Rather than necessarily containing the correlation between homocysteine

and

cobalamin or folate deficiencies, Rufsum further invites further experimentation to find such
associations. An invitation to investigate is not an inherent disclosure.").
530 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (stating the
"[w]rit of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.").
'3' Id.
at 2925 (Breyer, J., dissenting.) Justice Breyer stated, for the dissent:
The question before us is whether claim 13, as construed and applied in the
way I have described in part I-B, is invalid in light of the "law of nature"
principal, described in part I-A. I believe that we should answer that question.
There is a technical procedural reason for not doing so, namely, that LabCorp did
not refer in the lower courts to § 101 of the Patent Act, which sets forth subject
matter that is patentable, and within the bounds of which the "law of nature"
principal most comfortably fits. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 ("patent may be obtained for
any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter");..
Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 2925.
532
5

Id. at 2927-28 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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The presumption, of course, is that determination of validity of claim 13 of the
'658 patent properly hangs on the patentability of discovering a "natural
phenomenon." To do so, however, arguably gainsays the issue of whether claim 13, in
fact, claims nothing more than a natural phenomenon. As just discussed, the
question of the petition filed by LabCorp, on which certiorari was granted, loads the
question as a foregone conclusion by inquiring "[wihether a method
patent ... directing a party simply to 'correlate' test results can validly claim a
monopoly over a basic scientific relationship.
...
54 Judge Rader, in writing the
majority decision for the CAFC noted that, during the course of prosecution of the
'658 patent, the United States Patent and Trademark Office addressed the same
issue in the context of a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102 because "[imn the absence of a
correlation step, the preamble of claim 13 merely recites an intended use of the
invention." 53 5 As recited by Judge Rader, amending claim 13 to include a
"correlating" step put the application into condition for allowance, 536 thereby
imposing on the preamble a meaning beyond that of an intended use. 537 In other
words, insertion of the "correlating" step in response to the examiner's rejection for
lack of novelty narrowed the scope of the claim by imparting to the preamble the real
limitation of conducting the test on a population suspected of having, or to be
screened for, a cobalamin or folate deficiency. Interpreted in this way, the method,
as claimed, is no longer inherently anticipated by the prior existence of assays to
determine an elevated level of total homocysteine, as required in the first step of the
method of claim 13, since such elevated levels do not always mean that there is a
deficiency in cobalamin or folate, 538 and until the discovery of the correlation by the
inventors, the population to which the test was administered could not have been
limited to those suspected of, or to be screened for, cobalamin or folate deficiency.
Therefore, the prosecution history of claim 13 strongly suggests that the method is
novel, despite the fact that it is based, like all claimed subject matter, on natural
phenomena. From the point of view of a benefit analysis, even though the correlation
between elevated level of total homocysteine and a deficiency in cobalamin or folate
534Id.
53

at 2925.

Metabolite Labs., Inc., v.Lab. Corp. of Am.Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed.Cir. 2004).

536" Id. ("At that point, the applicant added the recommended "correlating" step. The examiner
then allowed claim 13.").
'37 Id.
("The prosecution history ties the preamble directly to the "correlating" step.
Specifically, the recitation of the intended use in the preamble makes this invention a method for
detecting a vitamin deficiency.").
8 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 7-8, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc.,
126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (No. 04-607). The brief stated:
Although elevated homocysteine has been linked to various medical conditions, a
test result showing elevated homocysteine levels, standing alone, is of limited
practical utility to physicians screening for a vitamin deficiency. That is because
homocysteine may be elevated in cases of cobalamin or folate deficiency, or as the
result of other conditions, and a test only for homocysteine therefore cannot itself
diagnose or distinguish between vitamin deficiencies.
Id. (emphasis in original). See also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11, Lab. Corp. of
Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (No. 04-607) ("The specification then
provides an example of tests conducted by the applicants in which total homocysteine levels were
elevated above normal levels for 99% of the patients with cobalamin deficiency and 95% of those
with folate deficiency."). Additionally, "[p]etitioner had argued that the assays were used primarily

to diagnose other conditions, especially heart disease." Id. at 23.
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existed as a natural phenomenon, the inventors made a contribution to the public
domain by providing a method that more accurately assesses the likelihood of
deficiency in cobalamin or folate in a selected population. Contrary to the question
posed in the petition by LabCorp, claim 13 does not direct "a party simply to
'correlate' test results," but, rather, directs a party to assay a specific population for
total homocysteine and to correlate those results as a method for detecting a
deficiency in cobalamin or folate in that population.53 9 Targeting an assay of total
homocysteine content to a population suspected of having a deficiency in cobalamin
or folate, or to be screened for such a deficiency, did not exist prior to discovery by the
inventors of the correlation. Therefore, the benefit contributed by the inventors
pursuant to their method entitles them to a limited period of exclusivity in its
application.

C. Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd.
In Integra LifeSciences -, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, the CAFC held that safe harbor
under 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e)(1),540 enacted under the Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act of 1984,541 did not extend to testing considered by the court to
be "only general biomedical research to identify new pharmaceutical compounds,"
because "the FDA does not require information about drugs other than the compound
featured in an Investigational New Drug application." 542 Therefore, according to the
court, such testing could not be "reasonably related to the development and
submission of information" to the FDA.543 In dicta, the court effectively limited
application of safe harbor to submission of information "facilitating expedited
approval of patented pioneer drugs already on the market," because "Ieixtending §
271 (e)(1) to embrace new drug development activities would ignore its language and
context with respect to the 1984 Act in an attempt to exonerate infringing uses only
potentially related to information for FDA approval." 544 The court did not expressly
preclude activities that "do not directly produce information for the FDA," stating
that "[t]he term 'reasonably' permits some activities that are not themselves the

539 Brief for Petitioner at 1, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct.
2921 (2006) (No. 04-607).
540 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000) states:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within
the United States or import into the United States a patented invention (other
than a new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are used
in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which
is primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA,
hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site specific genetic
manipulation techniques) solely for uses reasonably related to the development
and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.

Id.
,)4Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585.
542Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 866 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
5
Id. at 867.

5 Id.
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experiments that produce FDA information to qualify as 'solely for uses reasonably
related' to clinical tests for the FDA." 545 However, expansion of safe harbor under
§ 271(e)(1) to "reach any exploratory research that may rationally form a predicate
for future FDA clinical tests," 546 according to the court, "would swallow the whole
benefit of the Patent Act for some categories of biotechnological inventions," 547 such
as "biotechnology tool patents." 548 In a footnote, Judge Rader, for the court,
categorically dismissed interjection by Judge Newman in her dissent of any relevance
of the common law experimental use doctrine to § 271(e)(1):
In her dissent, Judge Newman takes this opportunity to restate her
dissatisfaction with this court's decision in Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d
1351, 64 USPQ2d 1737 (Fed. Cir. 2002). However, the common law
experimental use exception is not before the court in the instant case.
...Judge Newman's dissent, however, does not mention that the Patent Act
does not include the word "experimental," let alone an experimental use
54 9
exemption from infringement. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
For her part, Judge Newman characterized the majority decision as holding that
"there is no right to conduct such ["discovery-based"] research, under either the
common law research exemption or the statutory immunity established in 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1)."550 According to Judge Newman, "today the court disapproves and
essentially eliminates the common law research exemption," and she dissented from
that portion of the majority decision. 551 As stated by Judge Newman:
The purpose of a patent system is not only to provide a financial
incentive to create new knowledge and bring it to public benefit through
new products; it also serves to add to the body of published
scientific/technologic knowledge.
The requirement of disclosure of the
details of patented inventions facilitates further knowledge and
understanding of what was done by the patentee, and may lead to further
technologic advance.
The right to conduct research to achieve such
552
knowledge need not, and should not, await expiration of the patent.
Therefore, "disclosure of the details of patented inventions" has, as its purpose, at
least in part, public benefit by facilitating "further technologic advance" through
research:

51
516

Id. at 866.
Id. at 867 ("The safe harbor does not reach any exploratory research that may rationally

form a predicate for future FDA clinical tests.").
7 Id. ("Thus, exaggerating § 271(e)(1) out of context would swallow the whole benefit of the
Patent Act for some categories of biotechnological inventions.").
548Id. ("For example, expansion of § 271(e)(1) to include the Scripps-Merck activities would
effectively vitiate the exclusive rights of patentees owning biotechnology tool patents.").
M9 Id. at 863 n.2.
55OId. at 873 (Newman, J., dissenting).
551 Id.
552 Id.
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The patent statute requires full disclosure of the invention, including
details of enabling experiments and technical drawings and best modes and
preferred embodiments, even commercial sources of special components.
Such details would be idle and purposeless if this information cannot be
used for 17-20 years. Indeed, there would be little value in the requirement
of the patent law that patented information must be removed from secrecy
in consideration of the patent right to exclude, if the information is then
placed on ice and protected from further study and research
5 53
investigation.
Judge Newman's view of the common law exemption to infringement for
experimental use is consistent with its historical application, which limits exclusion
to the "threshold invention" made possible by "providing the initial knowledge,
without which there would be nothing to improve":
Of course, the common law exemption is not unlimited. Indeed, it is a
narrow exemption, for it must preserve the patentee's incentive to innovate,
an incentive secured only by the right to exclude. It is the patentee who
opened the door by providing the initial knowledge, without which there
would be nothing to improve .... It is the initial inventor whose rights
must receive primary consideration in an effective patent law, for the public
interest starts with the threshold invention. However, while that threshold
invention may (as here) exact tribute from or enjoin commercial and precommercial activity, the patent does not bar all research that precedes such
55 4
activity.
Contrary to previous suggestions in dicta of earlier cases, such as Roche, Embrex and
Madey, Judge Newman recognized that a "goal" or "purpose" of commercialization or
profit should not disqualify activities under experimental research doctrine:
The panel majority states that because the Scripps/Merck research had the
goal of curing cancer and commercializing the cure, this purpose moved the
research outside of any common law exemption. However, an ultimate goal
or hope of profit from successful research should not eliminate the
exemption. The better rule is to recognize the exemption for research
conducted in order to understand or improve upon or modify the patented
subject matter, whatever the ultimate goal. That is how the patent system
has always worked: the patent is infringed by and bars activity associated
with development and commercialization of infringing subject matter, but
the research itself is not prohibited, nor is comparison of the patented
subject matter with improved technology or with designs whose purpose is
555
to avoid the patent.

5

Id. at 875 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 876 (Newman, J., dissenting).

5 Id.
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For Judge Newman, interpretation of the common law exemption of infringement as
experimental use should at least dovetail, if not overlap, with that of 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1), and the price of failing to do so would be to create a "kind of limbo,
between exploratory research subject to exemption, and the FDA statutory
immunity, where the patent is infringed and the activity can be prohibited," and that
"the law does not favor such an illogical outcome. 5 5 6
On appeal, Justice Scalia, for a unanimous Supreme Court, vacated the CAFC
decision and remanded the case.557 The Court, like the CAFC, did not disagree with
the jury instruction at trial558 that, to qualify for the exemption under § 271(e)(1), the
defendant "must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would be
objectively reasonable for a party in [petitioner's] and Scripps' situation to believe
that there was a decent prospect that the accused activities would contribute,
relatively directly, to the generation of kinds of information that are likely to be
relevant in the processes in which the FDA would decide whether to approve the
product in question."55 9 The Court also did not disagree with the conclusion by the
CAFC that exemption under § 271(e)(1) "does not globally embrace all experimental
activity that at some point, however attenuated, may lead to an FDA approval
process." 560 With respect to the CAFC's position that, because "the FDA does not
require information about drugs other than the compound featured in [IND]
application ... Scripps' work sponsored by [petitioner] was not 'solely for uses
reasonably related to' clinical testing for FDA,"561 the Court held that, "not to protect
research conducted on patented compounds for which an IND is ultimately filed is
effectively to limit assurance of exemption to activities necessary to seek approval of
a generic drug,"5 62 contrary to the Court's interpretation of § 271(e)(1), whereby "all
uses of patented inventions that are reasonably related to the development and
submission of any information under the FDCA" are exempt.5 63 The Court did not
address experimental use as a doctrine when making the few statements limiting the
scope of § 271(e)(1):
Basic scientific research on a particular compound, performed without the
intent to develop a particular drug or a reasonable belief that the compound
will cause the sort of physiological effect the researcher intends to induce, is

Id. at 877 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 208 (2005).
558 Id. ("Thus, the evidence presented at trial has yet to be received under the standards set
forth in the jury instruction, which we believe to be consistent with, if less detailed than, the
construction of § 271(e)(1) that we adopt today.").
55

Id. at 200.
Id. at 205 (quoting Integra, 331 F.3d at 867) ("Second, the court concluded that the
exemption 'does not globally embrace all experimental activity that at some point, however
attempted, may lead to an FDA approval process.'... We do not quibble with the latter statement.").
5

560

561 Id.

562 Id. at 206.

563 Id. at 202 ("As an initial matter, we think it apparent from the statutory text that §
271(e)(1)'s exemption from infringement extends to all uses of patented inventions that are
reasonably related to the development and submission of any information under the FDCA.").
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surely not "reasonably related to the development and submission of
5 64
information" to the FDA.
Consequently, the Court also did not reach the question of biotechnology tool patents
which, according to Judge Rader, would be embraced by any broad interpretation of
the safe harbor provision, as discussed supra.
The opinion of the Supreme Court in Merck provides general guidance that, as
suggested by one commentator, could have "potentially vast" implications and "could
lead to chaotic results in the lower courts." 565 The same commentator suggests that
application of § 271(e)(1) by the lower courts in the context of other decisions, such as
the threshold requirement of providing laboratory data to establish conception of a
specific "practical utility," an interference practice, may severely limit availability of
the safe harbor provision under section § 271(e)(1), thereby potentially manifesting
the limbo forewarned by Judge Newman in her dissenting opinion. 566 The Supreme
Court does not provide any language that would exclude practice of patented subject
matter, the benefit of which is generation of data, from the safe harbor of § 271(e)(1).
Application of § 271(e)(1) within the guidelines provided by the Supreme Court
in Merck could be relatively straightforward if done in consideration of an historic
interpretation of common law experimental use doctrine. The decision in Roche,
which, by all accounts, prompted, at least in part, enactment of the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, held that "limited use of a
patented drug for testing and investigation strictly related to FDA drug approval
requirements during the last 6 months of the term of the patent constitute[s] a use
which, unless licensed ...[is] actionable." 567 The issue decided by Roche is closely
tracked by the safe harbor provision of § 271(e)(1), which states that "[i]t shall not be
an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States a
,

Id. at 205-06.

5, K. Burchfiel, Merck KGaA v.Integra:More Answers than Questions . 6 J. HIGH TECH. L.
79, 83-84 (2006).
If the subject matter limitations of the exception for uses of "patented
compounds" is expanded to include any "patented invention," at any stage of drug
development, the scope of the safe harbor becomes potentially vast.
If this principle is applied to inventions other than specific potential drug
candidate compounds such as those at issue in Merck, the Court's unrestricted
endorsement of a broad exemption could lead to chaotic results in the lower
courts.

Id.
566Id. at 89. Mr. Burchfiel states:

In the hands of the lower courts, the inquiry into whether a researcher has a
"reasonable basis" for believing that a patented compound may work "through a
particular biological process, to produce a particular physiological effect" may lead
to elaborate analysis invoking interference law concepts such as conception of a
specific "practical utility," as a prerequisite for the safe harbor exemption. In
general, the Federal Circuit has required laboratory data confirming an expected
and plausible but disputed utility, in the interference context.
Does this
requirement limit the availability of the safe harbor exemption, and if so, how will
Judge Newman's limbo be avoided?
Id. This author's response to Mr. Burchfiel's question, employing a benefit analysis, appears in the
Appendix to this article.
5 7 Roche v. Bolar, 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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patented invention ... solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates manufacture, use, or
sale of drugs . . . ."56 As discussed above, experimental use doctrine has never been
applied to exempt activities conducted in preparation for sale of protected subject
matter, including testing to ensure compliance with production standards, or even
demonstrations of suitability of claimed subject matter for a prospective customer.
These activities, which arguably embrace Government submission requirements
under the FDA, were properly held by the court in Roche to be infringing activities,
and outside the scope of exemption under the experimental use doctrine.
Intervention by Congress under the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984 and, specifically, provision of § 271(e)(1), was required to
exempt activities "reasonably related" to Government submission requirements from
infringement. In essence, § 271(e)(1) of Title 35 was born out of the shortfall
recognized by the courts of the exemption to infringement provided by the doctrine of
experimental use. The "intervening kind of limbo, between exploratory research
subject to exemption, and the FDA statutory immunity, where the patent is infringed
and the activity can be prohibited," referred to by Judge Newman in her dissenting
opinion to Integra,569 should not exist under any interpretation of the experimental
use doctrine or § 271(e)(1) because, properly interpreted, § 271(e)(1) was enacted
specifically to fill the gap between permissible experimental use and
commercialization that, in the absence of § 271(e)(1), would, effectively, extend
patent term. As stated by Judge Rader in Integra:
The second reason for the 1984 Act responded to this court's decision in
Roche Products,Inc. v. Bolar PharmaceuticalCo., 733 F.2d 858, 221 USPQ
937 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Specifically, the Act sought to ensure that a patentees
rights did not de facto extend past the expiration of the patent term because
a generic competitor also could not enter the market without regulatory
approval.570
Contrary to statements made by the court in Roche, Embrex, Madey and Merck,
successful application of the experimental use doctrine has never been dependent on
any commercial purpose of those activities. Rather, as has been discussed, the
doctrine has always hinged on whether the benefit of claimed subject matter, beyond
571
discovery of its operation, has been obtained by its manufacture, use or even sale.
Like routine testing to control quality, preparation of submissions mandated by the
government as a prerequisite to sale of patented subject matter provides a benefit of
that patented subject matter beyond discovery of its operation and, therefore, is not,
and historically has not, been exempt from infringement under the doctrine of
experimental use.
,68 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 § 202, 98 Stat. 1585 (as
amended 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000)).
569 Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 877 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
570 Id. at 865.
571 See, e.g., Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391) (finding that the
sale of a patented item in foreclosure was not an infringing deprivation of a patent owner's lawful
reward for his discovery).
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Consistent application of experimental use doctrine potentially reduces the
prospect of an "intervening limbo" between experimental use doctrine and § 271(e)(1)
envisioned by Judge Newman. 572 In particular, the issue of biotechnology tools posed
by Judge Rader in the majority decision of Integra,573 and left open by the Supreme
Court in Merck,57 4 is easily resolved, both with respect to patented tools that have as
their only use generation of data in compliance with Federal regulations and, more
interestingly, chemical compounds that, depending upon their use, can be candidates
for regulatory approval or research tools. By avoiding the gross parameter of
"commercial purpose," and instead focusing on the benefits of claimed subject matter
exclusive of discovery of its operation, the scope of exemption under § 271(e)(1)
becomes straightforward. A research tool, by definition, provides information about a
workpiece and, therefore, the data generated isthe benefit provided by the research
tool. Garnering the benefit of patented subject matter causes the activity to be
infringing and, consequently, outside the scope of experimental use doctrine.
Moreover, despite the broad language of the statute, § 271(e)(1) does not apply to a
research tool, not because its use is not "reasonably related to the development and
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture,
use, or sale of drugs," but because it is not the "patented invention" 57 5 that is the
subject of regulatory approval, 576 and, therefore, does not pose the threat of extended
patent term that was the impetus for exemption under the statute.

572 Integra,331
573

F.3d at 877 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 867. Judge Rader posed the issue with respect to research tool patents as follows:
For example, expansion of § 271(e)(1) to include the Scripps-Merck activities
would effectively vitiate the exclusive rights of patentees owning biotechnology
tool patents. After all, patented tools often facilitate general research to identify
candidate drugs, as well as downstream safety-related experiments on those new
drugs. Because the downstream clinical testing for FDA approval falls within the
safe harbor, these patented tools would only supply some commercial benefit to
the inventor when applied to general research. Thus, exaggerating § 271(e)(1) out
of context would swallow the whole benefit of the Patent Act for some categories of
biotechnological inventions.

Id.
5 71

Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 205 n.7 (2005). Justice Scalia

stated:
The Court of Appeals also suggested that a limited construction of §
271(e)(1) is necessary to avoid depriving so-called "research tools" of the complete
value of their patents. Respondents have never argued the RGD peptides were
used at Scripps as research tools, and it is apparent from the record they were
not. We therefore need not - and do not - express a view about whether, or to
what extent, § 271(e)(1) exempts from infringement the use of "research tools" in
the development of information for the regulatory process.
Id. (citation omitted).
575 35

U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).

It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within
the United States or import into the United States a patented invention ... solely
for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information
under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use or sale of drugs ....

Id.
576 § 271(e)(1) extends to patented inventions that are not necessarily chemical compounds,
such as medical devices. See, e.g. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402, reh'g en bane
denied, 879 F.2d 849 (Fed. Cir. 1989), affd, 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
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Whether a compound, for example, is a "patented invention," under § 271(e)(1)
will depend upon whether data generated by its use is in contemplation of its
approval or that of another compound under Federal law. For example, with respect
to screening assays, thousands or millions of compounds may be assayed, and the
same compound alternatively may be employed to target a candidate or may be the
candidate compound targeted. Use of that compound may be either as a research
tool or as an object of research, and the nature of use, either as a research tool or an
object of research, will determine whether experimental use doctrine should be
applied. Regardless, as part of the search for candidate compounds, § 271(e)(1)
should not apply because, as stated by the Supreme Court, and recited above, "[biasic
scientific research on a particular compound, performed without the intent to develop
a particular drug or reasonable belief that the compound will cause the sort of
physiological effect the researcher intends to induce, is surely not 'reasonably related
57 7
to the development and submission of information' to the FDA."

IV. CONCLUSION
Both inherency and experimental use doctrines in patent law are based on an
equitable exchange between an inventor and public benefit. Just as a patentee is not
permitted to embrace within his limited period of exclusivity subject matter of which
the public has had the advantage, discovery of phenomena, including the manner in
which an inventor's patented contribution operates, has been reserved to the public,
so long as the inventor's right to exclusivity over the benefit provided by
manufacture, use, or sale of the invention is maintained.
The link between these doctrines is a common understanding that an inventor's
exclusive right is coterminous with the benefit of his invention, and that the
fundamental right of philosophical inquiry can only be limited to the extent that it
deprives the inventor of his exclusive right to that benefit. Issues raised in SmithKline Beecham, Metabolite, and Merck, although apparently disparate, can all be
substantially resolved by focusing on the scope of the bargain between the public and
the inventor. In Smith-Kline Beecham, for example, despite allegations of the
certainty of the presence of PHC hemihydrate prior to the critical date of Smith-Kline
Beecham's patent directed to that compound, the fact that its presence was so small
as to be undetectable and, therefore, by definition, failing to provide benefit to the
public, should disqualify it as prior art. Likewise, the theoretical presence of PHC
hemihydrate in compositions of PHC anhydride prepared by Apotex, if undetectable,
should not be grounds for a holding of infringement of a claim to the hemihydrate
since, arguably, an undetectable presence, by definition, cannot provide a public
benefit.
Metabolite presents another example where novelty can properly be found in
view of prior art that did not provide the benefit of the claimed invention. In
Metabolite, the inventors' discovery of a correlation between elevated levels of total
homocysteine and deficiencies in cobalamin or folate provided a benefit, captured as a
method for detecting deficiency of cobalamin or folate in a warm-blooded animal.
Despite the presence in the prior art of the assay employed by the claimed method,
577Merck, 545 U.S. at 205-06 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)).
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the public, without the discovery of the correlation provided by inventors, would be
without a method to detect the deficiency. The claimed method, in effect, is a
limitation of a known assay to a population of warm-blooded animals suspected of, or
to be screened for, a deficiency in cobalamin or folate, and targeted application of the
method to that limited population is the only embodiment of the use of the known
assay that would infringe the claim. Once again, the inventor's exclusive right is
limited by the benefit provided to the public.
In Merck, the statutory provision of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), which was enacted to
prevent effective extension of patent term as a consequence of Federal regulatory
requirements prior to commercialization, has been given potentially vast scope by the
Supreme Court. Recognition of the scope of the well-established doctrine of
experimental use as historically applied would facilitate application of the guidelines
enunciated by the Court in Merck. Specifically, by disregarding commercial purpose
in favor of philosophical inquiry as the lynchpin for exemption from infringement
under the experimental use doctrine, and by applying § 271(e)(1) with a view to
experimental use doctrine, courts can provide for essentially all Federally mandated
submissions without creating Judge Newman's limbo and without abrogating the
exclusionary rights of the holders of research tool patents.
Like SmithKline Beecham and Metabolite, the lower court under Merck could
find guidance in the fundamental premise articulated by Renouard and recited by
Phillips, that patent protection is commensurate with the contribution made to the
public domain by an inventor's irretrievable disclosure and consequent common
benefit. Further, the bargain granted by the public of patent protection stops short of
an exclusive right by the patentee over use of the invention to discover the natural
principles on which it is based, regardless of the ultimate purpose motivating the
philosophical inquiry into those principles, unless by doing so the inventor is
otherwise deprived of the benefit of the contribution he has made by his invention.

[6:373 2007]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

APPENDIX

The significance of benefit provided by a reference as an enabling description in
the public domain, and the distinction of that enabling reference from entitlement by
a patent applicant to a priority document having the same enabling description was
made apparent in Rasmusson v. Smith-Kline Beecham, Corp.578 The CAFC affirmed
a decision by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences of the United States
Patent and Trademark Office denying benefit of a priority date to patent applicant
Rasmusson in an interference proceeding on the basis that, as of the necessary filing
date:
[A] person of ordinary skill in the art would have had no basis.., for
believing that finasteride [the subject matter of the interference] could be
used to treat prostate cancer in light of the state of the art and in light of
Rasmusson's failure to provide any data to demonstrate the effects of
57 9
finasteride in treating prostate cancer.
As a prior art reference, however, a published European application corresponding to
and disclosing the same subject matter as the priority document was found to be
sufficiently enabling to constitute a prior art reference with respect to the patent
application of the other party to the interference, Smith-Kline Beecham, Corp.
The distinction between an inability to claim priority to the document while that
same document can successfully be used as a prior art reference, derives from
conflation of the enablement requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 112 paragraph 1, with
that of utility under 35 U.S.C. § 101:
In explaining what constitutes a sufficient showing of utility in the context
of the enablement requirement, this court has stated that an applicant's
failure to disclose how to use an invention may support a rejection under
either § 112, paragraph 1 for lack of enablement or "§ 101 for lack of utility
'when there is a complete absence of data supporting the statements which
'580
set forth the desired results of the claimed invention."'
Because Rasmusson had not provided any supporting data, the court affirmed
the Board's denial of entitlement to any filing date that preceded evidence that "a
person of ordinary skill in the art would have believed that the 5aR inhibition
[provided by finasteride] could play a role in treating prostate cancer .
"581 With
578 Rasmusson v. Smith-Khne Beecham, Corp., 413 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

579 -d. at 1322.
5S0 Id. at 1323 (quoting In re Cortright, 165 F.3d at 1356 and Environtech Corp. v. Al George,
Inc., 730 F.2d 753, 762 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
581Id. at 1324. The court stated:
In order to obtain a priority date earlier than June 27, 1990, Rasmusson needed to
provide experimental proof that his invention could be effective in treating cancer.
Because Rasmusson failed to do so and obtained a priority date only as of the
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respect to the same published document constituting an effective prior art reference,
despite an inability to rely on that document in a priority contest, the court stated
"[tihe reason is that § 112 'provides that the specification must enable one skilled in
the art to 'use' the invention whereas [section] 102 makes no such requirement as to
58 2
an anticipatory disclosure.'
The court, however, also stated that an anticipating prior art reference must be
enabling:
A patent claim "cannot be anticipated by a prior art reference if the
allegedly anticipatory disclosures cited as prior art are not enabled." ...
The standard for what constitutes proper enablement of a prior art
reference for purposes of anticipation under § 102, however, differs from the
enablement standard under § 112.583
The distinction, according to the court in Rasmusson, is a statutory requirement of
utility in patent applications that is lacking as a threshold requirement for an
5
anticipating reference. 84
The court agreed with Rasmusson, that "proof of efficacy is not required in order
for a reference to be enabled for purposes of anticipation." 58 5 In essence, therefore,
the court imposed on Rasmusson a requirement of "proof of efficacy" in the priority
document asserted to establish a filing date prior to that of Smith-Kline. 58 6 The same
document, however, in the form of a published European application, did not require
any such proof, but rather only that the teachings be enabling, in order to anticipate
58 7
the claimed subject matter of Smith-Kline's later filed application.
The utility requirement imposed by the court in Rasmusson, which extends
beyond enablement, at least as enablement is applied as a requirement of
anticipatory references, arguably extends beyond disclosure necessary to form part of
the public domain. In fact, the Supreme Court decision in Brenner v. Manson,588 was
heavily criticized on this point by Judges Rich and Smith in extensive dissents to two
subsequent decisions by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, namely, In re
filing date of his '296 application, the Board was correct to find that all

applications prior to that application were not enabled.
Id.

Id. at 1325 (quoting In re Hafner, 410 F.2d 1403, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1969)).
Id. (quoting Elan Pharm., Inc., v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. Research, 346 F.3d 1051,
1054 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
581 Id. ("Since In ro Hafner,this court has continued to recognize that a prior art reference need
not demonstrate utility in order to serve as an anticipating reference under § 102.").
585 Id. at 1326. As stated by the court:
Rasmusson... asserts that the case [Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. BenVenue
Labs., Inc. 246 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001)] stands for the broader proposition that
proof of efficacy is not required in order for a reference to be enabled for purposes
of anticipation.
We agree with Rasmusson.
Id.
582
583

586 Id.
587 Id. The court did not hold that the published European application was enabling, instead it
remanded the case to the Board for a determination of whether the published European application
was "an enabling reference for purposes of anticipation." Id.
588 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
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Kir 58 9 and In re Joly.590 Judge Rich argued that statutory utility, even as applied
under a careful review of Brenner v. Manson, requires only that "some specific use be
mentioned (as Brenner said), at least in the absence of evidence that a specific use is
obvious." 591
Judge Rich further stated that use of certain terms, including
"practical," "substantial," "specific" and "currently available," to establish statutory
utility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, are "nothing but troublemakers as time will amply
demonstrate."' 592
Conflation of the threshold requirement for patentability of
statutory utility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 with enablement under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
paragraph 1, in combination with application of a standard of practical, substantial,
specific, and currently available use, imposes an obligation on patent applicants,
whereby enabling contributions are made to the public domain sufficient to operate
as anticipatory references under 35 U.S.C. § 102, without providing, in exchange,
benefit of limited exclusive rights to these contributions as patentees.
The application by the court of a "practical utility" requirement in Rasmusson,
therefore, deprives would-be patentees of exclusive rights in a manner that is
inconsistent with improvements they contribute to the public domain. As discussed
in Section III. C. above, Burchfiel suggests that this interpretation of utility may
contribute to the gap between experimental use doctrine and safe harbor under 35
U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) first identified by Judge Newman in her dissent in Integra
LifeSciences ILtd. v. Merck KGaA. 593 Partition of statutory utility under 35 U.S.C. §
101 from 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1, by recognizing the threshold for utility as
understood by Judge Rich, would permit the enablement requirement to be applied
with parity between establishment of priority dates and of sufficiency of prior art
references. As such, availability of the safe harbor exception would not be hobbled by
the possibility of linking a 'reasonable basis' for believing that a patented compound
may work through a particular biological process, to produce a particular
' 594
physiological effect," with an inordinate standard for "practical utility."

5S 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
590 376 F.2d 906 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
F91In re Kirk 376 F.2d at 955 (Rich, J., dissenting).
92 Id. at 960 (Rich, J., dissenting). Judge Rich stated that "we come to the practical problem
posed by the rule being promulgated by the majority - a rule of great vagueness and no definite
limits by reason of reliance on the terms 'practical,' 'substantial,' 'specific' and 'currently available.'
They are nothing but trouble-makers, as time will amply demonstrate." Id.
593 Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 877 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
F)91Burchfiel, supra note 565, at 89.

